Imperial Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. v. Michael Kelsch, personal representative to the estate of LaRue Griffin, deceased; Ruth Williamson; John Does 1 through 10 : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Imperial Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. v. Michael
Kelsch, personal representative to the estate of
LaRue Griffin, deceased; Ruth Williamson; John
Does 1 through 10 : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Chris D. Greenwood; James K. Haslam; Greenwood & Black; Attorney for Appellant.
James R. Boud; Ashton, Bruanberger & Boud, P.C.; Attorney for Appellees.
CHRIS D GREENWOOD JAMES K. HASLAM Greenwood & Black 1840 North State Street,
Suite 200 Provo, Utah 84604 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
JAMES R. BOUD Ashton, Braunberger & Boud, P.C. 302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 Murray, Utah
84107 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Imperial Mobile Home Park v. Kelsch, No. 970591 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1133
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the Estate of 
LaRue Griffin, Deceased; 
RUTH WILLIAMSON; and JOHN 
DOES I through 10, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
Case No. 970591-CA 
Priority No. 15 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRH3F 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. <r?otf/ - 6/9-
[CAPTION CONTINUED ON INSIDE FRONT COVER] 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK 
DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIMS, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND 
JAMES R. BOUD 
Ashton, Braunberger & Boud, P.C. 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CHRIS D GREENWOOD 
JAMES K. HASLAM 
Greenwood & Black 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
r * 
FEB - 4 1398 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the Estate of 
LaRue Griffin, Deceased; RUTH 
WILLIAMSON; and JOHN DOES 
I through 10, 
Counterclaimants/Appellant 
vs. 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME 
PARK, L.C., PATTON KWAN and 
JANET KWAN, doing business as 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK; 
SCOTT A. MADSEN; RON CLARK; 
and DOES 1 through X, 
CounterDefendant and 
Appellee, and Third-Party 
Defendants. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the Estate of 
LaRue Griffin, Deceased; 
RUTH WILLIAMSON; and JOHN 
DOES I through 10, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
[CAPTION CONTINUED ON INSIDE FRONT COVER] 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK 
DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIMS, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND 
CHRIS D. GREENWOOD 
JAMES K. HASLAM 
Greenwood & Black 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES R. BOUD 
Ashton, Braunberger & Boud, P.C. 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Case No. 970591-CA 
Priority No. 15 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the Estate of 
LaRue Griffin, Deceased; RUTH 
WILLIAMSON; and JOHN DOES 
I through 10, 
Counterclaimants/Appellant 
vs. 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME 
PARK, L.C., PATTON KWAN and 
JANET KWAN, doing business as 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK; 
SCOTT A. MADSEN; RON CLARK; 
and DOES 1 through X, 
CounterDefendant and 
Appellee, and Third-Party 
Defendants. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
Nature of the Case: 5 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court: 5 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding the Estate Has No Lease Agreement 
With the Park Because Mr. Kelsch Is Not the One Actually Paying the Rent 
and Because No One Is Actually Residing in the Griffin Mobile Home. . 10 
A. The Griffin lease agreement was assigned to the Estate 11 
B. The Estate at least has a lease implied by law 12 
C. The Estate, by and through Mr. Kelsch, is a "resident" pursuant to the 
MHPRA 14 
II. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding the Park had the Express Authority 
and Discretion to Set and Enforce Its Minimum Size Requirements and that 
by So Doing, the Park Could Not Violate Any Provisions of the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act 14 
A. The interpretation and construction of section 57-16-4(7) in light of the 
MHPRA's comprehensive purposes and provisions 16 
B. Balancing section 57-16-4(7) and section 57-16-4(4) 20 
C. The Trial Court erred by concluding that, because the Park was simply 
exercising its statutory authority to establish size requirements, the Park's 
i 
amendment of the rules accomplishing this purpose was not 
unconscionable 27 
D. The Park is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim for 
declaratory relief nor on the Estate's claims that the relevant Park rules 
are invalid, void, and unenforceable 33 
III. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that the Park Could Not Breach the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Because the Park Was Simply 
Exercising Its Express Contractual Rights and Because It Was Reasonable, 
as a Matter of Law, for the Park to Unconditionally Refuse to Allow any 
Individual to Sublet, Lease, or Occupy the Griffin Mobile Home 33 
IV. The Trial Court Erred to the Extent It Concluded that the UCSPA Does Not 
Apply to the Leasing of Lot Spaces for Mobile Homes 38 
V. The Trial Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment on the Estate's 
Claim that the Park Has Intentionally Interfered with the Estate's 
Economic Relations 43 
VI. The Trial Court Erred to the Extent It Required the Estate to Produce 
Sufficient Actual Evidence to Support Its Claims When the Park Produced 
No Actual Evidence to Refute Those Claims, But Merely Argued that the 
Estate's Legal Theories for Relief Were Not Recognizable or Applicable. 45 
VII. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Concluding that the Estate 
Failed to Mitigate Its Damages and that It Is Therefore Barred From 
Recovering Any Damages from the Park. 49 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 50 
ADDENDA 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Olwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982) 48 
Carliev. Morgan. 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996) 38 
Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990) 39 
CTG Exploration. Tnc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 897 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1995) 39 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) 17, 21 
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter. Inc.. 930 P.2d 268 (Utah App. 1996) . . . 13 
Cook v.Zions First Nat'l Bank. 919 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 1996) 34-37 
Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area. 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995) 47 
Durham y, Duchesne County, 893 P.2d 581 (Utah 1995) 2,3,16 
Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984) 48 
Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am.. 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996) 9 
Iadanzav. Mather. 820 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Utah 1993) 40 
John Call Eng.. Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990) 50 
Johnson v. Carman. 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) 31 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) 44, 45 
Morris v. Sykes. 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981) 31 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984) 
10,48 
Olvmpus Hills Center. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Tnc. 889 P.2d 445 (Utah 
App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) 34, 35 
Parrish v. Layton City Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) 48 
iii 
Pratt v. Board of Educ . 564P.2d294 (Utah 1977) 49 
Prince v-Elm Ivn, Co., 649 P.2d 820 (Utah 1982) 35 
Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994) 34, 37 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co.. 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) 
29,31 
Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991) 39 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 44 
State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2, 4, 16 
State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992) 3 
Travelers Ins Co. v. Kearl. 896 P.2d 644 (Utah App. 1995) 1,9 
Wadev. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) 38, 40, 43 
White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994) 1-4, 9 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 30 
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 177, § 1 19 
1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 178. §1-12 16 
42 United States Code § 5402(6) (1980) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2 (1997) 39, 40 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-3(2) (1997) 40 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-3(6) (1997) 40 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(1) (1997) 38, 39, 45 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2) (1997) 3 
iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-20-1(1) (1981) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1996) 17, 18, 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-3(3) (1996) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(4) (1996) 4, 21-25, 27, 45 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) (1996) 4, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 33, 42 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(1) (1996) 15, 21, 27-30, 45 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(l)(c) (1997) 29 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(t) (1997) 40 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-5 (1996) 20 
COURT RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 9 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) 48 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 112 (1995) 13 
Audio Tape Recordings of Utah Senate, March 5, 1981 (discussing S.B. No. 209 and S.B. 
No. 237) 18 
B.Y.U. Leg. Studs., 2 Summary of Utah Real Property Law § 13.4 (1978) 13 
Black's Law Dictionary 973 (abr. 6th ed. 1991) 19,40 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1037 (1990) 24 
v 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case, this Court has original 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ANP STANPARPS OF REVTEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by declaring that the mobile home park has the legal 
right to require any mobile home that is not at least 12 feet in width and 65 feet in length be 
removed from the park upon sale. (R. 493). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. White v. 
Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court accords no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal 
conclusions based on those facts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl 896 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah App. 
1995). In addition, the appellate court will view the properly submitted evidence, and the facts 
and inferences thereby supported, in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. Id. at 647. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Estate of LaRue Griffin, by and 
through Mr. Kelsch, could not be the successor of Mrs. Griffin's interest under her written lease 
agreement with the Park. (R. 498). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as 
a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Deseelhorst, 879 
P.2datl374. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Estate, by and through Mr. 
Kelsch, had no implied lease agreement with the mobile home park because Mr. Kelsch has paid 
the rent for the mobile home lot through an independent third party rather than out of personal or 
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estate funds, and because no one is actually occupying the Griffin mobile home. (R. 497). 
STANDARD: This issue presents a question of law, reviewed by the appellate court for 
correctness. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
4. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Park summary judgment on Appellant's 
claim for violations of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act ("MHPRA"), holding that the 
Legislature has authorized mobile home parks to establish minimum size specifications for mobile 
homes; accordingly there can be no violation of the MHPRA, as a matter of law, resulting from a 
mobile home park's doing just that. (R. 494). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. 
Deseelhorst 879 P.2d at 1374. Moreover, this issue depends on the construction of provisions of 
the MHPRA, presenting a question of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. See 
Durham v. Duchesne County. 893 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995). 
5. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Park's minimum size 
requirements are inherently reasonable as a matter of law and ,therefore, the park rule regarding 
size specifications does not prevent or unreasonably limit the sale of a park resident's mobile 
home. (R. 490). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, 
this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d at 1374; see 
also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
6. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Park's rule change establishing 
minimum size requirements is not unconscionable. (R. 492). STANDARD: This issue presents a 
question of law, reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. See Pena. at 935-36. 
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7. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Park summary judgment on Appellant's 
claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, concluding that, as a matter of law, 
there can be no violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the mobile home 
park was simply exercising express contractual rights left to its sole discretion. (R. 488). 
STANDARD: This issue presents a question of law, dependent on the interpretation of binding 
case law, which issue the appellate court reviews for correctness. State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 
517, 518 (Utah App. 1992). 
8. Whether the trial court erred by finding, either as a matter of undisputed fact or law, 
that it was reasonable for the mobile home park to absolutely refuse to allow any individual to 
sublet, lease, or occupy the Griffin mobile home on park premises even though the Park has 
allowed other tenants to do so. (R. 495). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. 
Deseelhorst 879 P.2d at 1374. 
9. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Park summary judgment on Appellant's 
claims for violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA"), holding that the 
UCSPA does not apply to the leasing of lot spaces for mobile homes. (R. 478). STANDARD: 
Inasmuch as this issue depends on the construction of provisions of the UCSPA, it presents a 
question of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. £ke Durham, 893 P.2d at 584. 
10. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Park has committed no 
unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction within the meaning of 
the UCSPA. (R. 477). STANDARD: This issue presents a question of law, which the appellate 
court reviews for correctness. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2); Durham, 893 P.2d at 584. 
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11. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Park summary judgment on Appellant's 
claim for intentional interference with economic relations because the Park had no duty of non-
interference. (R. 484). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Deseelhorgt, 879 P.2d at 1374. 
12. Whether the trial court erred, by plain error or otherwise, in requiring the non-
moving party in a motion for summary judgment to produce actual evidence to support all the 
elements of its claims when the moving party produced no evidence to controvert those claims 
and simply argued that the non-moving party's legal theories for recovery were inapplicable as a 
matter of law to this case. (R. 499). STANDARD: Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as 
a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Id. 
13. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that Appellant has failed to reasonably 
mitigate his damages and that, as a matter of law, any claim for damages by Appellant is 
completely barred by a failure to reasonably mitigate damages. (R. 495). STANDARD: Inasmuch 
as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court 
for correctness. Id. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
The following statutes are central to this appeal and their entire text is set forth verbatim in 
the addendum at Exhibit "I" (the MHPRA) and Exhibit "J" (the UCSPA), respectively. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-3(2), -3(5), -3(6), -5(1), -5(2) (1996). 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-2, -3(3), -3(8), -4(4), -4(7), -5(5), -7 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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I. Nature of the Case: This case on appeal involves the exercise of rights and 
obligations between a mobile home park, as landlord, and a resident mobile home owner, as 
tenant. It further involves the questionable conduct and methods of a mobile home park in 
exercising its rights to the detriment of the home owner and seeking to constructively evict the 
tenant by, among other claims, unreasonably limiting the sale of the tenant's mobile home and 
preventing the estate of a deceased tenant from residing in the mobile home. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court: Imperial Mobile Home 
Park ("Park") filed a complaint against Michael Kelsch, personal representative of the estate of 
LaRue Griffin ("Estate"), and Ruth Williamson, seeking declaratory judgment in the District 
Court that the MHPRA authorizes a mobile home park owner to require the removal of a mobile 
home from the park upon sale where the mobile home is less than 65 feet in length, as established 
by a newly adopted park rule. (R. 1-4). The Park later amended its complaint, claiming the 
Estate's and Williamson's mobile homes were not exempted from the minimum size 
specifications established by the Park, even though, the Park acknowledged that other undersized 
mobile homes were excluded from the size rule. (R. 49-50). 
The Estate and Williamson filed an answer to the amended complaint and asserted 
counter-claims and third-party claims against the Park, its owners and managers, for breach of 
contract; violation of the MHPRA; breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
intentional interference with economic relations; violations of the Utah Fair Housing Act, the 
Federal Fair Housing Act, and the UCPSA; punitive damages; and injunctive relief (R. 78). The 
Park, its owners, and managers, filed a reply and answer to the counterclaims and third party 
complaint. Prior to trial, the Park filed a motion for summary judgment and a supporting 
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memorandum on all issues. (R 158,293). The Estate and Williamson opposed the motion with 
memoranda, affidavits and deposition excerpts. (R 506). At the close of oral arguments, the 
Court granted the Park's motion for summary judgment. (R 758). The Court, on motion of the 
Park, subsequently entered Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and the Judgment. (R.676-
678); copies of which are attached as Exhibits "D" and "E" of the Addendum. The Estate now 
appeals from the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and the Judgment granting the park's 
declaratory relief and dismissing some of the Estate's counterclaims. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
LaRue Griffin, entered into a written lease agreement with the Park in February 1972. (R. 
248); a copy of which is attached at Exhibit "C" in the Addendum. In May 1996, LaRue Griffin 
died and Michael Kelsch was appointed personal representative of her estate. (R. 227). Mr. 
Kelsch subsequently received a letter from the Park dated June 10, 1996, requesting payment of 
rent and requiring removed of the mobile home when sold (R 215-216), a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "A" of the Addendum. From Mrs. Griffin's death up to the present, Mr. 
Kelsch has been causing the rent to be paid to the Park for the mobile home lot (R. 311), but has 
not been allowed to have a caretaker or subtenant live in the mobile home (R. 310, 697-99) 
despite the park manager's acknowledgment that an unoccupied mobile home poses a safety 
hazard (R.379) and that the Park has permitted other renters to have "housesitters" as an 
accommodation. (R. 376-377). The Park has further indicated that the Park will not allow a 
subtenant because the mobile home is undersized and must be moved out on sale. (R. 243-45). 
The mobile home is 13'10" m width and 63'4" in length. (R. 244, 546). 
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The Park has represented that the only reason Mrs. Griffin's mobile home must be 
removed upon sale has "nothing to do with its condition" (R. 379), but is because the home does 
not meet the minimum size specifications as set forth in the amended 1994 park rules. (R. 378), a 
copy of which Rules are attached as Exhibit "B" of the Addendum. Prior to 1994, no park rule 
existed setting forth any minimum size requirement. (R. 245). When the new rules were 
promulgated, the Park was aware that some lots were too small to fit a mobile home meeting the 
minimum sizes. (R. 243). In addition, the Park has made exceptions to the size rule after its 
implementation, allowing the park owner to sell an undersized mobile home and allow it to 
remain in the Park upon sale (R. 386, 242). The Park has also failed to measure each and every 
mobile home being sold, thus "mistakenly" allowing at least one undersized mobile home to 
remain in the park upon sale. (R. 239-243). 
Mr. Kelsch has received an appraisal valuing the Griffin mobile home at $15,450 (R. 313), 
and he has received offers to purchase the home for $15,000 to $16,000 (R. 311). The only offer 
he has received from someone who would move the home from the Park was for $8,000 (R. 222-
23). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was improvidently granted by the trial court in this case. When this 
Court views the facts and inferences in favor of the Estate, and construes and interprets the 
relevant statutory provisions and applicable case law, it will become clear that the Park is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its action for declaratory relief or on the Estate's claims 
raised for violations of the MHPRA, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
violations of the UCSPA, and intentional interference with economic relations. 
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The Estate is entitled to raise claims as a lessee and a resident of the Park. The evidence 
before the trial court supports a finding that the Estate was the successor in interest to Mrs. 
Griffin's written lease agreement with the Park. In any event because the mobile home is 
occupying lot #119 within the Park and rent is being paid to the Park, a lease should at least be 
implied by law. Moreover, the Estate qualifies as a resident of the Park under the MHPRA. 
Sections 57-16-4(4), -4(7), and -7(1) of the Utah Code are not clear and unambiguous, but 
capable of more than one interpretation. Moreover, there is some uncertainty as to how these 
provisions should be construed together. In refering to minimum size specifications in the 
MHPRA, it seems likely that the legislature intended to adopt some uniform size specifications 
for mobile homes. Even if parks have some discretion to set and enforce size specifications, that 
statutory discretion is not absolute and unfettered. With every right the MHPRA gives to a 
i 
mobile home park, it imposes a corresponding obligation on the park to protect its tenants. When 
properly considering the economic conditions, it becomes clear that the evidence supports a 
finding that the Park's rule in this case unreasonably limits the sale of the Griffin mobile home. In 
addition, the Park's rule change adopting the size requirements is both procedurally and 
substantively unconsionable, as defined by relevant case law. 
Furthermore, even though the Park has the contractual right to withhold approval for a 
subtenant or housesitter to reside in the Griffin mobile home, it may not unreasonably or in bad 
faith withhold that approval. Accordingly, the evidence on the record could support a finding that 
the Park has unreasonably refused to permit anyone to reside in the mobile home, in violation of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Moreover, when considered in light of other facts, it 
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would appear that the Park is trying to constructively evict the mobile home, also a breach of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
In addition, according to the plain language of the UCSPA, the leasing of lot spaces for 
mobile homes to mobile home owners is a consumer transaction, and the Park is accountable for 
unconscionable acts or practices committed in connection with that consumer transaction. Also, 
the Park has interfered with potential sales of the mobile home, unconditionally refusing to 
approve any purchaser who wants to remain in the Park. Because the Park has violated 
provisions of the MHPRA and the UCSPA in so interfering, the Park can be found liable for 
intentional interference with economic relations. 
Finally, the trial court erred by requiring the Estate to produce sufficient actual evidence to 
support its claims when the Park produced no evidentiary challenge to the claims preserved on 
appeal, but instead argued that the Estate's legal theories must fail as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entided to judgment as a matter of law." Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am.. 
923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added); se^alSQ Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Inasmuch 
as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the trial court's ruling is reviewed for 
correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the 
appellate court accords no deference to the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in 
dispute, nor the court's legal conclusions based on those facts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. KearL 
896 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah App. 1995). Finally, all 
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[d]oubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Litigants must 
be able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered 
against them unless it is obvious . . . that the party opposing judgment can 
establish no right to recovery. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
The trial court's ruling in the present case contains several "findings" which are either 
not supported by any evidence in the record, are genuinely disputed, are not being viewed in 
favor of the Estate, or are not relevant and do not support a judgment in favor of the Park. 
Moreover, proper resolution of just the legal issues raised in this case, without even addressing 
the factual disputes, would not entitle the Park to judgment as a matter of law on the Park's 
declaratory action and on the Estate's claims for violations of the MHPRA, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the UCSPA, and intentional interference 
with economic relations. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and set aside 
the summary judgment with respect to these claims. 
I. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding the Estate Has No Lease Agreement With the 
Park Because Mr. Kelsch Is Not the One Actually Paying the Rent and Because No One Is 
Actually Residing in the Griffin Mobile Home. 
Several of the Estate's claims depend upon whether it, or Mr. Kelsch, as its personal 
representative, qualifies as a "resident" of the Park for purposes of the MHPRA, and whether it is 
able to enforce the provisions of LaRue Griffin's lease with the Park. If the trial court had 
properly interpreted and applied the applicable law—and not weighed the evidence but rather 
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viewed it in a light most favorable to the Estate-it should have concluded that Mr. Kelsch or the 
Estate was, and still is, a resident of the Park and a successor under Mrs. Griffin's lease. 
While the trial court made no express ruling on this issue-neither at the hearing or in the 
written findings and conclusions-it did make findings: (1) that Mr. Kelsch does have certain 
rights under the Park's June 10, 1996 letter; but also (2) that Mr. Kelsch has never himself paid 
any rent to the Park; (3) that the rent has been paid by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (LDS church); (4) that neither Mr. Kelsch or the Estate have no obligation to repay the 
LDS Church; (5) that Mr. Kelsch has never physically possessed or inhabited the Griffm mobile 
home; and (6) that the mobile home has remained vacant since Mrs. Griffin's death.1 
Moreover, the trial court expressly adopted all of the Park's reasoning as presented in its 
memoranda to the Court. Certainly, the Park has repeatedly asserted the position that neither Mr. 
Kelsch nor the Estate has an actual lease agreement with the Park and that neither can be 
considered a resident of the Park. Nevertheless, any such conclusion is in error, and the Park is 
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this point. 
A. The Griffin lease agreement was assigned to the Estate. 
It is undisputed that Mrs. Griffm had a valid, written lease agreement with the Park, a copy 
is attached as Exhibit "C" of the Addendum. Logically, when she died, either that lease was 
terminated, or else the lease was transferred to her estate. A review of the evidence before the 
trial court supports a finding that the lease was assigned to the Estate and not terminated.2 
1
 The trial court may have correctly concluded that these last five facts are not disputed, 
but the Estate does dispute the relevance or legal effect of those facts. 
2
 In fact, even the Park's legal counsel admitted at the summary judgment hearing: "I think 
I would have to concede the point that the June 10th letter does create some sort of lease with 
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First and foremost, it is undisputed the mobile home was allowed to remain on lot #119 in 
the Park and that the Park continued to accept monthly rent for the lot space. Those facts alone 
would tend to support a finding that Mrs. Griffin's lease was not terminated. In addition, the Park 
never sent a notice of termination of the lease or an eviction notice to Mr. Kelsch, nor the Estate; 
instead, the Park sent the June 10th letter indicating the Park's position that the mobile home will 
"have to be removed by the buyer upon sale" and notifying him of the amount of rent due for June 
and mdicates that the $20.00 late charge will not be assessed, and that no "further action" will be 
taken, if the rent is paid in full by June 15. (Emphasis added.) 
The reasonable implications of the letter are that the Estate was being required to pay rent 
under the same terms and conditions that previously applied to Mrs. Griffin; that if the rent was 
timely paid, no action would be taken to evict the mobile home from the Park; and that the Estate 
was being considered bound by the same park rules (ie., those rules regarding size specifications) 
by which Mrs. Griffin had been bound under her lease agreement. 
Viewing these unrefuted facts and evidence in favor of the Estate, the conclusion must be 
reached that the Park did not terminate Mrs. Griffin's lease agreement. Either the Griffin lease 
agreement simply continued with her Estate, or else the letter constituted implicit written consent 
of a transfer of the Griffin lease agreement to her Estate.3 
IL The Estate at least has a lease implied by law. 
the personal representative. I think I have to concede that." (R. 813). 
3
 Paragraph 3 of the lease indicates that the "Resident shall not assign, transfer or sublet 
the site or any part thereof, or this Rental Agreement, without Landlord's prior written 
consent, " supporting the Park's implicit assignment of the lease to the Estate, or the Park's 
waiver of any right to withhold such approval. 
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In any event, by accepting rent and permitting the mobile home to remain in the park, the 
Park cannot legitimately assert that no lease agreement exists. As this Court recently recognized, 
M[w]here a party enters and occupies the land of another and pays rent under an invalid or 
unenforceable lease, a landlord-tenant relationship will be implied by law between the occupant 
and the owner of the land as a result of that occupancy and payment of rent." Consolidated Realty 
Group v. Sizzling Platter. Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting with approval 49 
Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 112 (1995)). In addition, it is axiomatic that "a person who 
possesses property and pays rents, though there is no written lease, will be estopped from 
asserting that there is no lease. Likewise, the landlord who accepts rents and allows the tenant to 
remam m possession will be estopped from claiming that there is no binding lease." B.Y.U. Leg. 
Studs., 2 Summary of Utah Real Property Law § 13.4 (1978). In accordance with these legal 
principles, either a lease implied by law, or a lease by estoppel, is created by (1) occupancy of the 
premises and (2) the payment of rent. 
Clearly, the Mobile Home Park is m the business of leasing lot spaces for mobile homes, 
and the Griffin mobile home is in fact occupying lot space #119 in the Park. It is also undisputed 
that the rent is being paid for the lot and is being accepted by the Park. More importantly, Mr. 
Kelsch's unrefuted testimony is that he has "caused" the rent to be paid, albeit out of fast offering 
funds of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS church"). (R. 311). In other 
words, the rent is being paid in that manner at the behest of Mr. Kelsch. These facts do not 
somehow convert the LDS church into the tenant in place of Mr. Kelsch or the Estate. The source 
of rent payment should be of no consequence if it is being paid at the insistence of, or on behalf 
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of, the actual tenant.4 Since both factors are met in this case, at least an implied lease 
arrangement should be presumed to exist between the parties. 
The facts and inferences drawn from the evidence supports a finding that Mrs. Griffin's 
lease agreement was allowed to continue with her Estate. In the alternative, a lease can and 
should be implied by law, and the Estate should be accorded the same rights of other Park tenants. 
Clearly, the Estate has certain rights and expectations under some agreement, which should have 
been fully considered and addressed before any judgment could be appropriately rendered. 
£L The Estate, by and through Mr. KelschT is a "resident" pursuant to the 
MHPRA, 
In addition to having a lease agreement, the Estate also qualifies as a "resident" of the Park 
for purposes of the MHPRA. Indeed, that Act imposes no requirement that the "resident" actually 
reside within the Park or live in the mobile home. A "resident" is simply defined as one "who 
leases or rents space in a mobile home park." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-3(3) (1996). 
As argued above, the facts and inferences can support a finding that the Estate, by and 
through Mr. Kelsch, is in fact leasing or renting space in the Park. Accordingly, the Estate 
qualifies as a resident in accordance with the express terms of the MHPRA, and is thus entitled to 
assert claims under the Act as a park resident. 
II. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding the Park had the Express Authority and 
Discretion to Set and Enforce Its Minimum Size Requirements and that by So Doing, the 
Park Could Not Violate Any Provisions of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
4
 Undoubtedly other tenants of the Park have received assistance from a church, or a 
friend, or a relative, in paying their rent obligations. The tenant obviously does not cease to 
be the tenant in such a situation. 
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The Estate has raised the claim that the Park's rule requiring the mobile home to leave the 
Park upon sale, under the circumstances of this case violates the MHPRA, namely section 57-16-
4(4) of the Utah Code, which provides in part that M[a]ny rule or condition of a lease purporting to 
prevent or unreasonably limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and 
unenforceable." The Estate also contends that the manner in which the Park's rule was adopted, 
combined with the unfairness of the rule itself, violates another provision of the MHPRA, which 
establishes that "[n]o change in rule that is unconscionable is valid." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-
7(1) (1996). Accordingly, the Estate contends that the Park's rule establishing a minimum size of 
12 feet by 65 feet, and requiring that any undersized homes be removed from the Park upon sale, 
should be held invalid, void, and unenforceable. 
The Park, on the other hand, maintains that the Utah Legislature has given mobile home 
parks the express authority and discretion to set and enforce minimum sizes within the Parks and 
to require that the now-undersized mobile homes be removed upon sale, in accordance with the 
provisions of section 57-16-4(7) of the Utah Code. The Park argues that because of this express 
grant of authority, the Park cannot, as a matter of law, violate other provisions of the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act by setting and enforcing size specifications. 
The argument does have some logical appeal, and the trial court apparently agreed with the 
Park, granting its request for declaratory relief and dismissing the Estate's claims under the Act. 
Nevertheless, the Estate asserts that any implied authority that the Park may have to 
establish and enforce minimum size requirements does not give a mobile home park absolute and 
unfettered discretion to set any size specifications, in any manner and by any means it chooses, 
and to enforce the size specifications in any way it chooses. The Estate asserts that the Park has 
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exceeded the permitted bounds of any authority and discretion that the Legislature may have 
granted it, and that the Park has violated express provisions of the MHPRA. 
These are issues of first impression in Utah, requiring this Court will decide what the 
Legislature intended in these various provisions of the Act, and how to construe them. The 
interpretation, construction, and applicability of a statute present questions of law for this Court 
alone to decide. Durham v. Duchesne County. 893 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995). Indeed, it is the 
role of "an appellate court to define what the law is, and [the appellate court will] never defer to 
any degree to a trial court on that count." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). 
A, The interpretation and construction of section 57-16-4(7^ in light of the MHPRA's 
comprehensive purposes and provisions. 
Section 57-16-4(7) of the Utah Code reads m full: 
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may require 
that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if: 
(a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size 
specifications; or 
(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair. 
This particular provision of the MHPRA, as well as the others relevant to the consideration of 
this case, were part of the original Act passed by the Legislature in March 1981. &££ 1981 Laws 
of Utah, Ch. 178, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "F" of the Addendum. 
While this provision clearly affords mobile home parks authority to upgrade and to require 
the removal of some mobile homes upon sale, nowhere in the Act, itself, does the Legislature 
express what the "minimum size specifications" are to be, or how and bv whom they are to be 
established. Accordmgly, some ambiguity, some uncertainty, is found in the statute. 
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In construing the MHPRA, this Court should apply the traditional rules of statutory 
construction. For example, 
the terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with their usual and accepted 
meanings. Another rule is that a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal 
fashion but as a comprehensive whole. Furthermore, "[i]f there is doubt or 
uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is 
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to 
harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose." In cases such 
as this, where a statement of the statute's purpose is codified in the statute, this 
method of construction is particularly appropriate. 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (footnotes omitted). Each of 
these rules of construction should prove helpful to the Court. 
In expressing the purposes of the MHPRA, the Legislature enacted section 57-16-2 of the 
Utah Code. In this provision, the Legislature recognized that park owners, in accordance with 
their fundamental property rights, should have "adequate remedies against those who abuse the 
terms of a tenancy." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1996). The Legislature further recognized that 
because of the high costs associated with relocating a mobile home, the owners of the mobile 
homes need "protection from actual or constructive eviction." IsL Accordingly, "[i]t is the 
purpose of this chapter to provide protection for both the owners of mobile homes located in 
mobile home parks and for the owners of mobile home parks." LL 
This balancing of rights between £M2 property owners has entailed unique policy 
considerations for the Legislature and likely represents the reason for enacting a statute that 
differs from others typically applicable to the traditional landlord/tenant relationship. 
In light of Legislature's expressed concern over the "high cost of moving mobile homes, 
the requirements of mobile home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of landscaping 
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and lot preparation," id, § 57-16-2, it seems logical that the Legislature intended to establish some 
objective minimum size specifications for mobile homes. Otherwise, a mobile home park could 
abuse the procedure by raising or lowering its minimum sizes to fit a particular situation, to make 
a particular lot space suddenly available to the Park because the owner wants to sell it. 
Indeed, the second basis established for authorizing the removal of a mobile home upon 
sale is that "the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair." Id, § 57-16-4(7)(b). This 
standard is clearly an objective one, one which could be enforced by either party in a court of law, 
and one which would not be left to the mobile home park's subjective determination.5 
Keeping this in mind, one possible interpretation of what was intended by the term 
"minimum size specifications" could be gleaned from a companion statute passed by the same 
Legislature, and m fact discussed and voted upon by the Utah Senate immediately preceding the 
Senate's discussion and vote upon the MHPRA. See Audio Tape Recordings of Utah Senate, 
March 5, 1981 (discussmg S.B. No. 209 and S.B. No. 237). 
The Legislature enacted a statute entitled "Manufactured Housing and Recreational 
Vehicles Standards," which was codified in the Utah Code at sections 41-20-1 et seq. This statute 
has been subsequently amended and dramatically changed. Even so, the statute, as it was passed 
contemporaneously with the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, applied to mobile homes and 
manufacture homes. 
Specifically, the Legislature adopted the standards published by the American National 
Standards Institute and the National Fire Protection Association for mobile homes built prior to 
5
 If this were not the case, a mobile home park could subjectively determine that a 
mobile home is in "rundown condition" merely because it is painted beige and thus require its 
removal. 
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June 15, 1976, and the standards adopted pursuant to the National Manufactured Housing 
Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 for mobile homes built after June 16, 1976. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-20-1(1) (1981); See^ko 1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 177, § 1. 
Perhaps most interestingly, the Legislature chose to define a "mobile home," in part, as "a 
structure built prior to June 15, 1976, transportable in one or more sections, which is eight body 
feet or more in width and 32 body feet or more in length." Utah Code Ann. 6 41-20-1 (2) (1981) 
(emphasis added); see also 1981 Laws of Utah, Ch. 177, § 1. Moreover, the federal act that 
applies to mobile homes (now also referred to as "manufactured homes"), and whose standards 
were adopted by the Utah Legislature for mobile homes built after June 16, 1976, defined 
"manufactured home," in part, as "a structure, transportable in one or more sections, which, in 
the traveling mode, is eight body feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length, or. 
when erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square feet." 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6) 
(emphasis added), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G" of the Addendum. 
It is certainly conceivable that the Utah Legislature intended these size specifications, 
which were adopted virtually the same time as was the MHPRA, to be the objective "minimum 
size specifications" referred to in section 57-16-4(7)(a) of the Utah Code. Indeed, the very 
term "specification" would seem to apply more to some uniform, technical standard rather than 
to some subjective "requirement" imposed by individual mobile home parks. CL.Black's Law 
Dictionary 973 (abr. 6th ed. 1991) (defining "specification" "[a]s used in the law relating to . . 
. manufacturing, . . . [as] a particular or detailed statement, account, description, or listing of 
the various elements, materials, dimensions, etc. involved"). 
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a . Balancing section 57-16-4(7) and section 57-16-4(4). 
However, even if the Court determines that mobile home parks have the implied 
authority and discretion to establish and enforce their size specifications, that exercise of that 
authority cannot be absolute and unfettered when the MHPRA, and its expressed purposes, are 
considered as a comprehensive whole. 
Again, the purpose of the entire act is to balance the respective property rights of two 
property owners-the owner of the mobile home park and the owner of the mobile home located 
within the park. In that light, the Legislature has accorded park owners various rights, 
including the following: (1) the right to change the use of the land, or any part of it, for a 
purpose other than the rental of mobile home spaces, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-5(5) & -3(8) 
(1996); (2) the right to evict park tenants for cause (ie., the failure to abide by a park rule, the 
failure to pay rent, and any behavior that endangers park residents or property), ML §§ 57-16-
5(1) to (4); (3) the right to raise rent under certain circumstances, IJL § 57-16-4(3); (4) the right 
to require standards for the maintenance and upkeep of the mobile homes and lots, IiL §§ 57-16-
7(1) to (3); (5) the right to change the park rules, Id, § 57-16-7(1); and (6) the right to upgrade 
the quality of the park under certain circumstances, 14 § 57-16-4(7). 
On the other hand, the Legislature has provided substantial protections for the owners of 
the mobile homes located within the mobile home parks: (1) in effect, the home owners are 
granted perpetual leases to remain in the park as long as the park owner continues to rent out 
lot spaces for mobile homes, and as long as the home owner does not give the park a reason to 
evict them for cause, S££.IiL§ 57-16-5 (indicating that the lease may be terminated only by 
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mutual agreement or for the listed causes); (2) various procedural steps must be followed by the 
park before a lease can be terminated, even for cause, S££j{i_§ 57-16-6; (3) the park owners 
are prohibited from seeking to prevent or unreasonably limit the sale of a mobile home 
belonging to a park resident, iiL § 57-16-4(4); and (4) any rule changes promulgated by a 
mobile home park are invalid if the change is unconscionable, IiL§ 57-16-7(1). 
A careful review of the MHPRA will reveal that with every right granted to the mobile 
home parks, a corresponding protection has been granted to the mobile home owners. Clearly 
the Legislature has recognized the vulnerable situation mobile home owners can find themselves 
in when the park can change, at a whim, the rules and requirements for park residency; thus, 
the Legislature has attempted to compensate for this natural imbalance of power. 
Accordingly, this same balancing of rights between park owner and home owner must be 
considered when construing section 57-16-4(7), giving parks the right to upgrade by requiring 
the removal of certain mobile homes upon their sale, in connection with section 57-16-4(4), 
giving the home owners the right to sell their mobile homes free any unreasonable limitations 
imposed by the parks. 
Because both of these provisions apply to situations involving the "sale" of a mobile 
home located within the park, the statutes should not be construed in piecemeal fashion, but 
should be read together in an attempt to harmonize the provisions in view of the purposes of the 
MHPRA. £££ Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). 
Our Legislature has given the mobile home parks the right "to upgrade the quality" of the 
parks by requiring that mobile homes failing to meet minimum size specifications "be removed 
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from the park upon sale." Sfi£ Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) (1996). While the statute is 
unclear over who establishes the size specifications, even if the mobile home parks have the 
discretion to do so, this right to upgrade can only be exercised when the undersized mobile is 
sold-when ownership of the mobile home has been transferred for a price. 
Nevertheless, the parks cannot enforce any rules or conditions which "prevent or 
unreasonably limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident." IiL § 57-16-4(4). 
Undoubtedly, when granting the parks the authority to require that undersized mobile homes be 
removed upon sale, the Legislature was aware that the mobile home owner (either the seller or 
the purchaser) would then incur the sizeable costs of relocation and installation. These costs 
would clearly have some impact on the sales price of the mobile home and on the number of 
potential purchasers. 
Even so, the Legislature must have reached the conclusion that the ordinary costs of 
relocation and installation would not impose an undue burden on a mobile home owner trying to 
sell his or her home. Accordingly, if the circumstances were limited to this type of situation, 
the Legislature made the decision that this requirement would not "unreasonably" limit the 
home's sale.6 
However, one of the Estate's key contentions on appeal is that itenforcement of this 
"removal" requirement has a profound adverse impact on the number of potential purchasers, or 
otherwise reduces the marketability of the mobile home, such that the mobile home either 
One of the trial court's concerns expressed at the hearing was that it will always be less 
costly and more convenient for the mobile home to be sold and remain in the park, and not 
removed. (R. 775). The trial court need not have had this concern. 
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cannot be sold or else the value of the home will be reduced by an amount substantially greater 
than the ordinary costs of relocation, then that park rule unreasonably limits the home's sale 
and cannot be enforced, pursuant to section 57-16-4(4). This conclusion must be reached if the 
statutory provisions are to be read and harmonized together. 
The Park raised only a legal challenge in its motion for summary judgment, rather than a 
factual one, to our claims that enforcement of the Park's rule violates the MHPRA. Even so, 
evidence was put on the record concerning the profound reduction in value that the Griffin 
mobile home had experienced because it would have to be relocated upon its sale. The 
testimony of Mr. Kelsch in his affidavit reveals that he had received an appraisal of the mobile 
home, placing the value of the home at or about $15,450.00. (R. 313). Mr. Kelsch's testimony 
further reveals that he had received offers to purchase the mobile home at or above the 
appraised value. On the other hand, the best evidence that the Park could produce was to show 
that the Griffin home could have been sold to someone who would remove it from the park for 
$8,000.00. Certainly a reduction of fifty percent, at least, is substantial enough to conclude 
that the Estate may have a valid claim, entitled to be tried, that the Park's rule is unreasonably 
limiting the mobile home's sale. 
The trial court rejected the Estate's argument after erroneously refusing to consider any 
impact caused by the current economic conditions, choosing to do so after concluding that the 
Park had no control over the economic conditions. (R. 757). While the Park may not be able to 
control the market conditions affecting mobile homes, the Park does not adopt or enforce its 
rules and conditions in a vacuum, free from economic or other environmental concerns. 
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Accordingly, a park can be prevented from enforcing rules or conditions because of the 
unreasonably adverse impact they have, in light of the economic circumstances involved. 
The MHPRA prohibits the enforcement of a rule or condition that prevents or 
unreasonably limits the "sale" of a resident's mobile home. I<i_§ 57-16-4(4). The term "sale" 
is typically defined as "the transfer of ownership of and tide to property from one person to 
another for a price." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1037 (1990). In other words, 
a "sale" is an economic transaction; therefore, it is inappropriate to disregard the impact of 
economic conditions when trying to determine if a particular park rule or condition 
unreasonably limits a "sale." 
The trial court was most concerned with whether a minimum size specification of 12 feet 
by 65 feet was somehow inherently unreasonable, regardless of whether the rule limits the sale 
or not.7 While the Estate believes that the Park's size requirements were unreasonable in and 
of themselves, a rule or lease condition violates section 57-16-4(4) only if it prevents or 
unreasonably limits "the sale." The impact of the rule upon the potential sale is the critical 
factor to consider, and the prevailing market conditions must be considered to properly 
determine this impact. 
7
 At the hearing, the dialogue on this point went as follows: 
THE COURT: . . . So what you need to tell me is why you think that --
MR. HASLAM: Why this unreasonably limits the sale. 
THE COURT: No, that's not the question. The question is why the 
size is unreasonable. Why imposing a minimum size of 12-by-65, why that 
particular requirement is in[h]erently unreasonable, whether it inhibits the sale 
or not. (R. 772). 
The trial court later in the hearing indicated that a minimum size requirement of 200 feet by 30 
feet would be unreasonable as a matter of law. (R. 763). 
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For example, a park rule requiring that residents can only sell their mobile homes to 
white males between the ages of 25 and 35 would be unlawful, discriminatory, and inherently 
unreasonable. However, that rule may have little economic impact and, thus, only minimally 
limit the actual sale if the highest offer to purchase the mobile home came from a white male 
age 25. In this hypothetical situation, the park's rule did not actually "prevent or unreasonably 
limit the sale," which is what the MHPRA prohibits. SeeJiL-§ 57-16-4(4). Moreover, 
Congress and the Utah Legislature have already provided other remedies to prevent such 
practices, such as the Federal and Utah Fair Housing Acts, and even the MHPRA (which also 
provides that approval of potential purchasers of mobile homes "may not be unreasonably 
withheld" by the park), see. iiL 
Similarly, if a park established an inherently unreasonable size requirement, such an 
action could probably be considered a violation of any implied authority and discretion to set 
size specifications under section 57-16-4(7), regardless of any actual impact upon the sale. 
It makes absolutely no sense from an economic standpoint to say that only if the rule 
itself is unlawful or inherently unreasonable does it "unreasonably limit the sale." Again, this 
seems especially true in view of the fact that a sale is, itself, an entirely economic transaction. 
The question then becomes whether the rule so limits the marketability of the mobile home as to 
cause a substantial economic injury to the home owner. 
Certainly, if market conditions were such that the mobile home could be sold to 
individuals who would move the home for roughly the same price that the home could be sold to 
individuals who would want to remain in the park (taking into consideration the ordinary costs 
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associated with a reasonable relocation) then the seller has not really suffered a disadvantage. 
In such an economic climate, the rule would only "reasonably" limit the sale of the mobile 
home. 
This interpretation makes further sense because "preventing" the sale altogether is 
absolutely barred by the statute. In addition to prevention of the sale, the statute provides that 
the sale cannot be "unreasonably limited."8 Economic conditions have to be taken into 
consideration to determine if a particular rule pertaining to a sale is or is not reasonable, and 
the trial court should be required to consider and take evidence of the same. 
If the mobile home park promulgates a rule that, in and of itself, violates no laws an$L 
causes no substantial economic hardship to the seller, then such a rule would not 
"unreasonably" limit the sale of the mobile home. But that is not what has occurred in this 
case, and the Estate's claim that the Park's rule violates § 57-16-4(4) is a valid, recognizable 
claim as a matter of law. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Park's minimum size requirement of 12 feet by 
65 feet for single-wide mobile homes is.inherently unreasonable because not all of the Park's 
lots provided for single-wide mobile homes can even fit a mobile home of 12 feet by 65 feet, or 
larger. This fact is undisputed and is part of the reason that the Park has had to make some 
unwritten exceptions to this otherwise mandatory rule. The trial court considered these 
"exceptions" to be of littie consequence. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that if the Park will 
have to permit some "undersized" mobile homes to remain in the Park, even upon sale, to 
8
 Indeed, because of prevailing economic conditions involving mobile home parks, the 
rule in question in our case borders on actual prevention of a sale. 
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prevent certain lots from becoming permanently vacant, then the minimum sizes estabhshed are 
unreasonable and exclusionary, regardless of whether they impact the marketability of the 
mobile homes currently in the Park. 
In any event, the question of "reasonableness," or "unreasonableness," as the case may 
be is typically a factual one, or else one so fact dependent that summary judgment is generally 
inappropriate when only a legal challenge is raised. Somehow the trial court concluded, as a 
matter of law, and without any evidence to support it, that a requirement of 12 feet by 65 feet is 
reasonable. (R. 673). 
Accordingly, the Park was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its declaratory 
action or on the Estate's claim that the Park's rule violated section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah 
Code. 
£L The Trial Court erred by concluding that, because the Park was simply exercising 
its statutory authority to establish size requirements, the Park's amendment of the 
rules accomplishing this purpose was not unconscionable. 
The Estate further contends that the manner in which the minimum size requirements 
were established by the Park by amending the park rules, when combined with the overall 
unfairness of the requirements established in die rule, was unconscionable and that the rule 
change is invalid. Indeed, the MHPRA expressly provides that f'[n]o change in rule that is 
unconscionable is valid." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(1) (1996). 
The Park contended below that because it can change the park rules "in its sole 
discretion," pursuant to the Griffin lease and the MHPRA~and because it can set size 
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requirements and require that undersized mobile homes be removed from the Park upon sale-
then it cannot violate section 57-16-7(1) of the Utah Code by establishing the rules it did. 
As previously mentioned, the statutory provision regarding minimum size specifications 
is silent on how such size specifications are to estabhshed and how they are to be implemented 
and enforced by the mobile home parks. Even if the parks are somehow invested with the 
authority to establish size specifications, it does not necessarily follow that they can do so by 
unilaterally amending the park rules, especially in view of the circumstances surrounding this 
case. 
While the Park conceded below that the MHPRA does not mandate that minimum size 
requirements be set and enforced by means of a park rule, that does not change the fact that 
they did set and seek to enforce the size requirements via a change to the park rules. Certainly 
the Park had other options.9 The fact remains that the Park amended the rules to set minimum 
sizes for the mobile homes and to require that undersized homes be removed from the Park 
upon sale. 
Mobile home parks have the right to set new park rules and change existing ones, and 
they can do so without the necessity of obtaining approval from the park residents. See id. § 
For example, if the Legislature has already provided some objective size specifications 
to reference, then the ability to require the removal of undersized mobile homes may exist as a 
matter of law, pursuant to the statute. In any event, the Park could simply impose the size 
requirements in the new lease agreements with new tenants or in lease renewal agreements 
with already existing tenants. This would certainly be the most equitable means of enforcing 
the size requirement because the tenants would at least be put on notice of the requirement-
and of the fact that if they want to sell their home, they will have to move it out-and have the 
chance to voluntarily agree to such a condition of tenancy. 
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57-16-7. Nevertheless, with the grant of this right, the Legislature correspondingly imposed 
some restrictions in order to protect park residents from the abuse of this right. For example, 
No new or amended rule shall take effect, nor provide the basis for an eviction 
notice, until the expiration of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each 
resident, as a condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be provided 
with a copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in their lease 
agreement. 
Id. § 57-16-7(1).10 More importantly, the Legislature enacted a provision to prevent the parks 
from making an unconscionable rule change. See. iiL 
The MHPRA does not define the term "unconscionable." Nevertheless, we can look to 
the meanings applied in contract law and in the Uniform Commercial Code by analogy. In this 
context, Utah courts have chosen to analyze unconscionability in terms of "substantive" and 
"procedural" unconscionability. See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock 
Co.. 706 P.2d 1028, 1041-42 (Utah 1985). The "substantive" test of unconscionability is met 
when terms or provisions are "'so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent 
party,' [or when] the terms 'are so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores 
and business practices of the time and place." IiL(citations omitted). This type of 
unconscionability is often indicated by "'an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights 
imposed . . . ' or significant cost-price disparity, . . . [or] 'terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.'" liLat 1041-42, 1043 (citations omitted). 
In addition, although not in effect at the time of the Park's rule change in this case, a 
new provision was recently added to the MHPRA that requires parks, for the 30 days 
following a proposed rule change, to give residents "the opportunity to meet with the mobile 
home park management about the proposed amendments." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(l)(c) 
(1997). 
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On the other hand, "procedural" unconscionability has been described simply as the 
"absence of meaningful choice" by the oppressed or surprised party. liLat 1042 (quoting 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). It is clear 
from the case law that when both procedural and substantive unconscionability are present, then 
this overall unconscionability would prevent enforcement of the term or contract, although it is 
unclear as to what degree of substantive unconscionability is required. See id. at 1042-43. By 
analogy, if a rule change is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, then the rule 
change must be considered unconscionable and, therefore, invalid. Sfi£.Utah Code Ann. § 57-
16-7(1) (1996). 
In our case, the park residents had absolutely no.choice but to accept the rule change, let 
alone a "meaningful" choice. Indeed, in all likelihood, most mobile home park rule changes 
are going to be at least "procedurally" unconscionable because the residents are rarely, if ever, 
given the chance to vote upon or voluntarily accept a proposed rule change. Admittedly, some 
element of substantive unconscionability must also be present. 
The evidence before the trial court could support the conclusion that the Park's rule 
change establishing 12' x 65' as a minimum size requirement is substantively unconscionable. 
It is undisputed that at the times the mobile home was moved into the Park and the lease 
agreement was entered, no rule existed which set any minimum size specifications. Clearly, 
the residents living in the park before the rule change had no reason to believe that a future rule 
would be adopted making some of their mobile homes too small to remain in the park upon 
sale. This rule change has had the practical effect of rendering the mobile home worthless, or 
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at least substantially reducing the home's value. When viewed in the Ught most favorable to the 
Estate, the facts and circumstances surrounding the aforementioned rule change can lead to the 
conclusion that the new rule would have unfairly surprised the affected Park residents. 
Moreover, the rule change is oppressive. It has the practical effect of forcing a few 
selected mobile homes to either remain in the park without tenants in them or to be sold for a 
grossly inadequate price when compared to the appraised market value of the mobile homes. 
This adverse economic impact upon the value of the Griffin mobile home is certainly severe 
enough to "shock the conscience," much as has been recognized in some land sale cases 
involving forfeiture provisions. S££, e.g.. Morris v. Sykes. 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) 
(refusing to enforce forfeiture provision where sum awarded to party is entirely 
disproportionate to actual damages); Johnson v. Carman. 572 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977) 
(concluding that allowing seller to retain from purchaser sum 34% greater than seller's actual 
damages would shock the conscience and be unconscionable). Thus, a harsh economic result 
may be enough to shock the conscience of the court without other elements of unconscionabihty 
even present. See also Resource Management. 706 P.2d at 1041-42 (mentioning "cost-price 
disparity" as indicative of substantive unconscionabihty). 
Even so, it is clear that the Park's rules also creates an "overall imbalance in the 
obligations and the rights imposed," giving virtually all the rights to the Park, while imposing a 
sizeable burden upon the Park's residents who suddenly discover their home must be removed 
from the Park if they sell it, even if the home is in otherwise good condition. When viewed in 
the Estate's favor, the facts and inferences drawn from the evidence and the terms of the rules 
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themselves can support the conclusion that the rules so unreasonably favor the Park as to be 
unconscionable. 
The trial court again seemed most concerned with whether the actual dimensions 
established by the rules were "unconscionable." As previously asserted, the Estate believes the 
minimum size requirements of 12 feet by 65 feet is inherently unreasonable, unfair, and 
unconscionable. Nevertheless, the trial court again erroneously focused on the physical 
dimensions established in the Park's rules rather than upon the procedural unfairness 
surrounding the rule changes and the oppressive nature rule and overall imbalance of the rights 
and obligations thereby imposed upon the affected park residents, such as the Estate. 
Clearly, the Park raised only a legal challenge in its motion for summary judgment, 
rather than a factual one, to the Estate's claims that the rule change was unconscionable. In 
that light, the Estate believes it has asserted a valid and legally recognizable claim in light of 
the interpretation of the various provisions of the MHPRA. Moreover, the determination of 
unconscionability should either be a question of fact or one of application of law to a given set 
of facts. Certainly, whether or not a particular rule change is unconscionable is an extremely 
fact-sensitive question, generally inappropriate for a summary judgment determination. 
In any event, because elements of both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability 
are involved in the relevant rule changes, the Court erroneously dismissed the Estate's claim 
that these particular rule changes are invalid under the MHPRA, granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Park. 
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IL The Park is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim for 
declaratory relief nor on the Estate's claims that the relevant Park rules are 
invalid, void, and unenforceable. 
The Estate has presented valid legal claims that the Park rules imposing size 
requirements and requiring that undersized mobile homes be removed from the Park upon sale 
are invalid, due to the unconscionabihty of the rule change, and void and uneforceable, because 
the rules unreasonably limit the sale of the Griffin mobile home. The Park is not entitied to 
judgment as a matter of law for these claims asserted under the MHPRA. Moreover, because 
these claims, if proven at trial, would prevent the Park from enforcing its size requirements 
against the Griffin mobile home, then the Park is also not entitled to its requested declaratory 
relief as a matter of law.11 
III. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that the Park Could Not Breach the Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Because the Park Was Simply Exercising Its Express 
Contractual Rights and Because It Was Reasonable, as a Matter of Law, for the Park to 
Unconditionally Refuse to Allow any Individual to Sublet, Lease, or Occupy the Griffin 
Mobile Home. 
The Estate claims that the Park has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
by absolutely and unconditionally refusing to allow the Estate to have a subtenant or even a 
caretaker reside within the Griffin home and by thus trying to constructively evict the Griffin 
home from the Park. On the other hand, the Park asserts that because it is simply exercising its 
express rights under the lease, the Estate's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
11
 The Park sought a declaration by the Trial Court "that Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) 
legally allows Plaintiff to have the Defendants' mobile homes removed from the park upon 
sale and that said statute is applicable to the facts of this case." (See. the Park's Complaint, at 
R. 2.) 
33 
fair dealing must fail as a matter of law. The Park, however, misunderstands the concept of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
"It is fundamental that every contract includes a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
with respect to dealings between the parties." Olympus Hills Center. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & 
Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah App. 1994), ceit denied, 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995). As part of this covenant imposed by law, "the parties constructively promised that 
they would not intentionally do anything to impair the other party's right to receive the fruits of 
the contract.M Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996). The fruits 
to which a party is entitled under a contract depend significantly upon the "justified expectations 
of the parties." feL (quoting Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 291 
(Utah App. 1994)). 
As has been previously asserted in this brief, the evidence, and the inferences drawn 
therefrom, support the finding that the Estate, by and through Mr. Kelsch, does in fact have a 
valid lease agreement with the Park and that the agreement is merely the continuation of Mrs. 
Griffin's written lease. Therefore, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing constructively 
applies to the parties' agreement. 
The Griffin lease agreement provides in part that the "Resident shall not assign, transfer 
or sublet the site or any part thereof, or this Rental Agreement, without Landlord's prior 
written consent." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the Park claims that it has the express right 
to refuse to permit any subletting or any occupation of the mobile home while it is located 
within the Park. 
34 
Nevertheless, contrary to Park's argument, "[w]hen one party to a contract retains power 
or sole discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that discretion reasonably and in good 
faith." Cook. 919 P.2d at 60; Olympus Hills. 889 P.2d at 450 ("Our courts have determined 
that a party must exercise express rights awarded under a contract reasonably and in good 
faith."). Indeed, when one party to a contract is given the sole right of approval of a matter, 
that party "must act fairly and in good faith in exercising that right. He has no right to withhold 
arbitrarily his approval; there must be a reasonable justification for doing so." Prince v. Elm 
Ivn. Co.. 649 P.2d 820, 825 (Utah 1982) (quoting William G. Vandever & Co. v. Black. 645 
P.2d 637 (1982)). 
Even so, Mr. Kelsch has been told by the Park management that the Park would not 
allow anyone to reside in the Griffin home. Mr. Kelsch justifiably expects to be accorded the 
same rights and privileges as other tenants with the Park. It is undisputed that the Park has 
allowed other tenants to have a caretaker or subtenant residing in mobile homes within the 
Park. Moreover, the Park has admitted that a vacant mobile home presents a safety hazard that 
would not otherwise exist if someone were residing within the mobile home. Nevertheless, the 
Park appears willing to assume this risk. 
Amazingly, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the Park acted reasonably in 
not allowing the Estate to sublet or assign its lease or interest. In addition, the trial court 
concluded that Park "had no legal obligation" to allow a sublet or an assignment "during the 
course of this litigation," and that "it was not unreasonable for the [Park] to withhold any 
consent while the mobile home[] [was] in the process of being sold and while this case was in 
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litigation." (R. 667) Nevertheless, when properly viewing all the facts and inferences in favor 
of the Estate, the evidence before the trial court could easily support a finding that the Park's 
absolute refusal to allow a subtenant, or even a caretaker, to reside in the mobile home was 
unreasonable under the circumstances, and that the Park was simply withholding its approval 
arbitrarily. Such a finding is clearly sufficient to support a claim for the Park's breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the June 10, 1996 letter to Mr. Kelsch, the Estate 
justifiably expected that the Park would take no "further action" with respect to the mobile 
home as long as the rent was paid and the park rules followed. The letter further leads to a 
conclusion that the Griffin home would be allowed to remain on lot space #119, at least until 
such time as it was sold or the Estate voluntarily removed it from the Park. 
Indeed, it is a fundamental expectation inherent to every lease agreement, that the tenant 
will be free from any wrongful or constructive eviction during the term of the lease. Even one 
of the express purposes of the MHPRA is to protect mobile home owners from "actual or 
constructive eviction." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1996). Possession and use of the leased 
premises are the tenant's "fruits" of his or her contract with the landlord. 
However, the facts and circumstances of this case could support a finding that the Park 
is trying to deny the Estate the "fruits" of the lease agreement and is acting in a manner 
inconsistent with the Estate's expectations of being free from eviction. Such actions are clearly 
violations of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Cook. 919 P.2d at 60. The Estate 
is being forced to pay rent-or to have the rent paid-for the right to occupy lot #119. The Park 
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unconditionally refuses to permit the Estate to have aD^ QOS. reside in its mobile home and that 
the Park is requiring the mobile home to be removed upon sale. As has been previously 
argued, if the mobile home must be removed from the Park upon sale, the home will lose most 
of its marketability. The evidence would support a finding that the home would not be sold as 
quickly or easily, and then only for a drastically reduced sales price. 
In other words, the Park is trying (1) to force the immediate sale of the Griffin home for 
a much lower price than the Estate should normally be able to get, upon which sale the home 
will leave the Park, or else (2) the Park is trying to force the Estate to voluntarily remove the 
home in order to avoid having to pay rent without being able to have a subtenant residing, who 
could assume the rent obligation, or without even being able to have a caretaker residing on the 
premises to maintain the mobile home and to reduce the potential safety hazards. In any event, 
the facts and inferences reasonably drawn in the Estate's favor could support a finding that the 
Park simply wants the mobile home moved out and is doing all it can to expedite that process. 
These actions amount to a constructive eviction of the home-and a breach of the Park's 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, as Utah courts have repeatedly held, "sgood faith and fair dealing are fact 
sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a 
factual issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law.'" Cook. 919 P.2d at 60-
61 (quoting Republic Group. 883 P.2d at 291). Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting 
the Park's motion for summary judgment on the Estate's claim for breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
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IV. The Trial Court Erred to the Extent It Concluded that the UCSPA Does Not Apply 
to the Leasing of Lot Spaces for Mobile Homes. 
The Estate has asserted claims that the Park has engaged in unconscionable acts or 
practices in violation of the UCSPA. Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-1 et seq. (1997). The trial 
court has made no express indication of why the Park was granted summary judgment on the 
Estate's claims brought under section 13-11-5(1) of the Utah Code. Nevertheless, the Park 
argued below that the UCSPA simply did not apply to the landlord/tenant relationship and that it 
had no relevance to the proceedings. We assume this argument provided the basis for the 
court's ruling, inasmuch as the court did hold that the Park was entitled to summary judgment 
on each of the Estate's claims "for all the reasons set forth in the Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum." (R. 671) 
The Park's contention that the UCSPA does not apply to a landlord/tenant transaction is 
a disingenuous attempt to stretch the holding in Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996), and 
to disregard the statute's plain language. The reasoning applied by the plurality opinion in 
Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991), has not been completely abrogated by Carlie.. In 
Wade. Justices Durham and Zimmerman concluded that the UCSPA does apply to residential 
leases. IJL at 1015. Such a conclusion was based on the expressed purposes of the Act and on 
the plain language of the UCSPA. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court modified its prior opinion in Wade. See Carlie. 922 
P.2d at 6. However, contrary to the Plaintiff's assertions, the Court merely concluded that "the 
UCSPA does not provide a remedy in the instant case where plaintiffs are seeking damages 
caused bv the uninhabitable condition of their apartments; " IiL (emphasis added). The Court's 
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decision was based on the reasoning that while the legislature did not expressly include or 
exclude residential leases under the UCSPA, the legislature has now expressly provided a 
remedy for tenants of uninhabitable property under the Utah Fit Premises Act. IjL-at 5-6. 
Specifically, however, the Court did "not decide whether the UCSPA applies to landlord/tenant 
transactions under circumstances not covered by the Utah Fit Premises Act." Ijl_at 6 n.3. The 
circumstances surrounding the unconscionable acts and practices committed by the Park in our 
case are certainly not remedied by the Utah Fit Premises Act. 
In any event, "when faced with a question of statutory construction, [the courts] first 
look to the plain language of the statute." CIG Exploration, Inc. v- Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995). "In reviewing legislative enactments, the reviewer assumes 
that each term was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally . . . ." Savage 
Indus., Inc. V. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991); see also Chris & 
Dick's Lumber v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990) (courts will "look to 
the plain meaning of the [statutory] language at issue to discern the legislative intent"). 
The Legislature declared that the UCSPA "shall be construed liberally to promote the 
following policies: . . . to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices." Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2 (1997). More specifically, the Act 
provides that" [a]n unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction." Id. § 
13-11-5(1). A "consumer transaction" is defined in the UCSPA as "a sale, lease. . . . or other 
. . . disposition of goods, services, or other property, both tangible and intangible (except 
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securities and insurance), to a person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes." 
I$L § 13-11-3(2) (emphasis added). 
According to their usual and accepted meanings, the terms "property" and "tangible 
property" refer to real property as well as personal property. See Tarianza v. Mather. 820 F. 
Supp. 1371, 1377 (D. Utah 1993) (construing UCSPA and concluding that "the phrase 
"property, both tangible and intangible' is not ambiguous, and its vusual and accepted' meaning 
includes residential real property"); s££-al££LBlack's Law Dictionary 1218 (6th ed. 1990) 
(defining "tangible property" as ff[a]ll property which is touchable and has real existence 
(physical) whether it is reaLor personal" (emphasis added)). Moreover, although the 
Legislature did not specifically define "property" in the UCSPA, n the Legislature has 
elsewhere provided that 
[i]n the construction of these statutes [the Utah Code], the following definitions 
shall be observed, unless the definition would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute: . . . 
(t) xProperty' includes both real and personal property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(t) (1997) (emphasis added). 
According to the plain and unambiguous language of the Act, a lease of real property for 
residential purposes is a consumer transaction. Similarly, a "supplier" is defined in part as a 
"lessor . . . who regularly engages in, or enforces consumer transactions." Id. $ 13-11-3(6). It 
The Legislature has provided that the UCSPA "shall be construed liberally to promote" 
its policies. LL § 13-11-2. Following this reasoning, the Wade plurality opinion determined 
the fact "that the UCSPA does not expressly mention the leasing of real property argues in 
favor of, rather than against, its application; the legislature has mandated a liberal construction 
of the Act, and it was explicit in excepting other transactions from its jurisdiction." Wade. 
818 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis in original). 
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is difficult to imagine someone who more regularly engages in the leasing of residential real 
property than a mobile home park. Therefore, to the extent that the Legislature has not 
provided a more specific remedy for the acts complained of, the UCSPA does.apply to the 
landlord/tenant situation in our case. 
The Estate's claims are based in part upon the unconscionable act committed by the Park 
in unilaterally changing and adopting new rules which oppress and unfairly surprise innocent 
tenants (as has been previously argued in this brief). Moreover, absolutely refusing to permit 
someone to reside in the mobile home, and in a very real sense seeking to constructively evict 
the it from the Park (as has also been previously asserted), would certainly be considered an 
unconscionable act or practice within the meaning of the Act. Finally, the Park's method of 
selectively enforcing the rules concerning size requirements, whether considered alone or in 
concert with the other acts complained of, should also constitute an unconscionable practice. 
The Park's rules are mandatory in nature and fail to establish any basis for making 
exceptions from the new size requirements. The rules clearly require that 
mobile homes purchased from current residents, located in the Park must be 
approved by the management prior to sale. . . . If Resident sells his or her mobile 
home, it shall be upon compliance with conditions set forth in the rules. 
Minimum requirements are as follows[:] 
a. Mobile home size must be at least 12' x 65' for a single-wide, 24' x 
50' for a double-wide. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 207). Nevertheless, the evidence clearly supports findings that the Park 
has (1) made exceptions for some residents based on lot size; (2) moved an undersized mobile 
home into the park itself after the adoption of the new rules and sold it, allowing it to remain in 
the Park upon sale; (3) approved the sale of another undersized mobile home and allowed that 
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mobile home to remain in the Park subsequent to the sale; and (4) has selectively chosen to 
enforce the new rules against a few unfortunate residents, for whom the Park will make no 
exception. The Park's selective and arbitrary enforcement of the new size requirements is 
further probative evidence of the Park's unwillingness or inability to uniformly apply the same 
mandatory rules. 
The Park argued below that it had some discretion regarding whether or not to enforce 
the minimum size requirements because § 57-16-4(7) of the Utah Code is merely permissive in 
nature, indicating that mobile home parks "may" require undersized mobile homes to move 
from the park upon sale. See. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) (1996). Nevertheless, the more 
logical interpretation of the statute is that mobile home parks have the discretion of whether to 
allow the undersized mobile homes, as a whole, to remain upon sale or to require their 
removal, not that the parks have the discretion to pick which undersized homes can stay and 
which must go. In any event, the Park's own rule is phrased in mandatory language. No 
exceptions were written into the rules, although the Park admittedly knew, at the time the rules 
were amended, that some lots would not fit a home meeting the "minimum" size requirements. 
Furthermore, while the Park has explained that either reasonable necessity or mere oversight on 
its part have resulted in some undersized homes remaining in the Park upon sale, the fact 
remains that the Park apparently has not bothered to measure each and every mobile home 
approved for sale, unilaterally deciding which to measure. The inferences drawn from these 
facts could support a finding that the Park either does not have the intent or else the ability to 
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uniformly apply the rules, and it is unconscionable for the Park to impose such a severe burden 
on a select few, but not all who own undersized mobile homes.13 
In any event, when properly viewing the facts and inferences drawn from the evidence in 
favor of the Estate, the Park's rule change, its attempt to constructively evict the Griffin home, 
and its attempt to enforce the size requirements against the Estate, when the Park has failed to 
enforce the same mandatory rules against other tenants, could all rise to the level of 
"unconscionable" acts and practices in connection with a lease of residential real property. 
Clearly their combined effect upon the Estate could constitute an unconscionable practice under 
the UCSPA. 
Finally, while the determination of unconscionability is a question of law, Wade, 818 
P.2d at 1016, that legal determination depends upon the resolution of several underlying factual 
issues. Until those material fact issues have been litigated, this Court cannot resolve the legal 
question of unconscionability. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the Estate's claims for violation of the UCSPA. 
V. The Trial Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment on the Estate's Claim that 
the Park Has Intentionally Interfered with the Estate's Economic Relations. 
The Estate has asserted that the Park's refusal to approve any potential purchasers of the 
mobile home constitutes the tort of intentional interference with existing or prospective 
economic relations. To sustain a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, the 
It should be noted that under the UCSPA, "unconscionability does not require proof of 
specific intent [on the part of the Park] but can be found by considering circumstances which 
the supplier Nknew or had reason to know/" Wade v. Johe. 818 P.2d 1006, 1016 (Utah 
1991). 
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claimant must prove: "(1) that the [alleged tortfeasor] intentionally interfered with the 
[claimant's] existing or potential economic relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the [claimant]." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 
811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991) (citing Leigh Furniture fc Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982)). 
The Park admits that it has refused and continues to refuse to approve potential 
purchasers of the Griffin home who might hope to apply for residency in the Park. Instead, the 
Park simply asserted that it has the authority to deny approval for potential purchasers who 
want the mobile home to remain in the Park; therefore, it has not improperly interfered. In 
other words, the Park has no duty of "non-interference." The Park is simply exercising its legal 
rights, which justifies its actions and causes the Estate's tort claim to fail. 
Nevertheless, the evidence and the law as discussed previously clearly supports the claim 
for intentional interference with economic relations. To prove its claim, the Estate must show 
that the Park's interference was for an improper purpose or buy improper means. The 
"requirement of improper means is satisfied where the means used to interfere with a party's 
economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized 
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 
N
 improper' means of interference." Leigh Furniture. 657 P.2d at 308. As is discussed in other 
sections of this brief, the Park's conduct in requiring the Griffin mobile home to move out upon 
sale and refusing to approve potential buyers of the mobile home has in fact violated provisions 
of the MHPRA and the UCSPA . 
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In fact, the MHPRA specifically provides the approval of prospective purchasers of a 
mobile home "may not be unreasonably withheld." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(4) (1996). 
Indeed, the Park is merely relying on a park rule that is invalid, void and unenforceable 
pursuant to the MHPRA, in order to justify withholding approval of any purchasers. As 
addressed previously, the rule change that requires undersized mobile homes to be removed 
from the Park upon sale is unconscionable and therefore invalid. See id. $ 57-16-7(1). Because 
the same rule also prevents or unreasonably limits the sale of the mobile home, the rule is void 
and unenforceable under the MHPRA. &££ iiL § 57-16-4(4). Accordingly, reliance upon, and 
enforcement of, this rule violates the MHPRA. 
Moreover, the Park has interfered with the Estate's prospective mobile home sales by 
engaging in the unconscionable acts and practices which violate the express provisions of the 
UCSPA. S££iiL§ 13-11-5(1). 
Because the methods used by the Park to interfere in the prospective sales transactions of 
the Estate violates essential statutory laws, then the "means" employed by the Plaintiff are 
improper. $££ Leigh Furniture. 657 P.2d at 308. Accordingly, the Park is not privileged nor 
justified in its conduct, and the Griffin Estate has a legally recognizable claim for the Park's 
intentional interference with economic relations. The Trial Court erred in granting the Park 
summary judgement on this claim. 
VI. The Trial Court Erred to the Extent It Required the Estate to Produce Sufficient 
Actual Evidence to Support Its Claims When the Park Produced No Actual Evidence to 
Refute Those Claims, But Merely Argued that the Estate fs Legal Theories for Relief Were 
Not Recognizable or Applicable. 
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The only evidence put before the trial court by the Park, as presented in the "Statement 
of Undisputed Fact" contained in the Park's memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court, in its ruling, adopted those facts as undisputed. 14 (R. 671). Even if 
accepted as true, none of those facts operates to defeat the Estate's claims raised on appeal. 
With respect to the Park's request for declaratory relief and to the Estate's claims that 
I 
the Park has violated provisions of the MHPRA, the Park simply argued that the Legislature has 
provided mobile home parks with the statutory authority and discretion to set and enforce 
minimum size requirements; thus, the Park could not possibly violate other provisions of the 
MHPRA for doing just that. 
With respect to the Estate's claim for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, the Park asserted that because it was simply exercising its contractual rights, there 
could be no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law. Again, with respect to the 
Estate's claim that the Park's actions have violated the UCSPA, the Park moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that the UCSPA does not apply to leases of residential real property, that 
the Park is not a "supplier" as defined in the Act, and that the Park's actions are not connected 
to a "consumer transaction." Finally, the Park sought summary judgment against the Estate's 
claim for intentional interference with economic relations on the simple theory that the Park had 
no "duty of non-interference" and was merely exercising its legal rights. 
14
 The Griffin Estate still disputes the Park's statement of "undisputed fact" that the June 
10, 1996 letter to Mr. Kelsch is his "only claim to a Mease' with the Park." The June 10 letter 
certainly evidences the claim to a lease, but is not the "only" claim. In addition, the assertion 
is more of a legal conclusion than a statement of fact. 
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The Park, with respect to the claims raised on appeal, presented only legal challenges, 
claiming that the Estate's claims must fail as a matter of law. The Park never produced any 
evidence as to the "reasonableness" of its size specifications or of its decision to absolutely 
refuse to allow a subtenant reside in the Griffin mobile home. It never provided evidence to the 
Court to support its claim to declaratory relief or to defeat the Estate's claims preserved on 
appeal. 
Nevertheless, the trial court's written findings reveal that the court concluded that there 
was "no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of the causes of action" brought by 
the Griffin Estate. The court proceeded to find that the Estate "presented no evidence 
whatsoever to back their theory of the case." While the Estate does believe that evidence on 
the record does in fact support its theory of the case and has attempted to demonstrate that to 
this Court, the Estate was not legally required to produce "evidence" to rebut purely legal 
challenges to its claims. 
The Estate may or may not have clearly raised this point with the trial court below. The 
Estate did argue in its memorandum opposing summary judgment that "resolution of just the 
legal issues involved in this case, without even addressing the factual disputes, would not 
support the [Park's] motion for summary judgment." (R. 499) Even so, to the extent that the 
trial court required actual evidence to support each element of the Estate's claims, the court 
committed "plain error." 
Whether plain error occurred is a matter for the appellate court to decide. As recently 
articulated in Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area. 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995): 
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The first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be 
"plain," i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that it 
should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error. . . . The 
second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a finding of plain error is that 
the error affect the substantial rights of [a party], i.e., that the error be harmful. 
LL at 892. 
It is a matter of plain law that when a motion for summary judgment is made to the 
court, any 
[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge [and] 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . . . The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided . . . , must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). According to Rule 56's plain language, the adverse 
party may rest on his pleadings and articulated legal theories when a motion for summary 
judgment is made on entirely legal challenges. 
Indeed, Utah courts have repeatedly declared that "it is not always required that the 
party opposing summary judgment proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment against him." 
Mountain States Tel & Tel, 681 P.2d at 1261; see also Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 
1984); Qlwell V. ClarK, 658 P.2d 585, 586-87 (Utah 1982); Parrish v. Layton City Corp.. 542 
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 1975). Obviously, this is such a case: where only legal challenges to 
the Estate's claims have been raised. The trial court's error should have been "plain." 
Moreover, the trial court's error did affect the Estate's substantial rights because the 
trial court apparently relied on the fact that "no evidence" was presented to support the Estate's 
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legal theories. Again, the Estate's position and assertion is that sufficient evidence was 
presented to the court. Nevertheless, to the extent that the trial court considered a lack of 
evidentiary support to be a dispositive or critical factor entitling the Park to judgment as a 
matter of law, the court's error has substantially harmed and prejudiced the rights of the Estate. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court to the extent that the lack of evidence 
provided a basis for granting the Park's motion for summary judgment on the claims asserted 
on appeal. 
VII. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Concluding that the Estate Failed to 
Mitigate Its Damages and that It Is Therefore Barred From Recovering Any Damages 
from the Park. 
Despite the extremely limited evidence before it, the trial court specifically found that 
Mr. Kelsch, as the personal representative of the Estate, has not "made a reasonable attempt to 
mitigate" damages. Even more disconcerting, the trial court found "that based upon the 
[Estate's] failure to mitigate [its] damages, even if the [Estate] could have prevailed in this 
action on other legal issues that [the Estate] is barred from seeking any damages from [the 
Park] due to [the Estate's] absolute failure and refusal to mitigate [its] damages." (Emphasis 
added). (R. 666-667). 
While the Estate may have some duty to mitigate damages in a breach of contract action, 
it is only required to take reasonable measures to do so. Reasonableness is almost always a 
question of fact, and, moreover, the Park bears the burden of proving that damages could have 
been minimized. See. Pratt v. Board of Educ. 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977) ("Although the 
plaintiff is obligated to minimize his damages, the burden is upon the party whose wrongful act 
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caused the damages to prove anything in diminution thereof."). The Park's attempt to show that 
the Estate might have been able to sell the mobile home and move it out for any conceivable 
price certainly does not meet its burden of proof. See also John Call Eng.. Inc. v. Manti City 
Corp.. 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990). 
Moreover, the Estate's claims based upon the MHPRA are not claims for damages, but 
are claims that the pertinent park rules are invalid, void and unenforceable. Normally, the 
doctrine of mitigation applies to breach of contract cases; however, even if the failure to 
mitigate damages could apply to any of the claims raised by the Estate below and on appeal, 
"the amount of damages otherwise recoverable by [a] plaintiff can be reduced [not completely 
barred] . . . if it failed to properly mitigate its damages. Id. (emphasis added). Again, "the 
burden of proving [a] plaintiff has not mitigated his damages and that its award should by 
correspondingly reduced is on [a] defendant." I$L (emphasis added). As a matter of law, 
failure to mitigate does not bar a wronged party from seeking any damages, but may only 
operate to reduce the damages recoverable to the extent they could have been mitigated. The 
trial court erred concluding otherwise. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals set aside the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment of the trial court summarily granting Appellee's request for 
a declaratory relief and dismissing Appellant's counterclaims for violations of the MHPRA, and 
the UCSPA, for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and for intentional interference 
with economic relations. Appellant further requests that the case be remanded for trial or other 
proceedings in the district court. 
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Dated this _± day of February, 1998. 
GREENWOQ^&sBLACK 
CH^SSJ^REENWOOD 
JAMES K. HASLAM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the / day of February, 1998,1 personally served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon James R. Boud, the counsel for the 
appellee in this matter, by hand-delivered two copies thereof at the following address: 
JAMES R. BOUD 
Ashton, Braunberger & Boud, P.C. 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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June 1 0 , 1996 
Mr. Mike Kelsch 
460 North 1020 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Dear Mr. Kelsch: 
From our conversation in early May, I understand that you 
are charged with selling the mobile home formerly owned by La Rue 
Griffin, a 1972 Fleetwood located in Imperial Park at space 119. 
Since subject home does not meet the minimum size 
specification of 65 feet for single wide homes as written in our 
Park Rules (see attached), the home can not remain in the 
Imperial Park, but would have to be removed by the buyer upon 
sale. We ask that when you consummate a sale that you notify us 
who will transport the home and on which day so that we may clear 
any charges for electricity owing and assist the transporter in 
the movement of the home out of the Park. 
The space rent for June in the amount of $224.76, due by 
June 5 has not been paid. If you pay this amount in full by June 
15, I will not assess the late charge of $20.00 or take any 
further action. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Yours Truly, 
Scott A. Madsen, Manager 
Phone: 225-2212 or 374-5191 
1 end. 
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rk Rule # 3 reads in part: 
Mobile Home size must be at least 12' x 65* for a 
e-wide, 24' X 50" for a double-wide. 
Park Rule # 27 reads: 
The Park may require that the mobile home be removed from the 
Park upon sale if: 
(a) The mobile home does not meet minimum size 
specifications as outlined in the Rules, if any. 
(b) The mobile home is in a rundown condition or in disrepair. 
(c) The mobile home does not , meet the minimum 
standards of the current rules and regulations. (See 
Rules #3 & #4)M 
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IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK 
1375 West 500 North 
Provo, Utah 8^601 
CBOl) 37^-5191 
PARK RULES 
The following Park Rules have been prepared to protect 
the Mobile Home Park and the Mobile Home Owner. These Rules are a 
part of the Lease Agreement and are binding upon the Park and the 
Resident. It is anticipated that these Rules will create a 
compatible community in which ail Residents can take pride. 
1. Rent is due on the first day of the month and payable by 
the fifth day. After the fifth day, a late charge of $20.00 is 
added. Thereafter, a THREE DAY NOTICE TO PAY OR QUIT may be served 
and eviction proceedings started. Returned check charge is $15.00. 
2. No rent will be refunded and the Resident is required to 
give thirty (30) days' written notice before vacating the premises. 
3. Mobile Homes moving into the Park, or existing Mobile 
Homes purchased from current resident, located in the Park must be 
approved by the management prior to sale. Consult the Park Manager 
for details. The installation of awnings and carports is subject to 
governmental regulations and permits. Consult the Park Manager for 
detaiisl Additions, remodeling, installations to any coach, Mobile 
Home or trailer pad must have prior approval of the management. 
Minimum requirements are as follows and must be installed within 
thirty (30) days of purchase or move in date: 
a. Mobile Home size must be at least 12' X 65' for a 
single-wide, 2k X 50 for a double-wide. 
b. Ail Mobile Homes must have complete, factory type 
vented skirting which is to be attractive and in conformance 
with the general appearance in the Park. 
c. All Mobile Homes must have a porch at the front 
entrance minimum size 6'X 10* complete with railings, and a 
factory type metal awning, minimum size 8' X 16' covering 
the porch. 
d. Chain link fence not exceeding four (k) feet may be 
allowed if first approved in writing by the management. 
Existing fences not conforming to management requirements may 
have to be removed upon sale of an existing Mobile Home. 
1 
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k. Mobile Homes moving into the Park must be approved by the 
management prior to being moved in. Mobile home sites and setup 
installations are under the direct control of the management. 
Water lines must have heat tapes and insulation, and sewer lines 
must have a continuous slant from the mobile home to the outlet. 
5. Garbage cans must be kept inside a storage shed or out of 
view from the street. On the regular trash pickup day (check with 
management for the correct day), roll the can to the curb and be 
sure that the hinge faces away from the street. For larger items, 
use the dumpster which is near the clubhouse. 
6. Laundry room hours will be as posted. Laundry should not 
be left unattended in laundry room. Management is not responsible 
for articles left unattended in laundry room. No laundry is to be 
hung outside the mobile home to dry, 
7. Tools, laundry boxes, etc., must be inside the home or 
storage shed. 
8. The recreation room is available to residents only on a 
reservation basis. All rents must be current before a resident is 
allowed to reserve the recreation room. The resident who reserves 
the area is solely responsive to see that it is left clean and in 
an orderly condition. There wi11 be a cleaning fee charged if the 
area is not left In satisfactory condition. There is a checklist 
of things to be clone before leaving the area posted in the 
clubhouse. The checklist is part of the Parte rules. Residents who 
leave the recreation room in a less than satisfactory condition 
will forfeit tHeir privileges to use the facility. 
9. The swimming pool will be open during the summer months 
to Residents and their guests. The Resident agrees not to hold 
management or ownership responsible for any accidents or injuries 
which occur on or about the premises. More detailed rules for the 
pool are attached and are part of these Park Rules. 
10. Quiet hours shall be from 10:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. Radios 
and televisions shall be turned down so as not to disturb anyone. 
Needless noise, interference with other residents, disturbance of 
the peace and quiet, destruction of property, injury to Residents 
or guests at any time on these premises, will result in the 
immediate eviction of the perpetrators as provided by law. 
11. No violation of the law or ordinance of city, county, 
state or federal government shall be allowed, nor will lewd or 
immoral conduct be permitted. 
12. The management shall have the right to enter the rental 
space and make all reasonable repairs, alterations or additions to 
any space which the Resident may have. 
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13. Management must have reasonable access to electric 
5. Meters that cannot be easily read, will be estimated on 
ly statements. 
l*t. Each mobile home site has facilities for parking two 
vehicles. No parking on street or lawns is allowed, and visitors 
must park in designated areas. After the second warning the» 
vehicle will be towed at the owner's expense. No boats, travel 
trailers, RV' s or campers may be parked at the mobile home site. 
On request, the manager may make storage available for a reasonable 
charge. 
15. All Residents must maintain their lot in a clean and 
orderly fashion and care for ail th£ landscaping thereon. Digging 
shall not be allowed unless there is a prior park management 
approval due to underground utilities. If, for some reason, 
maintenance is not performed in a satisfactory way to the manager, 
the manager can cause the same to be performed by another party and 
the Resident will be charged costs for the same1, to be due upon the' 
next rental payment. Failure to pay said costs shall be treated 
the same as failure to pay rent and eviction proceedings shall be 
commenced upon service of a THREE DAr NOTICE TO PAY OR'OUIT. 
16. Any additional landscaping must have approval of the park 
management. Upon termination of the tenancy, the premises are to 
be surrendered in as good a condition ats when received, ordinary 
wear and tear excepted. 
17. No car repairs shall be allowed in the mobile home park. 
18. For the safety and well being of the Residents, the speed 
limit shall be 10 miles per hour unless otherwise posted in the 
Park and all Residents must cooperate in its enforcement. Eviction 
proceedings may be commenced immediately against violators of the 
speed limit, since speeding constitutes behavior which 
substantially endangers the well being of persons or property in 
the Park. 
19. No unusable or unsightly vehicles will be allowed in the 
Park unless the Park has specially designated area for such storage 
and sudH storage must be by written permission of the Park. No 
such tinisightly or inoperative vehicle may be parked or stored 
anywhere'wi thin the Resident's space or in the streets of the Park. 
20. Tampering with Park electric service connections or other 
park uti1ity connections is strictly forbidden. Please contact the 
management in case of trouble. 
21. All rents arid charges must be paid in full before 
removing a mdbile home. Trees and/or shrubs placed upon the sitfc 
may not be removed without management's prior written approval. 
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22. Mobile home spaces 
ager's written approval. 
are not transferable , without the 
23. Solicitors, vendors, peddlers, or other persons whose 
presence and, business actiyities may be con§id,ered an intrusion on 
the mobile home park or the occupants thereqf,, is not permitted* 
Delivery men or repairmen who are authorized may have access to the 
Park. 
2k. All prospective purchasers must register with the Park 
prior .tot the time of the, purchase. The Park reserves the right to 
approve-any prospective pu^ch^s^r
 ;who intends to become, a Resident, 
but such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. 
25* The Park
 ;/ may unconditional ly refuse (to approve, ,as t$ 
Resident any. purchaser of , a;ipobi Je home whodoes not register prior 
to,purchase, Registration shal1 include the signing of a Lease 
Agreement, 
26. Resident may place not more, than one /'for saje"; sign vipon. 
his mobile home provided that the sign cannot exceed \hk 
square inches. 
27. The,Park may require that a mobile home be removed from 
the Park upon sale if: 
(a) The mobile home does not meet minimum size 
specifications as outlined in the Ruies, if any. 
(b) The mobile home is in a run down condition 
or in disrepair. 
(c) The mobile home does not meet the minimum 
standards of the current rules and regulations. ( See 
Rules #3 and #4) 
28. If, at any time, a Resident believes the Park has not 
fulfilled any iegai obligations the Park may have to, iRe^ i/feflt , or 
other homeowners,, Resident, agrees to immediately, ..£iv$,- the . Park 
written notice specifying what .Resident bel iev.es th^j .4P^k has 
failed to do and indicating what Resident believes the P^rk has to 
do in order to fulfill these obligations. This notice shall be as 
detailed as possible so that the Park n\ay fully ijnfil^stand the 
Resident' s concerns . The Res id en t agrees that th^ e, Park
 : w j 11; h^ve 
at least ninety (90) days or such longer period as is reasonably, 
necessary, after receipt of Resident's notice to remedy the 
probiem(si) Resident has identified in Resident ' s.-nqtice*. If Park 
dpes remedy t^e probiem(s) within the time period a.iiotted, 
Resident agrees that the Park will have no liability whatsoever to 
Resident for any expense, costs, injury or damages Resident may 
2 0 / 
have sustained. If Resident fails to give the Park a reasonable 
opportunity to remedy the problem(s), the Park will have no 
liability to Resident ,for , any expense, costs, damage or injury 
which Resident may sustain as a result of the problem(sX. 
29. The Park reserves the right to restrict both the number 
or types of pets allowed. No farm animals or exotic pets are 
allowed. Pets of Residents already in the Park or new Residents 
just entering the Park may be prohibited solely at the reasonable 
discretion of the Park. 
30. All pets must be immediately registered with the Park. 
Suchre^istr^tion shall, be kept current ahd any animal found in the 
P^fk
 ?whiph is notp registered will be removed or eviction 
proceedings may be'commenced for violation of these Rules. Such 
registration shall be on forms provided by the Park and it shall 
include a photograph of the pet. 
If pets are allowed, only those Residents who comply with 
the following Rules on a continuing basis shall be allowed to 
retain pets in the Park: 
a. Each pet must be licensed and inoculated in accordance 
with local laws. 
b. Pets are to be restrained within the Resident's space 
except when Resident has pet on leash and is walking the 
pet. 
c. Any pet running loose in the Park will be impounded at 
the owner's expense and the Resident may be notified to 
vacate his space or give up his pet. 
d. Pets will not be allowed in the clubhouse or any 
recreational areas at any time. 
e. Any excrement left by a pet outside or under the mobile 
home must be picked up immediately and disposed of by 
Resident. 
f. Pets will not be allowed to cause any disturbance which 
might annoy neighbors. If pet causes any disturbance, 
annoyance or harm such as barking, growling, howling, 
biting or any other unusual noises or damage which will 
annoy or cause harm to a neighbor, permission to keep the 
pet will be revoked. 
g. Guests of Residents may not bring pets into the Park. 
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If any violation of the pet rules is observed or a 
valid complaint is made by another Resident, the pet own^r* #111 
receive ah official j ^ ai'ning in writing to either correct 'Vhte 
problem, dispbse'of the pet, br vacate the space. ' If a secohftf 
violation ,is(poted, or a second val id, complaint received, the pet 
owner will receive a notii^' to qu^ it for ' behavior Which 
substantial ly endangers' the'toel i'being of "persons or property.1 
It is our sincere hope that the above Rules will never 
have to be referred to on the basis of being violated.( We will do 
all we can to make'this a pleasant anci enjoyable place to live for 
al 1 pur l Residents . We s,61 icit/your cooperation and support .in 
making it just thai. Suggestions are desired and welcome at any 
time. 
If we can be of any further service to you, please let us 
know ahd we shall do pur best to serve your needs. 
Imperial Mobile Home Park 
re? Qmjk 
J}02-
TabC 
<\ 
RENTAL AGREEMENT 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME P--rlK 
1375 West 500 North, Provo, Utah 3':6oi (30l) y,h - 5191 
THIS AGREEMENT, executed in duplicate on ^J^LtJ^ //) , 19Z2, 
If «nd ^ ^ v ^ < r t f A ^ t ^ + J A < f , , U ^ « , , C2AJ>) ("Landlord") 
q*< J (?<*.<&< <^ J^f^JjU*^ ("Rc.-ic.nt"). 
1. Period and Rental . Landlord does hereby demise and l e t unto Resident, and 
Eildent h i res from Landlord, s i t e number / / g
 l o c a t e d w l t h i 
Pea of the Imperial Mobile Home Park for r teTSHcFfroin month to month aomencin" 
JkUt-/6 
.} J-9 73* a t a monthly r 
rom montr. to montn aomencSng ^ / 
nth, payable in advance on the f i r s t day of each and every month. Ei ther 5 r t T 
^ t e r m i n a t e t h i s Rental Agreement by giving to the o ther party 30 days ' notice ' i:-. 
2 . Occupancy and Use. Said s i t e sha l l be used only as a mobile home residence 
Jcupied by no more than a d u l t s , ch i ldren and pets. The 
pord has the right to approve said mobile home before it is set, installed an* 
suected. Resident acknowledges that he.has inspected the ^reraises and herebv * *" 
™
P
« L o ? x ^ e i r . ^ s e n t condition, Pud Resident agrees"to hold Landlord harmless 
» any and all expense or liability arising directly from Resident's use of sa*H 
ce or from use of the common areas. 
L'3* Ass^-^"ent or Sublet. Resident shall not assign, transfer or sublet th* 
Gent a D y t h e r e o f> or this Rental Agreement, without Landlord's prior written J • 
fevj* -ark<.R"les> Regulations and Conventants , This Rental Agreement is subject |*he current Park Rules, Relations and Covenants, a copy of which has b-en 
£*1T$ Jesident; and to all mature Park Rules, Regulations and Covenants as 
Kte Rn^c p"16 ?°. t i m S t y L a n d l o r d in « s sole discretion. Each and every provision 
E°r TV*' Regulations and Covenants which now or hereafter exist i- hereby r-de 
Sf!,01 :^XS R e n t a l Agreement, and any failure by Resident to abserve each an^ every 
gvision thereof shall be deemed a noncurable default which may result in the 
"ediate termination of this Rental Agreement. 
A Aa,KL*- <Z£A-/JL^ J£JL/4:7JL, 
a/4/rr/t
 f. ^U/J-7A 
(da t e J 
?.a£L^ ££^-J£^_ EXHIBIT 
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^*** 
kii i ' f lat i^ 
James R. Boud, USB #A0388 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER & BOUD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C., a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the 
Estate of LaRue Griffin, 
Deceased, RUTH WILLIAMSON and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the 
Estate of LaRue Griffin, 
Deceased, RUTH WILLIAMSON, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.C., PATTON KWAN and JANET 
KWAN, doing business as 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
SCOTT A. MADSEN, RON CLARK, 
and DOES 1 THROUGH X, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 960001388 
Judge John C. Backlund 
CounterDefendant and 
Third Party Defendants. 
On the 25th day of June, 1997, Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim and for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiff's Declaratory Action came on for hearing. 
Plaintiff was represented by attorney James R. Boud. Defendants 
were represented by attorney Chris Greenwood and Mr. Greenwood's 
associate, . After thoroughly reviewing the 
pleadings, exhibits, and affidavits filed in support of and in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and listening to the 
arguments of counsel, and fully considering the matter, the Court 
now makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that considering all the evidence 
that has been produced, that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to any of the causes of action filed by the 
Defendants in their counterclaim. The Court further finds that 
summary judgment should be granted in favor of Plaintiff on 
Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Relief. 
2. The Court specifically finds that this action is not 
an action to terminate a tenancy of a resident in a mobile home 
park. The action brought by the Plaintiff is a suit for 
declaratory judgment to have the Court find that Utah Code Ann. 
Section 57-16-4(7), which provides that ifIn order to upgrade the 
quality of a mobile home park, it [the mobile home park] may 
require that a mobile home be removed from the park upon the sale 
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if: (a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size 
specifications...." The Court specifically finds that said statute 
is constitutional and enforceable. 
3. The Court specifically finds that the Utah State 
Legislature, pursuant to the Mobile Home Park Residency Act found 
at 57-16-1 et. seq.. specifically authorizes mobile home parks to 
set minimum size specifications relating to the lengths and widths 
of mobile homes. The Court finds that the above statute is very 
restrictive and does not give mobile home parks the authority to 
evict mobile home park residents from the park based upon minimum 
size specifications. The Court finds that the Legislature was very 
careful in drafting the statute and only allowed mobile home parks 
to "upgrade the quality of the mobile home park" upon the "sale" of 
a mobile home if the mobile does not meet minimum size 
specifications. The Court finds that the key factor that triggers 
the right to enforce minimum size specifications is that the 
resident voluntarily makes a choice to sell his or her mobile home. 
4. The Court finds that the size specifications set by 
the Imperial Mobile Home Park of twelve feet wide by sixty-five 
feet in length for single-wide mobile homes is reasonable. The 
Court further finds that Plaintiff's minimum size specifications 
are not unreasonable or unconscionable. The Court finds, as 
acknowledged by counsel for Defendants during the argument, that a 
twelve foot wide by sixty-five foot long mobile home is a standard 
size mobile home in the mobile home industry- The Court further 
finds that almost all of the single wide lots in the Imperial 
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Mobile Home Park were constructed to accommodate twelve feet by 
sixty-five feet single-wide mobile homes with a few minor 
exceptions. 
5. The Court specifically finds that if there is an 
economic hardship placed upon the Defendants in not being allowed 
to sell their mobile homes in Plaintiff's Park and having to move 
the homes from the Park# that the economic hardship is not the 
fault of the Plaintiff nor was it caused by any act of the 
Plaintiff. Defendants have argued that mobile home spaces are not 
readily available along the Wasatch Front at the present time. 
Defendants have put no evidence on with respect to this issue but 
even if this is a fact that can be accepted as true, the economic 
circumstances along the Wasatch Front at the present time are not 
in the control of Plaintiff. The Court further finds that the 
market for mobile homes and the spaces available in mobile home 
parks is dictated by economic conditions over which the Plaintiff 
has no control. 
6. The Defendants have set forth eight separate causes 
of action in their Counterclaim which causes of action include (1) 
breach of contract, (1) violation of the Utah Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act, (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, (4) intentional interference with economic relations, (5) 
violation of the Utah Fair Housing Act, (6) violation of the 
Federal Fair Housing Act, (7) violation of the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practice Act, and (8) punitive damages. The Court finds that 
summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Plaintiff and against 
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Defendants on each of the eight causes of action in Defendants' 
Counterclaim. The Court finds that there is no issue of fact with 
respect to any of the causes set forth in the Counterclaim and that 
for all of the reasons set forth in the Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Plaintiff's Reply 
Memorandum, all of which are incorporated herein by reference; that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim 
and upon Plaintiff's Complaint as a matter of law. 
7. The Court adopts the Statement of Facts as set forth 
on pages 3 through 7 of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and incorporates such statement of 
undisputed facts herein by reference. The Court finds that 
Defendants were not able to controvert any of the statement of 
undisputed facts by the Plaintiff by any credible or competent 
evidence. The Court finds that this action is a clear cut case and 
that a Counterclaim should never have been filed. The Court 
therefore finds that it is appropriate to reserve the issue of 
attorney fees for future hearing pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court finds that in the event attorney fees are 
granted, this judgment shall be augmented to include a provision 
for said attorney fees. 
8. The Court finds that based upon the lease agreement 
entered into between Imperial Mobile Home Park and Defendant Ruth 
Williamson dated February 15, 1972# that the reasonable 
expectations of the parties at the time said lease agreement was 
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entered into was that the lease could be terminated at any time by 
either party "by giving to the other party thirty days' notice in 
writing." The Court specifically finds that Mrs. Williamson never 
had a reasonable expectation of keeping her mobile home in the Park 
indefinitely nor of keeping the mobile home in the Park after she 
moved from the Park or sold her mobile home. 
9. The Court further finds that Mrs. LaRue Griffin, who 
is now deceased, had an identical lease to that of Mrs. Ruth 
Williamson and that LaRue Griffin's lease was dated February 10, 
1972 and that Mrs. LaRue Griffin's reasonable expectations were the 
same as Mrs. Ruth Williamson's. 
10. The Court finds that LaRue Griffin has died and that 
her personal representative, Michael Kelsch, has asserted in this 
action that he has certain rights pursuant to a June 10, 1996 
letter issued to him by Scott Madsen, the manager of Imperial 
Mobile Home Park. Mr. Kelsch's position is that he has an 
enforceable lease agreement pursuant to said letter. The Court 
finds that Mr. Kelsch does have certain rights as the personal 
representative of the estate of LaRue Griffin pursuant to the 
letter of June 10, 1996. The Court, however, finds that the letter 
of June 10, 1996 states specifically that, "Since subject home does 
not meet the minimum size specifications of sixty-five feet for 
single-wide homes as written in our Park rules (see attached), the 
home cannot remain in the Imperial Mobile Home Park, but would have 
to be removed by the buyer upon sale. We ask that when you 
consummate a sale that you notify us who will transport the home 
6 
6 7* 
and on which day so that we may clear any charges for electricity 
owing and assist the transporter in the moving of the home out of 
the Park." 
11. The Court finds that Mr. Michael Kelsch uses the 
last paragraph of said letter in an unsuccessful attempt to 
convince the Court that he has a right to resell the mobile home in 
the Park. The Court finds that there is absolutely no inference 
whatsoever in the June 10, 1996 letter which would give Mr. Michael 
Kelsch any expectation whatsoever that he has a right to resell the 
mobile home of LaRue Griffin to a buyer who would keep it in the 
Imperial Mobile Home Park. To the contrary, the Court finds that 
the June 10, 1996 letter is perfectly clear that the mobile home 
must be removed from the Park upon sale and Mr. Michael Kelsch 
could have no reasonable expectation to the contrary. 
12. The Court finds that in July of 1994 the Imperial 
Mobile Home Park implemented new rules which addressed minimum size 
specifications for mobile homes in the Park. The Court 
specifically finds that both Mrs. Ruth Williamson and Mrs. LaRue 
Griffin received copies of the new rules and that the Park Manager, 
Scott Madsen, mailed copies of said rules to both of said ladies. 
The Court further finds that Mrs. Williamson admitted in her 
deposition that she received a copy of the new Park rules in 1994 
and the Court believes Mrs. Williamson as to this point. 
13. The Court finds based upon unrebutted evidence that 
neither Ruth Williamsons mobile home nor the LaRue Griffin mobile 
home meets minimum size specifications even if the tongues were 
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counted. The Court further finds that it is not reasonable to 
count the tongue as part of the measurement of the mobile home as 
it is not part of the living space. The Court finds that it is 
reasonable to only count the box of the mobile home or the living 
area of the mobile home in determining whether the mobile home 
meets the minimum size specifications of the Park. 
14. The Court further finds that counsel for the 
Defendants in this action did not willingly inform the Court of the 
actual measurements of the Williamson and Griffin mobile homes, 
even counting the length of the tongues, and that at the hearing 
counsel for Defendants continued to evade the Court's questioning 
as to the actual lengths of the mobile home because said mobile 
homes did not, under any scenario of facts, meet the minimum size 
specifications of the Park. 
15. The Court finds that Defendant Michael Kelsch, as 
personal representative of the estate of LaRue Griffin, has never 
paid any rent to Imperial Mobile Home Park. The Court finds that 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has made fast 
offering donations to pay for rent for the LaRue Griffin mobile 
home but there is no obligation on the part of the estate of LaRue 
Griffin to repay the fast offering fund and there was no 
expectation of repayment. The Court further finds that Defendant 
Michael Kelsch, as personal representative of the estate of LaRue 
Griffin, has never physically possessed or inhabited the mobile 
home of LaRue Griffin and that the mobile home has been empty since 
the death of LaRue Griffin in May of 1996. 
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16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff, Imperial Mobile 
Home Park, acted reasonably in not allowing the Defendants, while 
they were trying to sell their mobile homes, to sublet or assign 
their lease or interest in the mobile homes to a third party 
renter. The subletting or assignment of said leasehold interest 
would require the written consent of the Plaintiff and the Court 
finds that it was not unreasonable for the Plaintiff to withhold 
any consent while the mobile homes were in the process of being 
sold and while this case was in litigation. 
17. The Court finds that the square footage argument 
propounded by the Defendants in their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is nonsensical, not 
plausible, and is contrary to the rules and regulations of the 
Park. 
18. The Court specifically finds that neither Defendant 
Ruth Williamson nor Defendant Michael Kelsch, as personal 
representative of the estate of LaRue Griffin, has made a 
reasonable attempt to mitigate their damages. The Court 
specifically finds with respect to Ruth Williamson that she has 
failed and refused to adequately market her mobile home for resale. 
The Court finds that Defendant Ruth Williamson moved to St. George 
prior to the filing of this law suit and that she comes back to 
stay in her mobile home on occasion for short periods of time. 
Although she has a "For Sale" sign in the window of her mobile 
home, she has made no real attempt to market her mobile home 
because any prospective buyer of the mobile home would have no way 
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of contacting her due to the fact that the telephone number on the 
"For Sale" sign was the telephone number to her mobile home which 
was, for the most part, not being lived in. The Court further 
finds that the telephone in Mrs. Williamson's mobile home did not 
have a recording device on it. 
With respect to Defendant Michael Kelsch, the Court finds 
that Michael Kelsch has not made an adequate attempt to market or 
sell the mobile home of LaRue Griffin. The Court specifically 
finds that Mr. Kelsch did have an offer to sell the mobile home of 
LaRue Griffin to an independent third party, who would have moved 
the mobile home from the Park for approximately $8,000.00, which 
sum would have liquidated all of the debts of the estate of LaRue 
Griffin. The Court further finds that Mr. Kelsch refused to sell 
the mobile home hoping that he could win this lawsuit and make more 
money if it could be sold to a buyer who would keep the home in the 
Park. The Court finds that this conduct was inappropriate and that 
he should have been looking out for the best interests of the 
estate rather than concerning himself with this lawsuit. 
19. The Court specifically finds that Defendant Ruth 
Williamson and Defendant Michael Kelsch, as personal representative 
of the estate of LaRue Griffin, has failed to adequately look into 
other mobile home parks where the mobile homes could be moved to 
and resold. 
20. The Court finds that the case law cited by Plaintiff 
in its Memorandum establishes that the Defendants' failure to 
mitigate their damages are grounds for the Court denying damages in 
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this action if damages could be awarded. The Court finds that 
based upon the Defendants' failure to mitigate their damages, even 
if the Defendants could have prevailed in this action on other 
legal issues that Defendants are barred from seeking any damages 
from Plaintiff due to their absolute failure and refusal to 
mitigate their damages. The Court further finds that both 
Defendants Williamson and Kelsch have taken the position that they 
would not try to market their mobile homes to people who would 
purchase the homes and move them from the park because they took 
the position that they had a right, pursuant to the causes of 
action set forth in their counterclaim, to resell their mobile 
homes to purchasers who would keep said homes in the Park. Even if 
they had such a right, the Court finds that this was an 
unreasonable position to take due to the fact that they are under 
an obligation to mitigate their damages. 
21. The Court finds that the Statement of Facts 
contained in the Affidavit of Scott Madsen has been unrefuted by 
the Defendants and that in particular, paragraphs 13 through 22 of 
the Affidavit of Scott Madsen establishes that the rules of the 
Park relating to minimum size specification have been uniformly 
enforced with a few reasonable exceptions made for irregular shaped 
lots in the Park. The affidavit does establish that many months 
after the 1994 rules relating to minimum size specifications were 
implemented, the Plaintiff's manager, Scott Madsen, realized that 
there were a few lots in the Park that could be reconfigured from 
non-conforming single-wide lots to double-wide lots which would 
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allow homes to be placed upon them that would conform to the rules 
of the Park. 
22. The Court finds that the sale of a mobile home by 
the Imperial Mobile Home Park to a family named Ellis, of which the 
Defendant takes exception to, was reasonable under all cir-
cumstances and that the post 1994 rule change conversion of the lot 
upon which the Ellis home sat from a non-conforming single-wide lot 
(a lot that could not fit a sixty-five foot long single-wide mobile 
home) to a conforming double-wide lot was a reasonable action for 
the Plaintiff to take. The Court finds no impropriety whatsoever 
with the transaction. 
23. The Court does note that the Plaintiff allowed one 
sixty foot mobile home to be resold in the Park during the 1994 
December holiday season as a result of an error. The Court 
specifically finds that an error was committed and that the Utah 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act gives the Plaintiff some discretion 
in enforcing minimum size specifications by the use of the word 
"may" which is contained in Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) . The Court 
finds that this error does not give the Defendants any right to 
resell their mobile homes to purchasers who have the intention of 
keeping the homes in the Park. The Court further finds that Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) gives a mobile home park the right to 
upgrade the quality of a mobile home park by setting minimum size 
specifications for mobile homes irrespective of any other right 
granted in the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act to amend or 
change a rule of the park. 
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24. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not do anything 
which would have prevented the Defendants from selling their mobile 
homes. The Defendants had every right to sell their mobile homes 
to any independent third party purchaser as long as the purchaser 
moved the mobile home from the Park. 
25. The Court specifically finds that the Plaintiff did 
nothing whatsoever to discriminate against Defendant Ruth 
Williamson or any other Defendant or LaRue Griffin and that the 
Fair Housing Act violations alleged by the Defendants had no basis 
in fact or law. 
26. The Court finds that the Defendants presented no 
evidence whatsoever to back their theory of the case that the 
minimum size specification set by the Plaintiff was unreasonable 
and unconscionable. This allegation was nothing more than a bald 
assertion made by the Defendants and was not supported by any 
credible evidence whatsoever. 
27. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has incurred 
Court costs in this matter in the sum of $ 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the 
Plaintiff should be granted summary judgment on its complaint for 
declaratory relief and against the Defendants on their eight 
separate causes of action which have been set forth in their 
Counterclaim. 
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2. The Court concludes that a further hearing should be 
held to determine whether the Defendants and their attorney should 
be required to pay to Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees for having 
to defend this action due to the fact that the Court concludes that 
there was absolutely no basis in law or fact for any of the eight 
separate causes of action which the Defendants have filed against 
the Plaintiff. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff may bring a 
motion based upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and based upon Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures seeking attorney fees against 
the Defendants and their attorney. 
3. The Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-
4(7) is constitutional and enforceable and that the Plaintiff 
mobile home park had a right to set minimum size specifications for 
the mobile homes in its park. 
4. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's minimum size 
specification as it relates to single-wide mobile homes of twelve 
feet wide by sixty-five feet in length is a reasonable minimum size 
specification to set. 
5. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff had no legal 
obligation to allow the Defendants to sublet or assign their 
leasehold interest in their mobile homes to third parties during 
the course of this litigation. 
6. The Court concludes that the Defendants failed to 
mitigate their damages, if any. 
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7. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff should be 
granted costs in the amount of $ 1 2^0*4 'y 
DATED this %-^ day of July, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORA: 
Fourt: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was 
mailed postage prepaid on the ph- day of July, 1997, to the 
following: 
Chris D. Greenwood 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1840 North State Street 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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c:files\Imperial\Findings 
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James R. Boud, USB #A0388 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER & BOUD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C., a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the 
Estate of LaRue Griffin, 
Deceased, RUTH WILLIAMSON and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
MICHAEL KELSCH, Personal 
Representative to the 
Estate of LaRue Griffin, 
Deceased, RUTH WILLIAMSON, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.C., PATTON KWAN and JANET 
KWAN, doing business as 
IMPERIAL MOBILE HOME PARK, 
SCOTT A. MADSEN, RON CLARK, 
and DOES 1 THROUGH X, 
CounterDefendant and 
Third Party Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960001388 
Judge John C. Backlund 
Cr7% 
On the 25th day of June, 1997, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was heard before the above court. The Honorable 
Judge John C. Backlund, presiding. James R. Boud appeared on 
behalf of Plaintiff, and Chris Greenwood and 
appeared on behalf of Defendants. After carefully reviewing the 
pleadings on file, listening to the arguments of counsel, and fully 
considering the matter, the Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff and against Defendants on both the complaint and the 
counterclaim in this action. 
The Court having now entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law filed herewith, now hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES, and enters Judgment as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Action for Declaratory Relief is hereby 
granted and the court rules as a matter of law that Plaintiff has 
the legal right pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(7) to upgrade 
the quality of its mobile home park by requiring that mobile homes 
be removed from the park upon sale if the mobile homes do not meet 
Imperial Mobile Home Park's minimum size specifications which are 
twelve feet wide by sixty-five feet in length for single-wide 
mobile homes. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-417 is constitutional and 
enforceable. 
3. The Defendants' counterclaim and each cause of 
action stated therein is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon 
the merits. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded its costs of court in the 
amount of $ t XO^ 1*> 
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5. Plaintiff may bring a motion for attorney fees and, 
if granted, this Judgment will be augmented by the amount of 
attorney fees so granted. 
DATED this day of / jt^Vt, 1997. 
HONORABLE J0HN3£©^ 
District Courtv 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment was mailed postage prepaid on the l~r*~ day of 
July, 1997, to the following: 
Chris D. Greenwood 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1840 North State Street 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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Ch. 177 MOBILE HOMES AND PARKS [994] 
MOBILE HOMES AND PARKS 
CHAPTER 177 
S. B. No. 209 (Passed March 12, 1981. In effect May 12. 1981.) 
MANUFACTURED HOUSING AND RECREATIONAL VEHICLES 
STANDARDS 
AN ACT RELATING TO MANUFACTURED HOUSING AND RECREATIONAL VEHICLES; 
PROVIDING DEFINITIONS; PROVIDING STANDARDS FOR MOBILE HOMES AND 
RECREATIONAL VEHICLES; AND PROVIDING MAXIMUM FEES TO BE CHARGED 
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTIONS 41-20-1, 41-20-3, AND 41-20-4.5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BV CHAPTER 15, LAWS OF UTAH 1974. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 41-20-1. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
15, Laws of Utah 1974, is amended to read: 
41-20-1. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) [The words "American Standard" mean] "Standard" means a stan-
dard adopted and published by the American National Standards Institute or 
the National Fire Protection Association, for recreational vehicles, and for 
mobile homes manufactured prior to June 15, 1976. For manufactured homes 
built after June 16, 1976, "standard" means the standard adopted pursuant to 
the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act 
of 1974. 
(2) [The words "mobile home" meon o vehicular, portable] "Mobile 
home" means a structure built [en~a| prior to June 15, 1976, transportable in 
one or more sections, which is eight body feet or more in width and 32 body 
feet or more in length, and which is built on a permanent chassis and 
designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation [m 
o dwelling] when connected to [mdieated] required utilities, and includes the 
plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein. 
(3) "Manufactured home" means a structure built after June 16, 1976, 
transportable in one or more sections, which is built orTa permanent chassis 
and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent founda-
tion when connected to required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, 
air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein. Modular or pre-
built homes conforming to the Uniform Building Code and presently regu-
lated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development which are not 
constructed on a chassis are exempt from this act. 
[(£)] {4} [The words "travel trailer" meon] Travel trailer means a vehicu-
lar, portable unit, mounted on wheels, not requiring special highway move-
ment permits when drawn by a motorized vehicle: 
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(a) Designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational and vacation 
use; arid 
(b) When factory-equipped for the road, having a body width of not more 
than eight feet and a body length of not more than forty feet. 
[fty^Fhe-words " motor-hen^"-mefm| (5) "Motor home" means a self-pro-
pelled vehicular unit, primarily designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, 
recreational and vacation use. 
|(£)j~T^~wef^"recreotio^ | (6) "Recreational vehicle" 
means a vehicular unit, other than a mobile home, primarily designed as a 
temporary dwelling for travel, recreational and vacation use, which is either 
self-propelled or is mounted on or pulled by another vehicle, including but 
not limited to: a travel trailer, a camping trailer, a truck camper, [an4| a 
motor home, a fifth wheel trailer, and a van 
|(^-The word-'person"] (7) "Person" includes any individual, firm, part-
nership, corporation, or other legal entity. 
(8) "Salvage vehicle" means a mobile home, manufactured home, or rec-
reational vehicle which is unfit for human habitation, to the extent that it is 
no longeTTeasible or desirable to bring it into conformity with the standards. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Secjion 41-20-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
15, Layys of Utah 1974, is amended to read: 
41-20-3J. Rental, sale or lease of mobile home, recreational vehicle, manufac-
tured home, salvage vehicle—Seals or labels required. 
(1) Every mobile home or recreational vehicle manufactured after July 1, 
1970 which is rented, leased, sold, or offered for sale in this state after the 
effective date of this act. shall bear a seal issued by the |atote--of--Utnh| 
department of business reflation certifying that the plumbing, heating, non-
electrical illumination [a«3j, electrical systems, and fire life safety of each 
mobile home or recreational vehicle are installed in compliance with the 
[American" Standard| standards for mobile homes or recreational vehicles 
applicable at the time of manufacture. 
(2) Every mobile home manufactured after April 1, 1974, which is 
rented,j leased, sold or offered for sale in this state shall bear a seal issued by 
the state of Utah certifying that the body and frame is designed and con-
structed and that the plumbing, heating, and electrical system is installed in 
compliance with the [American Standard] standards applicable at the time of 
manufacture. 
(31_AH manufactured homes built after June 15, 1976, shall have labels 
affixed to them required by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment to certify compliance. 
(4) A salvage vehicle sold or offered for sale in this state shall bear a seal 
issued by the department of business regulation certifying that it does not 
comply with the standards for recreational vehicles, mobile homes, or manu-
factured homes and may not be used for human habitation without complying 
with those standards. 
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[(3)] (5) The department of business regulation, or a person duly autho-
rized by the department, may issue a seal either on inspection of the plans 
for, or on actual inspection of, the mobile home, manufactured home, or rec-
reational vehicle. 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 41-20-4.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chap-
ter 15, Laws of Utah 1974, is amended to read: 
41-20-4.5. Fees. 
The department of business regulation shall collect in advance [the follow-
wg] fees [in carrying out the purposes of this net] not exceeding: 
(1) [For-each seal issued in accordance with section 41 20 3, a fee of $2 
for each mobile home or recreational vehicle containing only one, and $6 for 
lowing systems: plumbing, heating; nonelectrical illumination^ or electrical:] 
For multiple system seals, $15; for single system seals, $6; 
(2) [(Q) For filing each set of plans and specifications with the depart 
ment ond for each filing of additions, deletions, or alterations to the plans or 
specifications, $5] For filing each set of plans and specifications, $35; 
[(b) For filing body and frame design requirements with the deportment, 
Cfe) 
(3) For each [plumbing fixture ond eoch electrical system described in 
the plans ond specifications, $3.00] model included in an application for plan 
approval, $10; 
(4) For each [fuel burning heot producing opplionce described in the 
plons ond specifications, $4.00) plumbing, fuel burning heat producing, and 
electrical system included in a recreational vehicle, $20; 
[(5) For each nonelectrical illuminating opplionce described in the plans 
[(6)] (5) For renewing the certification of each set of plans or speci-
fications [which moy be] required by the department [of business regulation, 
UQ] , $20; 
[ O ] (6) F° r fte'd inspection or field technical service when required by 
the department of business regulation or when requested by a manufacturer 
or seller of mobile homes, manufactured homes, or recreational vehicles and 
with the approval of the department [of business regulation, $11 for the first 
hour ond $5.50 for eoch odditionni thirty minutes or fraction thereof] , $20 
per inspection and $10 for re-inspection; 
[(8) For filing o change of nome; address, or ownership of o mobile home 
(7) For filing a change of name, address, or ownership of a manufacturer, 
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I W I 15) Filing of in-plant quality control manual, [$1] $10; 
[flOf-For- oH4-of-stote inspection or field technical-
[(n) Totol travel cost between Salt Lake Citv. Utnh. nnd the point of 
importation^ *md] 
[(c) Reimbursement for food and lodging consistent with allowances estab 
tisfred4»y-4fre-finonce deportment for ihe~s4ft*e~of4^4fthr] 
(9) For instate in-plant inspections, the frequency of which shall be deter-
mined by the de partment based on product ion rate, $20 her hour for recrea-
tional vehicle manufacturers ancT$25 per hour for manufactured housing man-
ufacturers; 
(10) For out-of-state in-plant inspections, the frequency of which shall be 
determined by the department based on production rate or field technical ser-
vice, $20 per hour for recreational vehide manufacturers for time actually 
spend in the manufacturing facility plus air fare, current per diem, and neces-
sary ground transportation; and 
(11) For salvage seals, $15. 
Approved March 28, 1981. 
CHAPTER 178 
S. B. N6. 237 (Passed Mp.rch 11. 1981. In effect May 12, 1981.) 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT 
AN ACT RELATING TO MOBILE HOME PARKS; PROVIDING FOR THE REGULATION 
OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MOBILE HOME PARKS ANP MOBILE HOME PARK 
RESIDENTS; PROVIDING RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND REMEDIES FOR MOBILE HOME 
PARKS AND MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENTS. 
Be it exacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section; 1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the ''Mobile Home Park Res-
idency /Vet." 
Section' 2. Purpose. 
The- fundamental right to own and protect land and to establish conditions 
for its iise by others necessitate that the owner of a mobile home park be pro-
vided with speedy and adequate remedies against those who abuse the terms 
of a tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile homes, the requirements of 
mobile|home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of landscaping 
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and lot preparation necessitate that the owners of mobile homes occupied 
within mobile home parks be provided with protection from actual or con-
structive eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide protection for 
both the owners of mobile homes located in mobile home parks and for the 
owners of mobile home parks. 
Section 3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in one or more sec-
tions with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems contained within the 
unit, which when erected on a site, may be used with or without a permanent 
foundation as a family dwelling. 
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on which two or more 
mobile home spaces are leased, or offered for lease or rent, to accommodate 
mobile homes for residential purposes. 
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents space in a 
mobile home park. 
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land within a mobile 
home park designed to accommodate one mobile home. 
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of occupying a mobile 
home space, and may include service charges and fees. 
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for the use of elec-
trical and gas service improvements which exit at a mobile home space, or for 
trash removal, sewage and water, or any combination of the above. 
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resident's tenancy includ-
ing, but not limited to, late fees, charges for pets, charges for storage of rec-
reational vehicles, charges for the use of park facilities, and security deposits. 
(8) "Change of use" means a change of the use of a mobile home park, 
or any part of it, for a purpose other than the rental of mobile home spaces. 
Section 4. Termination of lease by park owner—Requirement for lease agree-
ment. 
(1) No mobile home park or its agents shall terminate a lease or rental 
agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this chapter. 
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be written, 
signed by the parties, and contain at least the following information: 
(a) Name and address of the mobile home park owner, or a person autho-
rized to act for the owner, upon whom notice and service of process may be 
served; 
(b) Type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or periodic; 
(c) Full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and other fees presently 
being charged on a periodic basis; 
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(d) Date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, and service charges 
are duje; and 
(e) All rules that pertain to the mobile home park which, if broken, may 
constitute grounds for eviction. 
(3) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall be unenforceable 
until 60 days after notice of the increase is mailed to the resident. If service 
chargejs are not included in the rent, service charges may be increased during 
the leasehold period after notice to such resident is given, and decreases in 
utility rates shall be passed through to the resident. 
The mobile home park may not alter the date or dates on which rent, 
fees, and service charges are due unless a 60-day written notice precedes the 
alteration. 
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreason-
ably limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unen-
forceable. The mobile home park may, however, reserve the right to approve 
the prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resi-
dent, but such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. I he mobile home 
park may require proof of ownership as a condition of approval. The mobile 
home |iark may unconditionally refuse to approve any purchaser of a mobile 
home who does not register prior to purchase. 
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to advertise 
for sale or sell such resident's mobile home; provided, that it mnv limit the 
size of a "for sale" sign affixed to the mobile home to not more than 144 
square inches. 
(6)! No mobile home park may compel a resident who desires to sell such 
residents mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to sell it through an 
agent designated by the mobile home park. 
.. _ i 
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may 
require that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if: 
(a) The mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications; or 
(b) The mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair. 
Section 5. Grounds for terminating lease. 
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park 
may be terminated during its term by mutual agreement or for any one or 
more of the following causes: 
(1) Failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule for a 
period of 15 days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the mobile 
home park; 
(2) Repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile home park rule, 
if the original notice of noncompliance states that another violation of the 
same or a different rule might result in forfeiture without any further period 
of cure; 
Ch. 178 MOBILE HOMES AND PARKS [1000] 
(3) Behavior by a resident which substantially endangers the security and 
health of the other residents or threatens the property in the park; 
(4) Nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges; 
(5) A change in the land use or condemnation of the mobile home park 
or any part of it. 
Section 6. Action for lease termination—Prerequisite procedure. 
(1) No legal action based upon a cause set forth in section 5, as grounds 
for termination of a lease, shall be commenced; except, in accordance with 
the following procedure: 
(a) Before issuance of any summons and complaint, the mobile home park 
shall send written notice as outlined in section 78-36-6 to the resident effected 
which sets forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is one which can be 
cured, the time within which the resident has to cure, and also sets forth the 
time after which the mobile home park may commence legal action against 
the resident if cure is not effected, as follows: 
(i) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park rule, the notice 
shall provide for a 15-day cure period except in the case of repeated viola-
tions and, further, that if cure is not timely effected, or a written agreement 
made between the mobile home park and the resident allowing for a variation 
in the rule or cure period, eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately; 
(ii) In the event of repeated violations or behavior by a resident that 
endangers the well-being of persons or property, summons and complaint 
may be issued three days after a notice is served; 
(iii) In the event of behavior by a resident that substantially endangers the 
well-being or property of other residents, eviction proceedings may com-
mence immediately; 
(iv) In the event of nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges, the 
notice shall provide a three-day cure period and further, that if cure is not 
timely effected, or a written agreement made between the mobile home park 
and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure period, eviction 
proceedings may be initiated immediately; and 
(v) In the event of a planned change in land use or condemnation of the 
park, the notice shall provide that the resident has 90 days after receipt of the 
notice to vacate the mobile home park if no governmental approval or per-
mits incident to the planned change are required, and if governmental 
approval and permits are required, that the resident has 90 days to vacate the 
mobile home park after all permits or approvals incident to the planned 
change are obtained. 
(b) If the planned change in land use or condemnation requires the 
approval of a governmental agency, the mobile home park, in addition to the 
notice required by subsection (1) (a) (iii) of this section, shall send written 
notice of the date set for the initial hearing to each resident at least seven 
days before the date scheduled for the initial hearing. 
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(c) Regardless of whether the change of use requires the approval of any 
governmental agency, if the resident was not a resident of the mobile home 
park at the time the initial change of use notice was issued to residents, writ-
ten notice of the change of use must have been given to the resident prior to 
the inception of residency. 
Section 7. Rules of parks. 
(1) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related to the health, 
safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and 
upkeep of such park. No change in rule that is unconscionable is valid. No 
new or amended rule shall take effect, nor provide the basis for an eviction 
notice, until the expiration of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each 
resident, as a condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be pro-
vided with a copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in their 
lease agreement. 
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material used, and the 
methods used in the installation of, underskirting, awnings, porches, fences, 
or other additions or alterations to the exterior of a mobile home, and may 
also specify the tie-down equipment used in a mobile home space, in order to 
insure the safety and good appearance of the park; but under no circum-
stances may it require a resident to purchase such material or equipment from 
a supplier designated by the mobile home park. 
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit fee, nor 
installation fee, but reasonable landscaping and maintenance requirements 
may be; included in the mobile home park rules. The resident is responsible 
for all costs incident to connection of the mobile home to existing mobile 
home park facilities and for the installation and maintenance of the mobile 
home 0n the mobile home space. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a mobile home 
park frpm requiring a reasonable initial security deposit. 
Section 8. Payment of rent and fees during pendency of eviction proceeding. 
If aj resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, fees, and 
service charges due and incurred during the pendancy of the action shall be 
paid into court according to the current mobile home park payment schedule. 
Failure I of the resident to pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the 
court, constitute grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the 
mobile J home park. Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, 
the coUrt shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home 
park. The prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attor-
ney's f£es. 
Section'9. Lienholder's liability for rent and fees. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 38-3-2 and section 70A-9-317, 
the lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily liable to the mobile 
home park owner or operator for rent and service charges if a mobile home is 
not removed within 10 days after receipt of written notice that a mobile home 
has bee|n abandoned or that a writ of restitution has been issued, The lien-
holder,! however, is only liable for rent that accrues after receipt of such 
notice. 
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Section 10. Utility service to mobile home parks—Limitation on providers' 
charges. 
Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those administered 
by municipalities and counties which provide water, sewer, or garbage collec-
tion services shall not receive a greater percentage net return from supplying 
a mobile home park than said entity receives from other residential custom-
ers. The net return is determined by taking into consideration the costs of 
maintenance and depreciation of the mobile home park facilities and all sav-
ings on administrative costs, including cost of billing residents. 
Section 11. Rights and remedies not exclusive. 
The rights and remedies granted by this chapter are cumulative and not 
exclusive. 
Section 12. Waiver of rights and duties prohibited. 
No park or resident may agree to waive any right, duty, or privilege con-
ferred by this chapter. 
Approved March 26, 1981. 
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H B. No. 57 (Passed March 12, 1981. In effect May 12, 1981.) 
MULT1STATE HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE MLU/TISTATE HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION AGREE-
MENT PROPOSED FOR ADOPTION BY THE VARIOUS STATES OF THE UNITED 
STATES; RATIFYING THAT AGREEMENT AND ENACTING IT INTO LAW; SPECI-
FYING THE FINDINGS AND PURPOSES OF THAT AGREEMENT; DEFINING CERTAIN 
TERMS AS USED THEREIN; PROVIDING FOR GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE 
AGREEMENT; CREATING AND SPECIFYING THE DUTIES OF A COOPERATING 
COMMUTER; SPECIFYING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING JURISDIC-
TIONS; PROVIDING FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE AND WITHDRAWAL; PROVIDING 
FOR CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY; PROVIDING FOR THE FILING OF DOCU-
MENTS; PROVIDING FOR THE RETENTION OF EXISTING LAWS RELATING TO 
WEIGHT AND SIZE STANDARDS AND SPECIAL PERMITS UNTIL CHANGED BY LAW; 
AND AUTHORIZING STATE OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES TO COOPERATE WITH 
THAT COOPERATING COMMITTEE. 
THIS ACT ENACTS SECTIONS 41-23-1 AND 41-23-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah-
Section 1. Section enacted. 
Section 41-23-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
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41-23-1. Enactment. 
Th<fe Multistate Highway Transportation Agreement is hereby enacted into 
law anp entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein. 
Section! 2. Section enacted. 
Secjtion 41-23-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
41-23-4. Text. 
Thd text of this agreement is as follows: 
MULTISTATE HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT 
Pursuant to and in conformity with the laws of their respective jurisdic-
tions, the participating jurisdictions, acting by and through their officials law-
fully authorized to execute this agreement, do mutually agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Findings and Purposes 
Section 1. Findings. The participating jurisdictions find that: 
(a) The expanding regional economy depends on expanding transportation 
capacity; 
(b) Highway transportation is the major mode for movement of people 
and goods in the western states; 
(c) Uniform application in the West of more adequate vehicle size and 
weight standards will result in a reduction of pollution, congestion, fuel con-
sumption, and related transportation costs, which are necessary to permit 
increased productivity; 
(d) A number of western states, already having adopted substantially the 
1964 Bureau of Public Roads recommended vehicle size and weight stan-
dards, still find current federal limits more restrictive; 
(e) The 1^ 74 revision of federal law (23 U.S.C. 127) did not contain any 
substantial improvements for vehicle size and weight standards in the western 
states and deprives states of interstate matching money if vehicle weights and 
widths are increased, even though the interstate system is nearly 92% com-
plete; and 
(f) The participating jurisdictions are most capable of developing vehicle 
size and weight standards most appropriate for their economy and trans-
portation requirements, consistent with and in recognition of principles of 
highway safety. 
Section 2. Purposes. The purposes of this agreement are to: 
(a) Adhere to the principle that each participating jurisdiction should have 
the freedom to develop vehicle size and weight standards that it determines to 
be most appropriate to its economy and highway system. 
TabG 
CHAPTER 70—MANUFACTURED HOME CONSTRUCTION 
A N D SAFETY STANDARDS 
Sec. 
5401. Congressional declaration of purposes. 
5402. Definitions. 
5403. Construction and safety standards. 
(a) Establishment pursuant to orders of Secretary; consultation with 
Consumer Product Safety Commission; reasonableness; con-
sideration of State and local Jaws. 
(b) Notice and hearing 
(c) Effective date ol orders establishing standards. 
(d) Supremacy of Federal standards 
(e) Amendment or revocation by Secretary; effective date. 
(0 Criteria. 
(g) Time for issuance of order establishing initial standards, 
(h) Coverage; exclusion 
(i) Manufactured housing construction and safety standards, 
(j) New performance standards for hardboard siding. 
5404. National Manufactured Home Advisory Council. 
(a) Appointment; composition; appointments without regard to civil 
service laws; publication of names of members and designa-
tion of members representing general public. 
(b) Consultation by Secretary with Council prior to establishment, 
etc., of standards 
(c) Compensation; per diem; travel expenses. 
5405. Judicial review of orders establishing standards. 
(a) Petition; additional evidence before Secretary. 
(b) Certified copy of transcript 
5406. Submission of cost or other information by manufacturer. 
(a) Purpose of submission; detail of information. 
(b) Conditions upon availability to public of submitted information 
(c) Establishment, etc., of standards on basis of submitted informa-
tion; publication of notice in Federal Register by Secretary' to 
allow comment by interested parties. 
(d) "Cost information" defined. 
(e) Power of Secretary to obtain or require submission of informa-
tion under other provisions unaffected. 
5407. Research, testing, development, and training by Secretary. 
(a) Scope ol program. 
(b) Contracts and giants with Stales, interstate agencies, and inde-
pendent institutions. 
5408. Cooperation by Secretary with public and private agencies. 
5409. Prohibited acts. 
(a) Generally. 
(b) Good faith exception. 
(c) Exemption from common law liability. 
5410. Penalties. 
(a) Civil penalties 
(b) Criminal penalties 
5411. Injunctive relief. 
(a) Jurisdiction; petition of United States attorney or Attorney Gen 
eral; notice by Secretary to affected persons to present views 
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5411. Injunctive relief. 
(b) Criminal contempt proceedings; conduct of trial. 
(c) Venue. 
(d) Subpenas. 
(e) Designation by manufacturer of agent for service of administra-
tive and judicial processes, etc.; filing and amendment of 
designation; failure to make designation. 
5412. Noncompliance with standards or defective nature of manufactured 
home. 
(a) Administrative or judicial determination; repurchase by manu-
facturer or repair by distributor or dealer; reimbursement of 
expenses, etc., by manufacturer. 
(b) Injunctive relief against manufacturer for failure to comply; 
jurisdiction and venue; damages; period of limitation. 
5413. Inspections and investigations for promulgation or enforcement of 
standards or execution of other duties. 
(a) Authority ol Secretary; results furnished to Attorney General and 
Secretary of Treasury for appropriate action. 
(b) Designation by Secretary of persons to enter and inspect facto-
ries, etc ; presentation of credentials; reasonableness and 
scope ol inspection. 
(c) Powers of Secretary. 
(d) Refusal to obey subpena or order of Secretary; order of compli-
ance by district court; failure to obey order of compliance 
punishable as contempt 
(e) Submission by manufacturer of building plans for manufactured 
homes; certification by manufacturer of conformity of building 
plans to standards. 
(0 Records, reports and information from manufacturers, distribu-
tors and dealers of manufactured homes; inspection and ex-
amination of relevant books, papers, records and documents 
by desigrrafed person. 
(g) Performance and technical data from manufacturer; persons 
required to receive notification of data. 
(h) Disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets. 
5414. Notification and correction of defects by manufacturer-. 
(a) Notice to purchaser within reasonable time after discovery of 
defect. 
(b) Notification by mail 
(c) Form and requisites of notification. 
(d) Copy to Secretary of all notices, bulletins, and communications 
sent by manufacturer to dealers arrd purchasers concerning 
defects; disclosure to public by Secretary. 
(e) Notice by Secretary to manufacturers of noncompliance with 
standards or defective nature of manufactured home; contents 
of notice; presentation by manufacturer of views; rrotice to 
purchasers of defects. 
(0 Maintenance by manufacturers of record of names and addresses 
of first purchasers of manufactured homes; procedures for 
ascertaining names arid addresses of subsequent purchasers; 
establishment arrd reasonableness of procedures for maintain-
ing records. 
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5414. Notification and correction of defects by manufacturer. 
(g) Correction of defects by manufacturer; conditions; procedures; 
contract or legal rights of purchasers or other persons unaf-
fected. 
(h) Submission to Secretary by manufacturer of plan for notifying 
owners of defects and repair of defects; approval of manufac-
turer 's remedy plan; effectuation and implementation of reme-
dy plan. 
(i) Defective or inadequately repaired manufactured homes; re-
placement with new or equivalent home or refund of purchase 
price. 
5415. Certification by manufacturer of conformity of manufactured home 
with standards; form and placement of certification. 
5416. Consumer's manual; contents. 
5417. Effect upon antitrust laws. 
5418. Use of services, research and testing facilities of public agencies and 
independent laboratories. 
5419. Inspection fees. 
5420. Failure to report violations; penalties. 
5421. Prohibition on waiver of rights. 
5422. State enforcement. 
(a) Jurisdiction of State agency or court under State law. 
(b) Assumption of responsibility for enforcement of Federal stan-
dards; submission of enforcement plan to Secretary. 
(c) Criteria for approval of State plan by Secretary. 
(d) Notice and hearing prior to rejection by Secretary of State plan. 
(e) Discretionary enforcement by Secretary of standards in State 
having approved plan. 
(f) Annual evaluation by Secretary of execution of State plan; basis 
of evaluation; submission of evaluation and data to Congress; 
determination by Secretary of improper administration, etc., of 
State plan; procedure; effect of determination. 
5423. Grants to States. 
(a) Purposes. 
(b) Designation by Governor of State agency for receipt of grant. 
(c) Submission of application by State agency to Secretary; review 
by Secretary. 
(d) Amount of Federal share; equality of distribution of funds. 
5424. Rules and regulations. 
5425. Reports to Congress. 
(a) Contents of biennial report. 
(b) Recommendations of biennial report. 
(c) Study and report of State inspection requirements and proce-
dures for used manufactured homes; time for submission; 
contents and recommendations of report. 
5426. Authorization of appropriations. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Standards prescribed pursuant to this chapter determining qualifications for— 
Insurance availability for financial institutions for housing renovation and 
modernization, see 12 USCA § 1703. 
Loan qualifications for housing and buildings on adequate farms, see 42 
USCA § 1472. 
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WESTLAW COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH 
WESTLAW supplements your legal research in many ways. WESTLAW 
allows you to 
• update your research with the most current information 
• expand your library with additional resources 
• retrieve direct history, precedential history and parallel citations with the 
Insta-Cite service 
For more information on using WESTLAW to supplement your research, see 
the WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide, which follows the Explanation. 
S 5 4 0 1 • C o n g r e s s i o n a l d e c l a r a t i o n of p u r p o s e s 
The Congres s dec l a r e s that the p u r p o s e s of this c h a p t e r a r e to 
reduce the n u m b e r of p e r s o n a l injuries a n d d e a t h s a n d the a m o u n t of 
insurance cos ts a n d p r o p e r t y d a m a g e resu l t ing from m a n u f a c t u r e d 
home acc iden t s a n d to i m p r o v e the qual i ty a n d durabi l i ty of m a n u -
factured h o m e s . Therefore , the Congre s s d e t e r m i n e s tha t it is neces -
sary to es tabl i sh Fede ra l cons t ruc t i on a n d safety s t a n d a r d s for m a n u -
factured h o m e s a n d to a u t h o r i z e m a n u f a c t u r e d h o m e safety r e s e a r c h 
and deve lopmen t . 
(Pub.L. 93 383, Title VI, § 602, Aug. Z2, 1974, 88 Stat. 700; Pub.L. 96-399, 
Title III, § 308(c)(4), Oct. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1641; Pub.L. 97-35, Title III, 
§ 339B(c), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 417.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1974 Acts. Senate Report No 93 693 
and House Conference Report No 
93-1279, see 1974 U.S. Code Cong and 
Adm. News, p. 4273. 
1980 Acts. Senate Report Nos 96-736, 
96-724, and 96-7)6, and House Confer-
ence Report No. 96-1420, see 1980 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 3506 
1981 Acts. Senate Report No. 97-139 
and House Conference Report No 
97-208, see 198! U.S. Code Cong and 
Adm. News, p. 396. 
Codifications 
References to "mobile homes", wherev-
er appearing in text, were ihanged to 
"manufactured homes" in view of the 
amendment of Title VI of the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974 
(this chapter) by section 308(c)(4) ol 
Pub.L. 96-399 requiring the substitution 
of "manufactured home" for "mobile 
home" wherever appearing in Title VI of 
the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, and section 339B(c) of 
Pub.L. 97-35 (set out as a note under 
section 1703 of Title 12, Banks and Bank-
ing) providing that the terms "mobile 
home" and "manufactured home" shall 
be deemed to include the terms "mobile 
homes" and "manufactured homes", re-
spectively. 
Amendments 
1980 Amendments. Pub.L. 96-399 sub-
stituted "manufactured home" for "mo-
bile home" wherever appearing. 
Effective Dates 
1974 Acts. Section 628 of Pub.L. 
93-383 provided that: "The provisions of 
this title [enacting this chapter and provi-
sions set out as a note under this section] 
shall take effect upon the expiration of 
42 § 5401 PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE Ch. 70 
180 days following the date of enactment Stat. 1641, provided that: "This title 
of this title [Aug. 22, 1974]." [which enacted this chapter and provi-
Short Title sions set out as a note under this section] 
1974 Acts. Section 601 of Pub.L. may be cited as the National Manufac-
93-383, as amended by Pub.L 96-399, tured Housing Constniction and Safety 
Title III, § 308(c)(5), Oct. 8, 1980, 94 Standards Act of 1974." 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law 
Mobile homes, construction and safety standards, see 24 C.F.R. § 3280.1 et seq., 
3282.1 et seq. 
American Digest System 
Building health and safety laws in general; motor homes included as dwellings, 
see Health and Environment <5=»32. 
Products liability action against manufacturers of buildings or building compo-
nents or materials, see Products Liability <®=>42. 
Encyclopedias 
Building health and safety laws in general; motor homes included as dwellings, 
see C.J.S. Health and Environment §§ 28 et seq., 31. 
Products liability action against manufacturers of buildings or building compo-
nents or materials, see C.J.S. Products Liability § 50. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Health and environment cases: 199k[add key number]. 
Products liability cases: 313ak[add key number]. 
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Private right of action 1 though electrical and plumbing modifica-
Sales contracts 2 tions to mobile home had not been ap-
proved as allegedly required by Mobile 
1. Private right of action Home Act. Wests RCWA 43:22 34<K433, 
The National Manufactured Housing i n that neither this chapter nor Mobile 
Construction and Safety Standards Act of Home Act contained provision rendering 
1974 creates no private right of action in sales contract in violation of Mobile 
favor of purchasers of allegedly defective Home Act void, and only statutory penal-
manufactured or mobile homes against ty in Mobile Home Act provided that any 
the manufacturers or sellers of such. person who violated provision of the Act 
Heuer v. Forest Hill State Bank, D.Md
 i ) t f a g r o s s misdemeanor. Ste-
F^d 402 PP* **" V K > ™ S t 0 n 1 9 8 ° ' 6 B P 2 d , 2 H ' 2 6 
2. Sales contracts 
Promissory note given for purchase of 
mobile home was enforceable even 
§ 5 4 0 2 . Definitions 
Wash.App. 731. 
As used in this chapter, the term— 
(1) "manufactured home construction" means all activities 
relating to the assembly and manufacture of a manufactured 
home including but not limited to those relating to durability, 
quality, and safety; 
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(2) "dealer" means any person engaged in the sale, leasing, or 
distribution of new manufactured homes primarily to persons 
who in good faith purchase or lease a manufactured home for 
purposes other than resale; 
(3) "defect" includes any delect in the performance, construc-
tion, components, or material of a manufactured home that 
renders the home or any part thereof not fit for the ordinary use 
for which it was intended; 
(4) "distributor" means any person engaged in the sale and 
distribution of manufactured homes for resale; 
(5) "manufacturer" means any person engaged in manufac-
turing or assembling manufactured homes, including any person 
engaged in importing manufactured homes for resale; 
(6) "manufactured home" means a structure, transportable in 
one or more sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight body 
feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length, or, 
when erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square 
feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to 
be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation 
when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumb-
ing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained 
therein; except that such term shall include any structure which 
meets all the requirements of this paragraph except the size 
requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer volun-
tarily files a certification required by the Secretary and complies 
with the standards established under this chapter; 
(7) "Federal manufactured home construction and safety stan-
dard" means a reasonable standard for the construction, design, 
and performance of a manufactured home which meets the 
needs of the public including the need for quality, durability, and 
safety; 
(8) "manufactured home safety" means the performance of a 
manufactured home in such a manner that the public is protect-
ed against any unreasonable risk of the occurrence of accidents 
due to the design or constniction of such manufactured home, or 
any unreasonable risk of death or injury to the user or to the 
public if such accidents do occur; 
(9) "imminent safety hazard" means an imminent and unrea-
sonable risk of death or severe personal injury; 
(10) "purchaser" means the first person purchasing a manu-
factured home in good faith for purposes other than resale; 
(11) "Secretaiy" means the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development; 
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(12) "State" includes each of the several States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin 
Islands, the Canal Zone, and American Samoa; and 
(13) "United States district courts" means the Federal district 
courts of the United States and the United States courts of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, the 
Canal Zone, and American Samoa. 
(Pub.L. 93-383, Title VI, § 603, Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 700; Pub.L. 96-399, 
Title III, § 308(c)(4), (d), Oct. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1641; Pub.L. 97-35, Title III, 
§ 339B(c), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 417.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
home" and "manufactured home" shall 
be deemed to include the terms "mobile 
homes" and "manufactured homes", re-
spectively. 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1974 Acts. Senate Report No 93-693 
and House Conference Report No 
93-1279, see 1974 U.S. Code Cong and 
Adm. News. p. 4273. 
1980 Acts. Senate Report Nos 96 736, 
96-724, and 96-716, and House Confer-
ence Report No. 96-1420, see 1980 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm. News, p 3506. 
1981 Acts. Senate Report No. 97-139 
and House Conference Report No. 
97-208, see 1981 U.S. Code Cong, and 
Adm. News, p. 396. 
References in Text 
For definition of Canal Zone, referred 
to in pars. (12) and (13), see section 
3602(b) of Title 22, Foreign Relations and 
Intercourse. 
Codl ficat ions 
References to "mobile homes", wherev-
er appearing in text, were changed to 
"manufactured homes" in view of the 
amendment of Title VI of the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974 
(this chapter) by section 308(c)(4) of 
Pub.L. 96-399 requiring the substitution 
of "manufactured home" lor "mobile 
home" wherever appearing in title VI of 
the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, and section 3398(c) of 
Pub.L. 97-35 (set out as a note under 
section 1703 of Title 12, Banks and Bank-
ing) providing that the terms "mobile 
Amendments 
1980 Amendments. Pars. (1) to (3). 
Pub.L. 96-399, § 308(c)(4), substituted 
"manufactured home" for "mobile 
home" wherever appearing. 
Par. (6). Pub.L. 96-399, § 308(c)(4), 
(d), substituted "manufactured home" for 
"mobile home", substituted "in the trav-
eling mode, is eight body feet or more in 
width or forty body feet or more in 
length, or, when erected on site, is three 
hundred twenty or more square feet" for 
"is eight body feet or more in width and 
is thirty-two body feet or more in length" 
and added exception relating to inclusion 
of any structure meeting all requirements 
of this paragraph except size and with 
respect to which a certification is volun-
tarily filed and standards complied with. 
Pars. (7), (8), (10). Pub.L. 96-399, 
§ 308(c)(4), substituted "manufactured 
home" for "mobile home" wherever ap-
pearing. 
Effective Dates 
1974 Acts. Section effective upon the 
expiration of 180 days following Aug. 22, 
1974, see section 628 of Pub.L. 93-383, 
set out as a note under section 5401 of 
this title. 
CROSS R E F E R E N C E S 
"Residential manufactured home" having same meaning as under this section for 
purposes of— 
Alternative mortgage transactions, see 12 USCA § 3802. 
Mortgage related security definition, see 15 USCA § 78c. 
Preemption of due-on-sale prohibitions ot National Housing provisions, see 12 
USCA§ 170I.J-3. 
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"Residential manufactured home" having same meaning as under this section for 
purposes of—Cont'd 
State laws limiting mortgage interest or related charges, see 12 USCA 
§ 1735f-7a. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
See WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
N OTES OF DECISIONS 
Rules and regulations 1 sign could be approved which permitted 
removal of structure's chassis, was mere 
1. Rules and regulations restatement of law which did not have to 
Standard letter mailed by Housing and J>e ^ ^ l ssued as "interpretative bul-
Urban Development official to manufac l e t , n pursuant to HUD s procedural reg-
tured housing design inspectors, in which ulations. Association for Regulatory Re-
official merely rearticulated statutory Ian- form v. Pierce, 1988, 849 F.2d 649, 270 
guage in advising inspectors that no de- U.S.App.D.C. 318. 
§ 5403. Construction and safety standards 
(a) Establishment pursuant to orders of Secretary; consultation 
with Consumer Product Safety Commission; reasonableness; 
consideration of State and local laws 
The Secretary, after consultation with the Consumer Product Safe-
ty Commission, shall establish by order appropriate Federal manu-
factured home construction and safety standards. Each such Feder-
al manufactured home standard shall be reasonable and shall meet 
the highest standards of protection, taking into account existing State 
and local laws relating to manufactured home safety and construc-
tion. 
(b) Notice and hearing 
All orders issued under this section shall be issued after notice and 
an opportunity for interested persons to participate are provided in 
accordance with the provisions of section 553 of Title 5. 
(c) Effective date of orders establishing standards 
Each order establishing a Federal manufactured home construc-
tion and safety standard shall specify the date such standard is to 
take effect, which shall not be sooner than one hundred and eighty 
days or later than one year after the date such order is issued, unless 
the Secretary finds, for good cause shown, that an earlier or later 
effective date is in the public interest, and publishes his reasons for 
such finding. 
(d) Supremacy of Federal standards 
Whenever a Federal manufactured home construction and safety 
standard established under this chapter is in effect, no State or 
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Chapter 1 
Brief History of the Banufactured Home Industry 
We can only shake our heads in amazement when we see a present day 
manufactured home. We realize Just how far industry has progressed since the 
early "trailers" of the forties. It was only after the end of World War II 
that the trailers pulled by automobiles began to be used for permanent housing. 
Most of those "house trailers" were units eight feet wide and 25 to 30 feet 
long. As the public demand for these small mobile housing units Increased, 
they were made more livable by enlarging them to ten and 12 foot widths. In 
the middle sixties, units of 12 feet and 14 feet widths were Introduced and 
became quite popular. At the same time, the lengths of the homes also 
Increased from an average of 50 feet 1n the late fifties to 70 feet by the 
late sixties. During that same time, the Industry saw a sharp increase 1n the 
popularity of double wide homes (two units joined together) and moved the 
units toward a more Hs1te-bu1It" appearance. 
One of the major problems for the Industry during these periods was a lack 
of uniformity in the state approved manufacturing standards of these homes. 
The manufactured housing Industry, in conjunction with the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA), and the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), developed and promoted the use of ANSI Standard A119.1 for mobile home 
body and frame designed construction. Not all states and local jurisdictions 
were willing to adopt this or any standard; by 1972 only 36 states had laws 
covering manufactured home construction. This lack of uniformity 1n the 
regulation and inspection of the homes made it difficult for the manufacturers 
to ship Interstate. 
In the late 1960's and early 1970,s, the state governments, working through 
the National Conference of States on Building Codes and Standards, Inc. 
(NCSBCS). and in conjunction with the industry, identified the need to esta-
blish a program of interstate reciprocity for the regulation of manufactured 
(mobile) housing. Over several years, NCSBCS held meetings and drafted model 
reciprocity procedures in an attempt to establish a workable voluntary Inter-
state reciprocity program aimed at improving the health and life safety 
features of manufactured housing. 
- 5 -
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By 1974, several well publicized health, durability and life safety 
problems 1n manufactured homes made It apparent that a voluntary program would 
not work, and federal legislation to preempt (under the Interstate commerce 
clause) the states' regulatory authority over manufactured housing was written. 
In early 1974, Congress passed Title VI of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, "The National Mobile Home Construction and Safety 
Standards Act."* That law became enforceable on June 15, 1976. In assuming 
this regulatory authority, Congress recognized the Importance of Involving the 
states to the fullest extent possible** 1n the federal program. 
The federal law, standards, and rules and regulations provided relief for 
the manufacturer 1n that they mandated a single preemptive Federal Standard 
for homes to be constructed and established the mechanism for uniformity In 
the Inspection procedures. The creation of the federal law was a leap forward 
for the Industry as 1t now could ship freely Into any other state without 
repercussions. At the same time, the Introduction of the federal program 
moved the Industry upward 1n quality, durability, and safety. 
In the Initial years of the federal program there was a shake out where 
some manufacturers stopped producing manufactured housing rather than meet a 
minimum Federal Standard. This coincided with a financial downturn 1n the 
nation's economy and a decline In the sales of manufactured housing. 
* See Appendix C. The Federal Act was amended 1n 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 
and 1982. 
** That legislative Intent 1s clearly shown 1n Sections 609 and 614(b)(2) of 
Title VI of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, and the Senate 
Report which accompanied the Act which "contemplated that to the maximum 
extent, the enforcement of standards would be taken on by the states under 
plans approved by the Secretary." Section 1974 U.S. Code Cong, and Ad News 
4340 and HUD's own regulatory requirements note that the Secretary 1s to 
"Involve state agencies In the enforcement of the Federal Manufactured Home 
Standards to the maximum extent possible consistent with the capabilities of 
such agencies and public Interest." (Paragraph [b]t Section 3282.1 Scope and 
Purpose. Subpart [A] - General of the May 13, 1976 Manufactured Home 
Procedural and Enforcement Regulations). 
- 6 -
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In the late 1970* s and early 1980's, however, the changes In the market-
ability* of manufactured homes coupled with an Increase In the quality, dura-
bility, and safety of homes due to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) program, helped stimulate the growth of the manufactured 
housing industry. 
By 1985 approximately 12 million Americans lived 1n manufactured homes.** 
In 1984-85 manufactured housing accounted for over 50X of the total new single-
family residences constructed or sited 1n the states of Oregon and South 
Carolina. During this same time period, HUD's Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) began to provide permanently-sited manufactured homes with 30 year 
mortgage loans at the same Interest rates as s1te-bu1lt structures. The 
Veterans Administration (VA) followed that practice 1n 1984. The secondary 
mortgage market for manufactured home loans was picked up by the Government 
National Mortgage Association, Federal National Mortgage Association, and 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and a secondary market program for 
manufactured housing personal property loans also was established.*** 
As this program reached Its tenth year, the participating states began to 
see several problem areas that needed resolution. The mechanisms for handling 
consumer complaints were not functioning adequately. There appeared to be a 
decline among some manufacturers In product durability. The Federal Standards 
needed to be updated to reflect changes 1n technology and the needs of Industry 
and consumers. In addition, the states were very concerned that attempts to 
keep the Federal Standards updated had failed. Noting on one hand that 
Industry had supported meaningful change 1n the regulation of formaldehyde 
within the Federal Standards as a means of counteracting the negative press 
they had received on this Issue, the states expressed concern that similar 
industry support was not forthcoming on the other equally Important aspects of 
the outdated Federal Standards such as condensation and energy conservation. 
* The sales of manufactured housing Increased proportionately with the 
dramatic Increase 1n mortgage rates for single-family, site-built housing. 
** For an analysis of the demographics of manufactured home residents, see 
1980 Census of Housing, Series HC80-3-2; Mobile Homes, U.S. Census Department. 
Also see Appendix B. 
*** See Appendix D. 
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State regulatory officials 1n particular noted that the referenced 
standards used under the HUO program were similar to the uniform model 
building codes used throughout the country In s1te-bu11t housing at the time 
the federal program began. This being the case, the states as partners 1n the 
federal program expressed concern that the older Federal Standards were 
further eroding the arguments they put forth on behalf of the Industry In 
zoning hearings throughout the country that manufactured housing and 
s1te-bu1lt housing are relatively comparable. 
In the Spring of 1985, therefore, the governor-appointed delegates of 
NCSBCS passed a resolution calling upon HUD to enter Into a dialogue with the 
states on ways of Improving this Important federal program. Subsequently, 
during the NCSBCS 18th Annual Conference 1n Portland, Maine 1n September 1985, 
a symposium was held on the "Role of the States In the Federal Manufactured 
Housing Program." During that symposium, HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Single Family Housing James Nlstler urged the states to establish within their 
national organization a forum through which the states could collectively 
review the strengths and weaknesses of the federal program. 
The NCSBCS State Task Force on the Federal Manufactured Housing Program 
was created 1n September 1985 as a forum for the states to collectively assess 
problem areas and bring them to the appropriate parties for resolution. In 
establishing the task force, the NCSBCS Board of Directors approved funding 
for the project from state government and membership services accounts and 
prohibited the task force from commenting on the NCSBCS manufactured housing 
program monitoring contract with HUD.* Further background on the composition 
and work of the task force are contained in Chapter 7, "Overview of Task 
Force's Activities." 
* See Appendix E. 
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57-15-6 REAL ESTATE Ui 
57-15-6. Exempt l ende r s . 
This chapter is not applicable to security interests in real 
estate originated by, or for purchase by any entity established 
pursuant to Title 9, Chapter 4, Part 9, or by public agencies 
making noninterest and/or low interest loans and noninterest 
and/or low interest loans made by private nonprofit corpora-
tions for the rehabilitation of existing residential structures. 
This chapter is not applicable to a person with a security 
interest in real estate who is not regularly engaged in the 
business of making real estate loans. 1995 
57-15-7. Cal l ing e n t i r e b a l a n c e on i m p a i r m e n t of secu-
rity. 
If the lender's security interest is substantially impaired, 
according to the standard of Section 57-15-3, the lender may 
call the entire loan balance due, if that option is provided for 
in the original loan agreement, though the lender may not 
charge any penalty or increased interest for prepayment of the 
indebtedness made as a result of the call. 1981 
57-15-8. P r o c e d u r e for a s s u m p t i o n — Reques t to 
l ende r — Effect of fa i lure to r e q u e s t — Ap-
prova l o r refusal by l e n d e r — In fo rmat ion 
furn i shed by lender . 
(1) In order to effect an assumption under this chapter the 
original borrower, or, if the secured party has previously 
approved, and pursuant to that approval there has been 
effected, an assumption of the indebtedness secured by an 
instrument representing a security interest in real estate, the 
person last approved as an assumer and who has assumed the 
indebtedness shall give to the lender a written notice and 
request for assumption. The lender shall either approve or 
reject a prospective assumer within 30 days after the written 
notice and request for assumption is received from the original 
borrower or the party last approved as an assumer. The lender 
may refuse to release the original borrower or the party last 
approved as an assumer and who has assumed if the secured 
party has previously approved the assumption of the indebt-
edness, from liability for the payment of the indebtedness to 
be assumed. With respect to any transfer involving an as-
sumption effected after the effective date of this act, if the 
written notice and request for an assumption is not timely 
made before a transfer or within 90 days after transfer, the 
lender may call the entire loan balance due without a deter-
mination that the security interest is substantially impaired, 
if that option is provided for in the original loan agreement. 
(2) The lender shall provide the original borrower or, if the 
indebtedness has been assumed with the previous approval of 
the lender, the person last approved with a statement of loan 
condition within 14 days after receipt of written notice and 
request. The statement shall include the following informa-
tion: (a) the amount of the unpaid balance on the secured loan; 
(b) the interest rate; (c) the amount of the monthly loan 
installment; (d) the date or dates any real estate taxes and 
special assessments were last paid; (e) the amount of hazard 
insurance in effect if that information is contained in the 
records of the lender; and (f) the amount of any impound 
balance reserve for payments of taxes, special assessments, 
and insurance. 1981 
57-15-8.5. Accelera t ion — Cond i t ions a u t h o r i z i n g — 
Exempt ion of loans sold to federa l agenc ies . 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 57-15-2 and 
57-15-4, a lender or secured party may accelerate or mature 
an indebtedness upon assumption of that indebtedness if: 
( D A written agreement with, or a written instrument 
executed by, the obligor on the indebtedness allows the 
secured party or lender to accelerate or mature the 
indebtedness and/or increase the interest rate thereon 
upon assumption of the indebtedness; and 
(2) The secured party or lender has offered to acc»*i 
the assumption without acceleration and without mat\nj 
ing the indebtedness provided the assumer agree to H the secured party or lender not more than a 1% assumj 
tion fee, a not more than 1% interest rate incre^J 
effective as of the date of assumption, whichever is earli^S 
and a further not more than 1% interest rate increaMi 
effective a date five years after the date of assumption! 
whichever is earlier. Neither of said interest rate j*] 
creases may cause the total interest rate on the indebted! 
ness to exceed 1% below the weighted average yield of thj 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation weekly auoJ 
tion for purchases of mortgages secured by residential 1 \A 
4 family dwellings in effect on the date of the increase! 
and 
(3) The assumer has refused to consent to such a& 
sumption fee and interest rate increases. 
As used in this section, the term "obligor" shall mean the] 
original borrower or, if the secured party or lender hai' 
previously approved, and pursuant to that approval there has' 
been effected, an assumption of the indebtedness, the person' 
last approved as an assumer and who has assumed the 
indebtedness. 
If a determination is made by the Federal National InsuK 
ance Corporation or by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation that it will not purchase Utah mortgage loam, 
because of the effects of this act, and such determination ii 
communicated in writing to the Legislature or governor of thill 
state, then this act will not apply, after receipt of such' 
communication, to any mortgages originated after the effec-
tive date of this act and sold to the entity making such 
determination. 1961 
57-15-9. Liabi l i ty for d a m a g e s caused by violat ion. 
A lender violating any provision of this act, in addition to 
any other penalties provided by law, shall be liable to an 
injured party for actual damages plus all reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs incurred by the injured party because of 
the violation. 1981 
57-15-10. Severab i l i ty of provis ions . 
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of the chapter shall not be impaired thereby. 1981 
57-15-11. L imi ta t ion on enforcement of due-on-sale 
c lauses . 
After October 15, 1985, this chapter applies to any instru-
ment described in Section 57-15-2 that: 
(1) was originated in this state by a financial institu-
tion other than a national bank, a federal savings and 
loan association, a federal thrift institution, or a federal 
credit union; and 
(2) was made or assumed during the period beginning 
on May 12, 1981, and ending on October 15, 1982. 19# 
CHAPTER 16 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 
Section 
57-16-1. 
57-16-2. 
57-16-3. 
57-16-4. 
57-16-5. 
57-16-6. 
Short title. 
Purpose of chapter. 
Definitions. 
Termination of lease or rental agreement ^ 
Required contents of lease — Increases U* 
rents or fees — Sale of homes. 
Cause required for terminating lease ~" 
Causes — Cure periods — Notice. 
Action for lease termination — Prerequisite 
procedure. 
p*11 57-16-5 
Section 
57-16-7. 
67-16-7.5. 
57-16-8. 
57-16-9. 
57-16-10. 
57-16-11. 
57-16-12. 
57-16-15.1 
57-16-1. ! 
Rules of parks. 
Payment of rent required after notice — Sum-
mary judgment. 
Payment of rent and fees during pendency of 
eviction proceeding. 
Lienholder's liability for rent and fees. 
Utility service to mobile home parks — Limi-
tation on providers' charges. 
Rights and remedies not exclusive. 
Waiver of rights and duties prohibited. 
Eviction proceeding. 
Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act." 1981 
57-16-2. Purpose of chapter. 
The fundamental right to own and protect land and to 
establish conditions for its use by others necessitate that the 
owner of a mobile home park be provided with speedy and 
adequate remedies against those who abuse the terms of a 
tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile homes, the require-
ments of mobile home parks relating to their installation, and 
the cost of landscaping and lot preparation necessitate that 
the owners of mobile homes occupied within mobile home 
parks be provided with protection from actual or constructive 
eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide protection 
for both the owners of mobile homes located in mobile home 
parks and for the owners of mobile home parks. 1981 
57-16-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in 
one or more sections with the plumbing, heating, and 
electrical systems contained within the unit, which when 
erected on a site, may be used with or without a perma-
nent foundation as a family dwelling. 
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on 
which two or more mobile home spaces are leased, or 
offered for lease or rent, to accommodate mobile homes for 
residential purposes. 
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents 
space in a mobile home park. 
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land 
within a mobile home park designed to accommodate one 
mobile home. 
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of 
occupying a mobile home space, and may include service 
charges and fees. 
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for 
the use of electrical and gas service improvements which 
exist at a mobile home space, or for trash removal, sewage 
and water, or any combination of the above. 
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resi-
dent's tenancy including, but not limited to, late fees, 
charges for pets, charges for storage of recreational ve-
hicles, charges for the use of park facilities, and security 
deposits. 
(8) "Change of use" means a change of the use of a 
mobile home park, or any part of it, for a purpose other 
than the rental of mobile home spaces. 1981 
57-16-4. Termination of lease or rental agreement — 
Required contents of lease — Increases in 
rents or fees — Sale of homes. 
(1) A mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a 
lease or rental agreement upon any ground other than as 
specified in this chapter. 
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall 
be written and signed by the parties. Each lease shall contain 
at least the following information: 
(a) the name and address of the mobile home park 
owner and any persons authorized to act for the owner, 
upon whom notice and service of process may be served; 
(b) the type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or 
periodic; 
(c) a full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and 
other fees presently being charged on a periodic basis; 
(d) the date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, 
and service charges are due; and 
(e) all rules that pertain to the mobile home park 
which, if broken, may constitute grounds for eviction. 
(3) (a) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall 
be unenforceable until 60 days after notice of the increase 
is mailed to the resident. If service charges are not 
included in the rent, service charges may be increased 
during the leasehold period after notice to the resident is 
given, and increases or decreases in electricity rates shall 
be passed through to the resident. Increases or decreases 
in the total cost of other service charges shall be passed 
through to the resident. 
(b) The mobile home park may not alter the date or 
dates on which rent, fees, and service charges are due 
unless a 60-day written notice precedes the alteration. 
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or 
unreasonably limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a 
resident is void and unenforceable. The mobile home park 
may, however, reserve the right to approve the prospective 
purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resident, 
but the approval may not be unreasonably withheld. The 
mobile home park may require proof of ownership as a 
condition of approval. The mobile home park may uncondition-
ally refuse to approve any purchaser of a mobile home who 
does not register prior to purchase. 
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to 
advertise for sale or to sell his mobile home. However, the park 
may limit the size of a "for sale" sign affixed to the mobile 
home to not more than 144 square inches. 
(6) A mobile home park may not compel a resident who 
desires to sell his mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to 
sell it through an agent designated by the mobile home park. 
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it 
may require that a mobile home be removed from the park 
upon sale if: 
(a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size 
specifications; or 
(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in 
disrepair. 1997 (1st s.s.) 
57-16-5. Cause required for terminating lease — 
Causes — Cure pe r iods — Notice . 
(1) An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a 
mobile home park may be terminated by mutual agreement or 
for any one or more of the following causes: 
(a) failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home 
park rule: 
(i) relating to repair, maintenance, or construction 
of awnings, skirting, decks, or sheds for a period of 60 
days after receipt of a notice of noncompliance from 
the mobile home park; or 
(ii) relating to any other park rule for a period of 
seven days after receipt of notice of noncompliance 
from the mobile home park, except relating to main-
tenance of a resident's yard and space, the mobile 
home park may elect not to proceed with the seven-
day cure period and may provide the resident with 
written notice as provided in Subsection (2); 
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(b) repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile 
home park rule, if the original notice of noncompliance 
states that another violation of the same or a different 
rule might result in forfeiture without any further period 
of cure; 
(c) behavior by a resident which substantially endan-
gers the security and health of the other residents or 
threatens the property in the park; 
(d) nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges; 
(e) a change in the land use or condemnation of the 
mobile home park or any part of it. 
(2) If the mobile home park elects not to proceed with the 
seven-day cure period in Subsection (l)(a)(ii), a 15-day notice 
shall: 
(a) state that if the resident does not perform his duties 
or obligations under the lease agreement or rules of the 
mobile home park within 15 days, the mobile home park 
may enter onto the resident's space and cure any default; 
(b) state the expected reasonable cost of curing the 
default; 
(c) require the resident to pay all costs incurred by the 
mobile home park to cure the default by the first day of 
the month following receipt of a billing statement from 
the mobile home park; 
(d) state that the payment required under Subsection 
(2Kb) shall be considered additional rent; and 
(e) state that the resident's failure to make the pay-
ment required by Subsection (2Kb) in a timely manner 
shall be a default of the resident's lease and shall subject 
the resident to all other remedies available to the mobile 
home park for a default, including remedies available for 
failure to pay rent. 1997 (1st S.S) 
57-16-6. Action for lease termination — Prerequisite 
procedure. 
A legal action to terminate a lease based upon a cause set 
forth in Section 57-16-5 may not be commenced except in 
accordance with the following procedure: 
(1) Before issuance of any summons and complaint, the 
mobile home park shall send or serve written notice to the 
resident or subtenant: 
(a) by delivering a copy of the notice personally; 
(b) by sending a copy of the notice through regis-
tered or certified mail addressed to the resident or 
subtenant at his place of residence; 
(c) if the resident or subtenant is absent from his 
place of residence, by leaving a copy of the notice with 
some person of suitable age and discretion at his 
residence and sending a copy through the mail ad-
dressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of 
residence; or 
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot 
be found, by affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicu-
ous place on the resident's or subtenant's mobile 
home and also sending a copy through the mail 
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of 
residence. 
(2) The notice shall set forth the cause for the notice 
and, if the cause is one which can be cured, the time 
within which the resident has to cure. The notice shall 
also set forth the time after which the mobile home park 
may commence legal action against the resident if cure is 
not effected, as follows: 
(a) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile 
home park rule, the notice shall provide for a cure 
period as provided in Subsections 57-16-5(l)(a) and 
(2), except in the case of repeated violations and, shall 
state that if a cure is not timely effected, or a written 
agreement made between the mobile home park and 
the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or 
cure period, eviction proceedings may be initiated 
immediately. 
(b) If the resident commits repeated violations of
 a 
rule, a summons and complaint may be issued three 
days after a notice is served. 
(c) If a resident behaves in a manner that substan-
tially endangers the well-being or property of other 
residents, eviction proceedings may commence imme-
diately. 
(d) If a resident does not pay rent, fees, or service 
charges, the notice shall provide a five-day cure 
period and, that if cure is not timely effected, or a 
written agreement made between the mobile home 
park and the resident allowing for a variation in the 
rule or cure period, eviction proceedings may be 
initiated immediately. 
(e) If there is a planned change in land use or 
condemnation of the park, the notice shall provide 
that the resident has 90 days after receipt of the 
notice to vacate the mobile home park if no govern-
mental approval or permits incident to the planned 
change are required, and if governmental approval 
and permits are required, that the resident has 90 
days to vacate the mobile home park after all permits 
or approvals incident to the planned change are 
obtained. 
(3) If the planned change in land use or condemnation 
requires the approval of a governmental agency, the 
mobile home park, in addition to the notice required by 
Subsection (2)(e), shall send written notice of the date set 
for the initial hearing to each resident at least seven days 
before the date scheduled for the initial hearing. 
(4) Regardless of whether the change of use requires 
the approval of any governmental agency, if the resident 
was not a resident of the mobile home park at the time the 
initial change of use notice was issued to residents the 
owner shall give notice of the change of use to the resident 
before he occupies the mobile home space. 
(5) (a) Eviction proceedings commenced under this 
chapter and based on causes set forth in Subsections 
57-16-5(1 )(a), (b), and (e) shall be brought in accor-
I dance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall not be treated as unlawful detainer actions 
under Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible Entry and De-
tainer. Eviction proceedings commenced under this 
chapter and based on causes of action set forth in 
Subsections 57-16-5(l)(c) and (d) may, at the election 
of the mobile home park, be treated as actions 
brought under this chapter and the unlawful detainer 
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible Entry and 
Detainer. 
(b) If unlawful detainer is charged, the court shall 
endorse on the summons the number of days within 
which the defendant is required to appear and defend 
the action, which shall not be less than five days or 
more than 20 days from the date of service. 
1997 (1st S.S.) 
57-16-7. Rules of parks. 
(1) (a) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related 
to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents 
and to the maintenance and upkeep of such park. No 
change in rule that is unconscionable is valid. 
(b) No new or amended rule shall take effect, nor 
provide the basis for an eviction notice, until the expira-
tion of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each 
resident, as a condition precedent to such rule being in 
effect, shall be provided with a copy of each new or 
amended rule that does not appear in their lease agree-
ment. 
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(c) For 30 days after the mobile home park proposes 
amendments to the mobile home park rules, the mobile 
home park shall allow residents, individually or through a 
representative of a group of residents, the opportunity to 
meet with the mobile home park management about the 
proposed amendments. The meetings shall be held within 
15 days after receipt of written request for the meeting by 
the residents or the representative. 
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material 
used, and the methods used in the installation of, 
underskirting, awnings, porches, fences, or other additions or 
alterations to the exterior of a mobile home, and may also 
Specify the tie-down equipment used in a mobile home space, 
in order to insure the safety and good appearance of the park; 
but under no circumstances may it require a resident to 
purchase such material or equipment from a supplier desig-
nated by the mobile home park. 
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit 
fee, nor installation fee, but reasonable landscaping and 
maintenance requirements may be included in the mobile 
home park rules. The resident is responsible for all costs 
incident to connection of the mobile home to existing mobile 
home park facilities and for the installation and maintenance 
of the mobile home on the mobile home space. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a 
mobile home park from requiring a reasonable initial security 
deposit. 1997 
57-16-7.5. Payment of rent required after notice — 
Summary judgment. 
(1) (a) Any resident shall continue to pay the mobile home 
park all rent required by the lease after having been 
served with any notice pursuant to this chapter, except a 
notice for nonpayment of rent. 
(b) In cases not involving payment of rent, the mobile 
home park may accept rent without waiving any rights 
under this chapter. 
(2) If the resident fails to pay rent, the mobile home park 
shall be entitled to summary judgment for: 
(a) the rent owed; 
(b) termination of the lease; and 
(c) restitution of the premises. 
(3) The summary judgment as provided in Subsection (2) 
shall be granted even if a five-day notice to pay or quit was not 
served, so long as another appropriate notice under this 
chapter has been served. 1997 
57-16-8. Payment of rent and fees during pendency of 
evict ion proceeding. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all 
rents, fees, and service charges due and incurred during the 
pendency of the action shall be paid into court according to the 
current mobile home park payment schedule. Failure of the 
resident to pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the 
court, constitute grounds for granting summary judgment in 
favor of the mobile home park. Upon final termination of the 
issues between the parties, the court shall order all amounts 
paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The prevailing 
party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees. 1981 
57-16-9. Lienholder's liability for rent and fees. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 38-3-2 and Sec-
tion 70A-9-317, the lienholder of record of a mobile home is 
primarily liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for 
rent and service charges if a mobile home is not removed 
within 10 days after receipt of written notice that a mobile 
home has been abandoned or that a writ of restitution has 
been issued. The lienholder, however, is only liable for rent 
that accrues after receipt of such notice. 1981 
57-16-10. Utility service to mobile home parks — Limi-
tation on providers' charges. 
Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those 
administered by municipalities and counties which provide 
water, sewer, or garbage collection services shall not receive a 
greater percentage net return from supplying a mobile home 
park than said entity receives from other residential custom-
ers. The net return is determined by taking into consideration 
the costs of maintenance and depreciation of the mobile home 
park facilities and all savings on administrative costs, includ-
ing cost of billing residents. 1981 
57-16-11. Rights and remedies not exclusive. 
The rights and remedies granted by this chapter are cumu-
lative and not exclusive. 1981 
57-16-12. Waiver of rights and duties prohibited. 
No park or resident may agree to waive any right, duty, or 
privilege conferred by this chapter. 1981 
57-16-15.1. Eviction proceeding. 
(1) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter 
and based on causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-
5(1), (2), and (5), and eviction proceedings commenced under 
this chapter based on causes of action set forth in Subsections 
57-16-5(3) and (4), where a landlord elects to bring an action 
under this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer 
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible Entry and De-
tainer, shall comply with the following: 
(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff may: 
(i) include an order of restitution of the premises; 
and 
(ii) declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(b) The jury, or the court if the proceedings are tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of 
the following: 
(i) waste of the premises during the resident's 
tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and 
proved; and 
(ii) the amount of rent due. 
(c) If the lease or agreement provides for reasonable 
attorneys' fees, the court shall order reasonable attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party. 
(d) Whether or not the lease or agreement provides for 
court costs and attorneys' fees, if the proceeding is con-
tested, the court shall order court costs and attorneys'fees 
to the prevailing party. 
(e) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(f), after judg-
ment has been entered under this section, judgment and 
restitution may be enforced no sooner than 15 days from 
the date the judgment is entered. The person who com-
mences the action shall mail the judgment to the lease 
premises by registered mail within five days of the date 
the judgment is entered. 
(f) If a resident tenders to the mobile home park 
postjudgment rent, in the form of cash, cashier's check, or 
certified funds, then restitution may be delayed for the 
period of time covered by the postjudgment rent, which 
time period shall not exceed 15 days from the date of the 
judgment unless a longer period is agreed to in writing by 
the mobile home park. 
(2) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter 
and based on causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-
5(3) and (4), in which the mobile home park has elected to 
treat as actions also brought under the unlawful detainer 
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible Entry and De-
tainer, shall be governed by Sections 78-36-10 and 78-36-10.5 
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with respect to judgment for restitution, damages, rent, en-
forcement of the judgment and restitution. 
(3) The provisions in Section 78-36-10.5 shall apply to this 
section except the enforcement time limits in Subsections 
(1 He) and (f) shall govern. 1994 
CHAPTER 17 
RESIDENTIAL RENTERS' DEPOSITS 
Section 
57-17-1. 
57-17-2. 
57-17-3. 
57-17-4. 
57-17-5. 
Return or explanation of retainage upon termi-
nation of tenancy. 
Non-refundable deposit — Written notice re-
quired. 
Deductions from deposit — Written itemization 
— Time for return. 
Holder of owner's or designated agent's interest 
bound by provisions. 
Failure to give renter required notice — Recovery 
of deposit, penalty and costs. 
57-17-1. Return or explanation of retainage upon ter-
mination of tenancy. 
Owners or designated agents requiring deposits however 
denominated from renters leasing or renting residential 
dwelling units shall either return those deposits at the termi-
nation of the tenancy or provide the renter with written notice 
explaining why any deposit refundable under the terms of the 
lease or rental agreement is being retained. 1981 
57-17-2. Non-refundable deposit — Written notice re-
quired. 
If there is a written agreement and if any part of the deposit 
is to be made non-refundable, it must be so stated in writing to 
the renter at the time the deposit is taken by the owner or 
designated agent. 1981 
57-17-3. Deductions from deposit — Written itemiza-
tion — Time for return. 
Upon termination of the tenancy, property or money held as 
a deposit may be applied, at the owner's or designated agent's 
option, to the payment of accrued rent, damages to the 
premises beyond reasonable wear and tear, other costs pro-
vided for in the contract and cleaning of the unit. The balance 
of any deposit and prepaid rent, if any, and a written itemiza-
tion of any deductions from the deposit, and reasons therefor, 
shall be delivered or mailed to the renter within 30 days after 
termination of the tenancy or within 15 days after receipt of 
the renter's new mailing address, whichever is later. The 
renter shall notify the owner or designated agent of the 
location where payment and notice may be made or mailed. If 
there is damage to the rented premises, this period shall be 
extended tv> 30 days. 1981 
57-17-4. Holder of owner ' s or de s igna ted agent's inter-
est bound by provis ions . 
The holder of the owner's or designated agent's interest in 
the premises at the time of termination of the tenancy shall be 
bound by the provisions of this act. 1981 
57-17-5. Failure to give renter required notice — Re-
covery of deposit, penalty and costs. 
If the owner of a residential unit or his agent in bad faith 
fails within 30 days after termination of the tenancy or wTithin 
15 days after receipt of the renter's new mailing address, 
whichever is later, to provide the renter the notice required in 
Section 57-17-3, the renter may recover the full deposit, a civil 
penalty of $100, and court costs. Receipt of new address must 
occur within 30 days of termination of tenancy. 1983 
CHAPTER 18 
LAND CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT 
Section 
57-18-1. Short title. 
57-18-2. Definition and characteristics of conservation 
easement. 
57-18-3. Acquisition of conservation easement. 
57-18-4. Requirements for creation. 
57-18-5. Termination. 
57-18-6. Enforcement. 
57-18-7. Conservation easement not obtained through 
eminent domain. 
57-18-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Land Conservation Easement 
Act." 1985 
57-18-2. Definition and characteristics of conservation 
easement. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "conservation easement" means 
an easement, covenant, restriction, or condition in a deed, will, 
or other instrument signed by or on behalf of the record owner 
of the underlying real property for the purpose of preserving 
and maintaining land or water areas predominantly in a 
natural, scenic, or open condition, or for recreational, agricul-
tural, cultural, wildlife habitat or other use or condition 
consistent with the protection of open land. 
(2) A conservation easement is an interest in land and runs 
with the land benefited or burdened by the easement. 
(3) A conservation easement is valid whether it is appurte-
nant or in gross. 
(4) A conservation easement is enforceable by the holder to 
the easement and its successors and assigns. A conservation 
easement is enforceable against the grantor and its successors 
and assigns. 1985 
57-18-3. Acquisition of conservation easement. 
A charitable organization which qualifies as being tax 
exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
or a governmental entity may acquire a conservation ease-
ment by purchase, gift, devise, grant, lease, or bequest. 1985 
57-18-4. Requirements for creation. 
(1) Any property owner may grant a conservation easement 
to any other qualified person as defined in Section 57-18-3 in 
the same manner and with the same effect as any other 
conveyance of an interest in real property. 
(2) A conservation easement shall be in writing and shall be 
recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which the 
easement is granted. 
(3) The instrument that creates a conservation easement 
shall identify and describe the land subject to the conservation 
easement by legal description, specify the purpose for which 
the easement is created, and include a termination date or a 
statement that the easement continue in perpetuity. 
(4) Any qualified person, as defined in Section 57-18-3, that 
receives a conservation easement shall disclose to the ease-
ment's grantor, at least three days prior to the granting of the 
easement, the types of conservation easements available, the 
legal effect of each easement, and that the grantor should 
contact an attorney concerning any possible legal and tax 
implications of granting a conservation easement. 1985 
57-18-5. Termination. 
A conservation easement may be terminated, in whole or in 
part, by release, abandonment, merger, nonrenewal, condi-
tions set forth in the instrument creating the conservation 
easement, or in any other lawful manner in which easements 
may be terminated. 1985 
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transferred, any of the sounds referred to in Sections 
13-10-3 and 13-10-4 (other than from the sound track of a 
motion picture) intended for, or in connection with, broad-
cast transmission or for archival purposes; or 
(b) any person transferring any such sounds without 
any compensation being derived by this person or any 
other person from the transfer. 
(2) This chapter shall neither enlarge nor diminish the 
rights of parties in civil litigation. 1095 
13-10-6. Violation a misdemeanor. 
Each violation of Section 13-10-4 is a misdemeanor. 1995 
13-10-7. Application of provisions. 
Sections 13-10-1 through 13-10-6 apply only to recorded 
sounds that were initially fixed before February 15, 1972. 
1995 
13-10-8. Failure to disclose the origin of a recording — 
Penalty. 
(1) For purposes of this section "recording" means: 
(a) a tangible medium on which sounds or images are 
recorded or otherwise stored, including an original pho-
nograph record, disc, tape, audio or video cassette, wire, 
film, or other similar medium; or 
(b) a copy or reproduction that duplicates the original 
in whole or in part. 
(2) A person is guilty of failure to disclose the origin of a 
recording if: 
(a) the person commits any of the following acts for 
commercial advantage or private financial gain: 
(i) offers a recording for sale, resale, or rent; 
(ii) sells, resells, rents, leases, or lends a recording; 
or 
(iii) possesses a recording for any of the purposes 
described in Subsection (2)(a)(i) or (ii); and 
(b) the person knows that the recording does not con-
tain the true name and address of the manufacturer in a 
prominent place on its cover, jacket, or label. 
(3) A person who fails to disclose the origin of a recording 
under Subsection (2) is guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the third degree if the offense involves 
100 or more recordings during a 180-day period or if the 
person has previously been convicted of a violation of this 
section; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor if the offense involves at 
least ten recordings but less than 100 recordings during a 
180-day period; or 
(c) a class B misdemeanor if the offense involves less 
than ten recordings. 
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in Subsection (3), a 
court may order a person who commits a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) to forfeit any recordings in the person's possession that 
served as the basis for the violation of Subsection (2). 1995 
CHAPTER 11 
CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
Section 
13-11-1. 
13-11-2. 
13-11-3. 
13-11-4. 
13-11-5. 
13-11-6. 
13-11-7. 
13-11-8. 
Citation of act. 
Construction and purposes of act. 
Definitions. 
Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
Unconscionable act or practice by supplier. 
Service of process. 
Duties of enforcing authority — Confidential-
ity of identity of persons investigated — 
Civil penalty for violation of restraining or 
injunctive orders. 
Powers of enforcing authority. 
Section 
13-11-9. 
13-11-10 to 13-
13-11-16. 
13-11-17. 
13-11-17.5. 
13-11-18. 
13-11-19. 
13-11-20. 
13-11-21. 
13-11-22. 
13-11-23. 
Rule-making requirements. 
11-15. Repealed. 
Investigatory powers of enforcing authority. 
Actions by enforcing authority. 
Costs and attorney's fees. 
Noncompliance by supplier subject to other 
state supervision — Cooperation of enforcing 
authority and other official or agency. 
Actions by consumer. 
Class actions. 
Settlement of class action — Complaint in 
class action delivered to enforcing authority. 
Exemptions from application of act. 
Other remedies available — Class action only 
as prescribed by act. 
13-11-1. Citation of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act." 1973 
13-11-2. Construction and pu rposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the follow-
ing policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law govern-
ing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer 
sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales prac-
tices not inconsistent with the policies of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administra-
tive rules, with respect to the subject of this act among 
those states which enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith 
comply with the provisions of this act. 1973 
13-11-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly 
or indirectly for money, credit, property, financial assis-
tance, or any other thing of value on the plea or represen-
tation that it will be used for a charitable purpose. A 
charitable solicitation may be made in any manner, in-
cluding: 
(a) any oral or written request, including a tele-
phone request; 
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting of any 
handbill, written advertisement, or publication; 
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or request of 
donations for any book, card, chance, coupon, device, 
magazine, membership, merchandise, subscription, 
ticket, flower, flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, 
trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other article in 
connection with which any appeal is made for any 
charitable purpose, or where the name of any chari-
table organization or movement is used or referred to 
as an inducement or reason for making any purchase 
donation, or where, in connection with any sale or 
donation, any statement is made that the whole or 
any part of the proceeds of any sale or donation will 
go to or be donated to any charitable purpose. A 
charitable solicitation is considered complete when 
made, whether or not the organization or person 
making the solicitation receives any contribution or 
makes any sale. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assign-
ment, award by chance, or other written or oral transfer 
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or disposition of goods, services, or other property, both 
tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), 
to a person for primarily personal, family, or household 
purposes, or for purposes that relate to a business oppor-
tunity that requires both his expenditure of money or 
property and his personal services on a continuing basis 
and in which he has not been previously engaged, or a 
solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect to any of 
these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of an agree-
ment with respect to any of these transfers or disposi-
tions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this 
section. 
(3) "Enforcing authority*' means the Division of Con-
sumer Protection. 
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any 
supporting opinion, that determines the rights of the 
parties and concerning which appellate remedies have 
been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, govern-
ment, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, 
estate, trust, partnership, association, cooperative, or any 
other legal entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, 
broker, or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, 
or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he 
deals directly with the consumer. 1987 
13-11-4. Decept ive ac t or p r ac t i ce by suppl ier . 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection 
with a consumer transaction violates this chapter whether it 
occurs before, during, or after the transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier 
commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly 
or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, 
accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, 
if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
is new, or unused, if it is not, or has been used to an extent 
that is materially different from the fact; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
is available to the consumer for a reason that does not 
exist; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
has been supplied in accordance with a previous repre-
sentation, if it has not; 
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction 
will be supplied in greater quantity than the supplier 
intends; 
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it 
is not; 
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it 
does not; 
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, ap-
proval, or affiliation the supplier does not, have; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or 
does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, 
particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or 
obligations, if the representation is false; 
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, 
discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering 
into a consumer transaction in return for giving the 
supplier the names of prospective consumers or otherwise 
helping the supplier to enter into other consumer trans-
actions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event 
occurring after the consumer enters into the transaction; 
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, failgf^ 
ship the goods or furnish the services within the timS 
advertised or otherwise represented or, if no specific tim3 
is advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods oS 
furnish the services within 30 days, unless within thri 
applicable time period the supplier provides the buyd 
with the option to either cancel the sales agreement and 
receive a refund of all previous payments to the supply 
or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed 
by the supplier, but any refund shall be mailed or deliv, 
ered to the buyer within ten business days after the seller 
receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's 
right to cancel the sales agreement and receive the 
refund; 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to 
cancel a direct solicitation sale within three business days 
of the time of purchase if the sale is made other than at 
the supplier's established place of business pursuant to 
the supplier's mail, telephone, or personal contact and if 
the sale price exceeds $25, unless the supplier's cancella-
tion policy is communicated to the buyer and the policy 
offers greater rights to the buyer than Subsection (2)(m), 
which notice shall be a conspicuous statement written in 
dark bold at least 12 point type, on the first page of the 
purchase documentation, and shall read as follows: "YOU, 
THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY 
TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSI-
NESS DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's can-
cellation policy but not less than three business days) 
AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR RE-
CEIPT OF THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER,"; 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyra-
mid scheme as defined under Title 76, Chapter 6a, Pyra-
mid Scheme Act; or 
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in 
response to a charitable solicitation will be donated or 
used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used 
by a particular organization, if the representation is false. 
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13-11-5. Unconsc ionab le ac t o r p rac t i ce by supplier . 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in 
connection with a consumer transaction violates this act 
whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question 
of law for the court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that 
an act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties shall be 
given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its 
setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscio-
nable, the court shall consider circumstances which the sup-
plier knew or had reason to know. 1973 
13-11-6. Service of p rocess . 
In addition to any other method provided by rule or statute, 
personal jurisdiction over a supplier may be acquired in a civil 
action or proceeding instituted in the district court by the 
service of process in the following manner. If a supplier 
engages in any act or practice in this state governed by this 
act, or engages in a consumer transaction subject to this act, 
he may designate an agent upon whom service of process may 
be made in this state. The agent must be a resident of or a 
corporation authorized to do business in this state. The 
designation must be in writing and filed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code. If no designation is made 
and filed, or if process cannot be served in this state upon the 
designated agent, whether or not the supplier is a resident of 
this state or is authorized to do business in this state, process 
may be served upon the director of the Division of Corpora-
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jmd Commercial Code, but service upon him is not 
e unless the plaintiff promptly mails a copy of the 
and pleadings by registered or certified mail to the 
[ant at his last reasonably ascertainable address. An 
t of compliance with this section must be filed with the 
of the court on or before the return day of the process, if 
0r within any future time the court allows. 1991 
IHll-7. Dut ies of enforc ing a u t h o r i t y — Confidential-
i ty of iden t i ty of p e r s o n s inves t iga ted — Civil 
pena l ty for v iola t ion of r e s t r a i n i n g o r in junc-
t ive o rde r s , 
jffi The enforcing authority shall: 
(a) enforce this chapter throughout the state; 
(b) cooperate with state and local officials, officials of 
other states, and officials of the federal government in the 
administration of comparable statutes; 
(c) inform consumers and suppliers on a continuing 
basis of the provisions of this chapter and of acts or 
practices that violate this chapter including mailing in-
formation concerning final judgments to persons who 
request it, for which he may charge a reasonable fee to 
cover the expense; 
(d) receive and act on complaints; and 
(e) maintain a public file of final judgments rendered 
tinder this chapter that have been either reported offi-
cially or made available for public dissemination under 
Subsection (l)(c), final consent judgments, and to the 
extent the enforcing authority considers appropriate, as-
surances of voluntary compliance. 
|{2) In carrying out his duties, the enforcing authority may 
publicly disclose the identity of a person investigated 
\ his identity has become a matter of public record in an 
brcement proceeding or he has consented to public disclo-
{3) On motion of the enforcing authority, or on its own 
tion, the court may impose a civil penalty of not more than 
5,000 for each day a temporary restraining order, prelimi-
injunction, or permanent injunction issued under this 
pter is violated, if the supplier received notice of the 
tig or injunctive order. Civil penalties imposed under 
! section shall be paid to the General Fund. 1987 
| M l - 8 . P o w e r s of enforc ing au thor i ty . 
(1) The enforcing authority may conduct research, hold 
blic hearings, make inquiries, and publish studies relating 
^consumer sales acts or practices. 
j|2) The enforcing authority shall adopt substantive rules 
*t prohibit with specificity acts or practices that violate 
ion 13-11-4 and appropriate procedural rules. 1973 
| fr l l -9. Ru le -making r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
11) In addition to complying with other rule-making re-
HWrements imposed by this act, the enforcing authority shall: 
(a) adopt as a rule a description of the organization of 
wis office, stating the general course and method of 
operation of his office and method whereby the public may 
obtain information or make submissions or requests; 
(b) adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and 
requirements of all formal and informal procedures avail-
able, including a description of the forms and instructions 
used by the enforcing authority of his office; and 
(c) make available for public inspection all rules, writ-
ten statements of policy, and interpretations formulated, 
adopted, or used by the enforcing authority in discharging 
bis functions. 
f A rule of the enforcing authority is invalid, and may not voked by the enforcing authority for any purpose, until it ^ n made available for public inspection under Subsec-
tion (1). This provision does not apply to a person who has 
knowledge of a rule before engaging in an act or practice that 
violates this act. 1973 
13-11-10 to 13-11-15. Repea l ed . 1983, 1988 
13-11-16. Inves t iga to ry p o w e r s of enforc ing author i ty . 
(1) If, by his own inquiries or as a result of complaints, the 
enforcing authority has reason to believe that a person has 
engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in an act or 
practice that violates this act, he may administer oaths and 
affirmations, subpoena witnesses or matter, and collect evi-
dence. 
(2) If matter that the enforcing authority subpoenas is 
located outside this state, the person subpoenaed may either 
make it available to the enforcing authority at a convenient 
location within the state or pay the reasonable and necessary 
expenses for the enforcing authority or his representative to 
examine the matter at the place where it is located. The 
enforcing authority may designate representatives, including 
officials of the state in which the matter is located, to inspect 
the matter on his behalf, and he may respond to similar 
requests from officials of other states. 
(3) Upon failure of a person without lawful excuse to obey a 
subpoena and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected, 
the enforcing authority may apply to the court for an order 
compelling compliance. 
(4) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against 
self-incrimination, testimony and evidence from the witness 
may be compelled pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 22b, Grants of 
Immunity. 1997 
13-11-17. Act ions by enforc ing au thor i ty . 
(1) The enforcing authority may bring an action: 
(a) to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or 
practice violates this chapter; 
(b) to enjoin, in accordance with the principles of eq-
uity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, or is 
otherwise likely to violate this chapter; and 
(c) to recover, for each violation, actual damages, or 
obtain relief under Subsection (2Kb), on behalf of consum-
ers who complained to the enforcing authority within a 
reasonable time after it instituted proceedings under this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) The enforcing authority may bring a class action on 
behalf of consumers for the actual damages caused by an 
act or practice specified as violating this chapter in a rule 
adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection 
13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on which the 
action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 
13-11-5 by final judgment of courts of general jurisdiction 
and appellate courts of this state that was either reported 
officially or made available for public dissemination under 
Subsection 13-ll-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority ten 
days before the consumer transactions on which the 
action is based, or, with respect to a supplier who agreed 
to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent 
judgment that became final before the consumer transac-
tions on which the action is based. 
(b) (i) On motion of the enforcing authority and with-
out bond in an action under this subsection, the court 
may make appropriate orders, including appointment 
of a master or receiver or sequestration of assets, but 
only if it appears that the defendant is threatening or 
is about to remove, conceal, or dispose of the defen-
dant's property to the damage of persons for whom 
relief is requested. An appropriate order may include 
an order: 
(A) to reimburse consumers found to have 
been damaged; 
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(B) to carry out a transaction in accordance 
with consumers' reasonable expectations; 
(C) to strike or limit the application of uncon-
scionable clauses of contracts to avoid an uncon-
scionable result; or 
(D) to grant other appropriate relief. 
(ii) The court may assess the expenses of a master 
or receiver against a supplier. 
(c) If an act or practice that violates this chapter 
unjustly enriches a supplier and damages can be com-
puted with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on 
behalf of consumers who cannot be located with due 
diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pur-
suant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act. 
(d) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a 
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
cedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery 
under Subsection (2) is limited to the amount, if any, by 
which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(e) An action may not be brought by the enforcing 
authority under Subsection (2) more than two years after 
the occurrence of a violation of this chapter. 
(3) (a) The enforcing authority may terminate an investi-
gation or an action other than a class action upon accep-
tance of the supplier's written assurance of voluntary 
compliance with this chapter. Acceptance of an assurance 
may be conditioned on a commitment to reimburse con-
sumers or take other appropriate corrective action. 
(b) An assurance is not evidence of a prior violation of 
this chapter. Unless an assurance has been rescinded by 
agreement of the parties or voided by a court for good 
cause, subsequent failure to comply with the terms of an 
assurance is prima facie evidence of a violation. 
(4) (a) In addition to other penalties and remedies set out 
under this chapter, and in addition to its other enforce-
ment powers under Title 13, Chapter 2, Division of 
Consumer Protection, the division director may issue a 
cease and desist order and impose an administrative fine 
of up to $1,000 for each violation of this chapter. 
(b) All money received through administrative fines 
imposed under this section shall be deposited in the 
Consumer Protection Education and Training Fund cre-
ated by Section 13-2-8. IMS 
13-11-17.5. Costs and attorney's fees. 
Any judgment granted in favor of the enforcing authority in 
connection with the enforcement of this chapter shall include, 
in addition to any other monetary award or injunctive relief, 
an award of reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and costs of 
investigation. 1987 
13-11-18. Noncompliance by supplier subject to other 
state supervision — Cooperation of enforcing 
authority and other official or agency. 
(1) If the enforcing authority receives a complaint or other 
information relating to noncompliance with this act by a 
supplier who is subject to other supervision in this state, the 
enforcing authority shall inform the official or agency having 
that supervision. The enforcing authority may request infor-
mation about suppliers from the official or agency. 
(2) The enforcing authority and any other official or agency 
in this state having supervisory authority over a supplier shall 
consult and assist each other in maintaining compliance with 
this act. Within the scope of their authority, they may jointly 
or separately make investigations, prosecute suits, and take 
other official action they consider appropriate. 1973 
13-11-19. Actions by consumer. 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise 
has an adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an 
action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or prac-
tice violates this chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a 
supplier who has violated, is violating, or is likely to 
violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of 
this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual 
damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs. 
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover 
damages or has an adequate remedy at law, he may bring a 
class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and 
appropriate ancillary relief against an act or practice that 
violates this chapter. 
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation 
of this chapter may bring a class action for the actual 
damages caused by an act or practice specified as violat-
ing this chapter by a rule adopted by the enforcing 
authority under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the con-
sumer transactions on which the action is based, or 
declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a final 
judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general 
jurisdiction and appellate courts of this state that was 
either officially reported or made available for public 
dissemination under Subsection 13-ll-7(l)(c) by the en-
forcing authority ten days before the consumer transac-
tions on which the action is based, or with respect to a 
supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by 
the terms of a consent judgment which became final 
before the consumer transactions on which the action is 
based. 
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter 
unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages can be 
computed with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable 
on behalf of consumers who cannot be located with due 
diligence shall be transferred to the state treasurer pur-
suant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act. 
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a 
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of pnn 
cedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery 
under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in 
which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing author-
ity, the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable 
attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that 
violates this chapter has brought or maintained an action 
he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an 
act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by 
a judgment or required by the court to be settled under 
Subsection 13-ll-21(l)(a). 
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is 
taken, a final judgment in favor of the enforcing authority 
under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence' 
of the facts on which it is based in later proceedings under this 
section against the same person or a person in privity with 
him. 
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the 
prevailing party shall mail a copy to the enforcing authority 
for inclusion in the public file maintained under Subsection 
13-ll-7(l)(e). 
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two 
years after occurrence of a violation of this chapter, or within 
one year after the termination of proceedings by the enforcing 
authority with respect to a violation of this chapter, whichever 
is later. When a supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a 
counterclaim any claim under this chapter arising out of the 
transaction on which suit is brought. 1W5 
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13-11-20. Class actions. 
(1) An action may be maintained as a class action under 
this act only if: 
(a) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable; 
(b) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class; 
(c) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 
(d) the representative parties will fairly and ad-
equately protect the interests of the class; and 
(e) either: 
(i) the prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk 
of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 
respect to individual members of the class which 
would establish incompatible standards of con-
duct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class that would as a practical 
matter dispose of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests; or 
(ii) the party opposing the class has acted or re-
fused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect 
to the class as a whole; or 
(iii) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. 
(2) The matters pertinent to the findings under Subsection 
(lXeXiii) include: 
(a) the interest of members of the class in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class; 
(c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action. 
(3) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by 
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this 
subsection may be conditional, and it may be amended before 
decision on the merits. 
(4) In a class action maintained under Subsection (l)(e) the 
sourt may direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to each member who can be identified through reason-
able effort. The notice shall advise each member that: 
(a) the court will exclude him from the class, unless he 
requests inclusion, by a specified date; 
(b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include 
all members who request inclusion; and 
(c) a member who requests inclusion may, if he desires, 
enter an appearance through his counsel. 
(5) When appropriate, an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or a 
|£kss may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated 
fe a class. 
(6) In the conduct of a class action the court may make 
iPproDriate orders: 
(a) determining the course of proceedings or prescrib-
ing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication 
in the presentation of evidence or argument; 
(b) requiring, for the protection of the members of the 
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that 
notice be given in the manner the court directs to some or 
all of the members or to the enforcing authority of any 
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the 
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify 
whether they consider the representation fair and ad-
equate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or 
otherwise to come into the action; 
(c) imposing conditions on the representative parties or 
on intervenors; 
(d) requiring that the pleadings be amended to elimi-
nate allegations as to representation of absent persons, 
and that the action proceed accordingly; or 
(e) dealing with similar procedural matters. 
(7) A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without approval of the court. Notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class as the 
court directs. 
(8) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action 
under Subsection (l)(e)(i) or (ii), whether or not favorable to 
the class, shall describe those whom the court finds to be 
members of the class. The judgment in a class action under 
Subsection (l)(e)(iii), whether or not favorable to the class, 
shall specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in 
Subsection (4) was directed, and who have requested inclu-
sion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class. 
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13-11-21. Sett lement of class action — Complaint in 
class action del ivered to enforcing authority. 
(1) (a) A defendant in a class action may file a written offer 
of settlement. If it is not accepted within a reasonable 
time by a plaintiff class representative, the defendant 
may file an affidavit reciting the rejection. The court may 
determine that the offer has enough merit to present to 
the members of the class. If it so determines, it shall order 
a hearing to determine whether the offer should be 
approved. It shall give the best notice of the hearing that 
is practicable under the circumstances, including notice to 
each member who can be identified through reasonable 
effort. The notice shall specify the terms of the offer and a 
reasonable period within which members of the class who 
request it are entitled to be included in the class. The 
statute of limitations for those who are excluded pursuant 
to this subsection is tolled for the period the class action 
has been pending, plus an additional year. 
(b) If a member who has previously lost an opportunity 
to be excluded from the class is excluded at his request in 
response to notice of the offer of settlement during the 
period specified under Subsection (a), he may not there-
after participate in a class action for damages respecting 
the same consumer transaction, unless the court later 
disapproves the offer of settlement or approves a settle-
ment materially different from that proposed in the 
original offer of settlement. After the expiration of the 
period of limitations, a member of the class is not entitled 
to be excluded from it. 
(c) If the court later approves the offer of settlement, 
including changes, if any, required by the court in the 
interest of a just settlement of the action, it shall enter 
judgment, which is binding on all persons who are then 
members of the class. If the court disapproves the offer or 
approves a settlement materially different from that 
proposed in the original offer, notice shall be given to a 
person who was excluded from the action at his request in 
response to notice of the offer under Subsection (a), and he 
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is entitled to rejoin the class and, in the case of the 
approval, participate in the settlement. 
(2) On the commencement of a class action under Section 
13-11-19, the class representative shall mail by certified mail 
with return receipt requested or personally serve a copy of the 
complaint on the enforcing authority. Within thirty days after 
the receipt of a copy of the complaint, but not thereafter, the 
enforcing authority may intervene in the class action. 1973 
13-11-22. Exemptions from application of act. 
(1) This act does not apply to: 
(a) an act or practice required or specifically permitted 
by or under federal law, or by or under state law; 
(b) a publisher, broadcaster, printer, or other person 
engaged in the dissemination of information or the repro-
duction of printed or pictorial matter so far as the infor-
mation or matter has been disseminated or reproduced on 
behalf of others without actual knowledge that it violated 
this act; 
(c) claim for personal injury or death or claim for 
damage to property other than the property that is the 
subject of the consumer transaction; 
(d) credit terms of a transaction otherwise subject to 
this act; or 
(e) any public utility subject to the regulating jurisdic-
tion of the Public Service Commission of the state of Utah. 
(2) A person alleged to have violated this act has the burden 
of showing the applicability of this section. 1973 
13-11-23. Other remedies available — Class action only 
as prescribed by act. 
The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies other-
wise available for the same conduct under state or local law, 
except that a class action relating to a transaction governed by 
this act may be brought only as prescribed by this act. 1973 
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13-lla-l. Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to prevent deceptive, mislead-
ing, and false advertising practices and forms in Utah. This 
chapter is to be construed to accomplish that purpose and not 
to prohibit any particular form of advertising so long as it is 
truthful and not otherwise misleading or deceptive. 1989 
13-lla-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Advertisement" means any written, oral, or 
graphic statement or representation made by a supplier 
in connection with the solicitation of business. It includes, 
but is not limited to, communication by noncable televi-
sion systems, radio, printed brochures, newspapers, leaf-
lets, flyers, circulars, billboards, banners, or signs. It does 
not include any oral, in person, representation made by a 
sales representative to a prospective purchaser. 
(2) To "clearly and conspicuously disclose" means: 
(a) in the print media: 
(i) to state in typeface that is sufficiently bold 
to be obviously seen; 
(ii) to state in type size of at least 10 point type 
for a 14" x 23" document, and, in larger docu-
ments, of a type size of proportionately the same 
size; and 
(iii) to place in the text so as to be obviously 
seen; 
(b) in radio advertising, to verbally state in the 
same volume as that used in the advertisement; 
(c) in television advertising, the method for print 
media or radio advertising is acceptable unless con-
trary to other governing laws. 
(3) "Generic good" means a product which is offered for 
sale under its common descriptive name rather than 
under a trademark, trade name, brand name, house 
brand, or other distinguishing appellation. 
(4) "Goods and services" means all items which may be 
the subject of a sales transaction. 
(5) "Nondiscounted price" means a price at which the 
goods or services are offered at the time of the price 
assessment without a temporary store reduction in price. 
(6) "Person" means an individual, including a con-
sumer, corporation, government, or governmental subdi-
vision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partner-
ship, unincorporated association, two or more of any of the 
foregoing having a joint or common interest, or any other 
legal or commercial entity. 
(7) "Price assessment" means the determination of the 
prices underlying a price comparison. 
(8) "Price assessor" means a firm or individual that 
determines the prices, including the reference prices, 
underlying the price comparison, or who makes the price 
comparison. 
(9) "Price comparison" means any express representa-
tion that a specific savings, reduction, or discount exists 
or will exist between the supplier's advertised price and 
another specific price. A representation which does not 
reasonably imply a comparison to identifiable prices or 
items does not express a price comparison. Language 
constituting mere sales "puffing" is not prohibited by this 
chapter. 
(10) "Product area" means the geographical area in 
which the prospective purchasers to whom the advertise-
ment is aimed could reasonably be expected to seek the 
goods or services in question. 
(11) "Reference price" means a higher price to which a 
supplier compares a lower price to indicate that a reduc-
tion in price exists or will exist. 
(12) "Regular price" means the price at which a sup-
plier has recently offered the goods or services for sale in 
good faith in the regular course of business. Every price 
represented in an advertisement is considered a regular 
price unless it is specifically represented as a price other 
than a regular price, such as a discount price or a 
manufacturer's suggested price. It is prima facie evidence 
that a price is other than a regular price when it was not 
offered as the nondiscount price of the goods or services 
for the 15 days immediately preceding an advertisement 
of the price, and the price change during the 15 day period 
was not due to price changes inherent in the pricing of 
seasonal or perishable goods, due to changes in cost of the 
goods or services to the supplier, or due to pricing changes 
made to match a competitor's price. 
(13) "Sales transaction" means a sale, lease, assign-
ment, award by chance, or other written or oral transfer 
or disposition of goods, services, or other property, both 
tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), 
to a person or business, or a solicitation or offer by a 
